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ABSTRACT
EXPLORING INTERACTIONS DURING MULTIORGANIZATIONAL
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE
VIRGINIA COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
Madeleine Wright McNamara
Old Dominion University, 2008
Director: John C. Morris, Ph.D.
Organizations face implementation challenges compounded by complex and
interconnected public problems. In the environmental arena, the inabilities of individual
organizations to resolve these problems independently are exacerbated by the scope,
duration, and tremendous diversity of tasks coupled with a lack of funding. As a result,
multiorganizational arrangements are created as public, private, and nonprofit
organizations work together to implement policy. These relationships increase
organizational capacities through the diversification of resources and expertise.
Multiorganizational implementation is complicated by various legal authorities,
missions, goals, and operational procedures that guide individual organizations. One way
to approach these complexities is to expand our understanding of the different types of
interactions that occur between organizations. The purpose of this study is to explore the
use of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration between 15 federal/state agencies,
local governments, and nongovernmental organizations when working together to
implement the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program.
Inquiry into the empirical presence of different types of multiorganizational
interactions makes two contributions to theory. First, the Multiorganizational
Implementation Model is developed and presented as a framework that utilizes the policy
implementation and interorganizational theory literatures to distinguish between

cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. A theoretical foundation for comparing
different types of interactions creates opportunities for consistent theoretical inquiry.
Second, this is the first time that a model focused on different types of
multiorganizational interactions is applied to a policy implementation setting. Broadening
the scope of current inquiry to explore different types of interactions improves our
theoretical understanding of policy implementation in multiorganizational arrangements.
A continuum of interaction may help theorists move beyond a narrow reconciliation of
the top-down/bottom-up approaches towards a fourth generation of implementation
research.
Textual data are gathered through document review and 34 semistructured
interviews. Findings support the utility of the Multiorganizational Implementation Model
in explaining interactions between organizations in this setting. In addition,
administrators perceive collaborative interactions to occur within the multiorganizational
arrangement when implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. Finally,
interactions during multiorganizational implementation are initiated formally and
informally in ways other than the current body of literature explores.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Background
Organizations often face implementation challenges compounded by inherently
complex and interconnected policy problems (O'Toole, 2000). Increased demands on
government, coupled with fewer resources, further exacerbate the inabilities of individual
organizations to independently implement public policy. As a result, public organizations
work across bureaucratic boundaries to increase government's capacity for addressing
complex problems (Kettl, 2003; Mandell, 1999). Partnerships between public, private,
and nonprofit organizations develop and interdependencies form. Multiorganizational
arrangements are increasingly used as agencies work together to implement policy by
diversifying resources and expertise (Hall & O'Toole, 2004; Keast, Mandell, Brown, &
Woolcock, 2004; O'Toole, 1993).
Implementation inevitably requires interactions across organizational boundaries
(Hjern & Porter, 1981; O'Toole, 1993). Therefore, it is important to expand our
understanding of the interactions that take place between organizations when working
together to implement policy. This study introduces the Multiorganizational
Implementation Model (MIM) to explore the use of cooperation, coordination, and
collaboration during multiorganizational policy implementation.
The policy implementation literature identifies two theoretical approaches to
policy implementation: the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. These two
approaches address implementation in different ways and emphasize different values
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(Schofield, 2001). Much of the implementation research focuses on identifying variables
specific to each approach (see, for example, Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989; O'Toole,
1986). The circuitous debate comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the top-down
and bottom-up approaches must be replaced with research identifying the variables most
critical to policy implementation (O'Toole, 1986; 2000). The number of variables, wide
variation in their perceived importance, and complexity of interactions are problematic
for theoretical advancement (Goggin, 1986; O'Toole, 1986; 2000); conceptual clarity
remains elusive. Although theorists acknowledge the importance of reconciling both
approaches, a synthesized framework based on the combined strengths of the topdown/bottom-up approaches is needed (O'Toole, 2000; Saetren, 2005).
Organizations are often mandated by legislation to implement public policy in
support of particular policy goals. Some mandates require two or more organizations to
work together during policy implementation (see, for example, Caruson & MacManus,
2006; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984; Raelin, 1982). In these instances, relationships are
likely to develop between organizations. The importance of interaction across
organizational boundaries is first acknowledged in Pressman & Wildavsky's (1973)
Implementation, where ignorance of organizational interdependence in complex decision
chains ultimately contributes to a mismatch between policy expectations and outcomes.
Despite this recognition more than three decades ago, little is done to examine
interactions during multiorganizational implementation empirically. The focus of this
research is on the different types of interactions that occur when organizations work
together to implement public policy.
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Problem Statement
The policy literature recognizes the importance and complexity of
multiorganizational implementation (see, for example, O'Toole, 1986; Pressman &
Wildavsky, 1973). However, empirical inquiry emphasizes formalized interactions based
on policy mandate, agency rulemaking, or organizational procedures (Caruson &
MacManus, 2006; Raelin, 1982). More specifically, the literature focuses on the extent to
which policies identify interorganizational partners (Hall & O'Toole, 2004), policy
characteristics that induce or constrain interdependence (May, 1995; O'Toole, 1995;
O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984), or the structures used in multiorganizational implementation
(Mandell, 1994; O'Toole, 1997). Despite a nonhierarchical nature, much of the literature
involving implementation networks also emphasizes formalized interactions based on
organized efforts (Hall & O'Toole, 2004; Mandell, 1994). The common thread among
these different approaches to the literature is that organizations are assumed to work
together in a formalized arrangement based on a requirement to do so.
There are three problems with this approach. First, it fails to consider the
possibility that multiorganizational implementation may occur outside the boundaries of
operational authority. Informal interactions between organizations are important (Keast et
al., 2004) and should be empirically examined. Second, legislators are limited in their
abilities to foresee and specify the interactions required in complex implementation
settings (O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). It is highly unlikely that policy mandates account
for all potential interactions within implementation settings. Third, the literature appears
not to have progressed beyond the top-down/bottom-up debate even though O'Toole
(2000) declared its ending nearly a decade ago. Exclusive acknowledgement of
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formalized arrangements advocates a top-down approach. In the multiorganizational
implementation literature, this approach is emphasized under the guise of alternative
nomenclature—coordination.
Collective action lies at the heart of multiorganizational implementation
(O'Toole, 1991). Researchers use terms such as cooperation, coordination, or
collaboration to describe interactions in multiorganizational implementation (Jennings &
Ewalt, 1998; Lundin, 2007; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). While these terms are often used
within the public administration, organization theory, and education literatures (see, for
example, Intriligator, 1992; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close,
& Monsey, 2001), there is much that still needs to be done to understand empirically the
nuances that distinguish these terms from one another.
A lack of conceptual clarity impacts inquiry in three ways. First, there is a
tendency to broadly categorize interaction terms with little regard for the definitions that
distinguish them from one another (Caruson & MacManus, 2006; Keast, Brown, &
Mandell, 2007; Mandell & Steelman, 2003). Without acknowledging and defining each
term, theorists cannot properly consider the range of interactions potentially useful in
multiorganizational implementation settings. Second, the appropriate application of
cooperation, coordination, and collaboration cannot be acknowledged when they are used
interchangeably. Misapplication of terms makes it difficult to identify the conditions
under which it is appropriate to use a particular type of interaction as an implementation
strategy. Third, researchers often assume an interaction occurs even though its presence is
not empirically tested (see, for example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Imperial, 2001;
Jennings & Krane, 1994; Kettl, 2003). The collective impact from these problems further
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perpetuates theoretical inconsistency. A conceptual model pertaining to the use of
different types of interactions during multiorganizational implementation is nonexistent.

Study Setting
The Virginia Coastal Zone Management (VCZM) Program provides the setting
for this study. Its mission is to protect, restore, and strengthen Virginia's coastal areas by
managing and overseeing activities that affect coastal resources. The VCZM Program is a
network of Virginia state agencies and local governments who administer state laws,
regulations, and policies to protect coastal resources. This network of organizations is
selected as the setting for this study based on their involvement in implementing a policy
mandate, a need for them to work collectively to implement this mandate, and a potential
for a variety of interactions to occur between the government and nongovernmental
organizations involved in implementing the program.

Implementing the Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program
The VCZM Program was established in 1986, by executive order, to protect
Virginia's coastal zone and in response to the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
(Kaine, 2006; United States Congress, 1972). The executive order explains the mission of
the VCZM Program, specifies policy goals, identifies the Virginia Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) as the lead agency, and requires specific state agencies to
participate in program implementation. Despite its designation as lead agency, the DEQ
does not have control over other state agencies.
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State agency involvement in the VCZM Program is specified by executive order
and classified into two categories: (1) agencies primarily responsible for implementing
the VCZM Program's enforceable policies, and (2) agencies responsible for assisting
with the VCZM Program (Kaine, 2006). These agencies are listed in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1
Virginia State Agencies Designated by Executive Order
Agencies Primarily Responsible for
Agencies Responsible for Assisting with the
Implementation of Enforceable Policies
Program
Department of Environmental Quality
Department of Historic Resources
Department of Conservation and Recreation Department of Forestry
Marine Resource Commission
Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Department of Game and Inland Fisheries
Services
Department of Health
Virginia Institute of Marine Science
Department of Transportation
Virginia Economic Development
Partnership
In Virginia's eight coastal areas, local governments are involved in the VCZM
Program through the Planning District Commissions (PDCs). The PDCs focus on coastal
management issues of greater than local concern by facilitating relationships, passing
information, and pooling resources between state and local governments (Office of Ocean
and Coastal Resource Management [OCRM], 2004). On an annual basis, the VCZM
Program awards each PDC a grant to provide local governments with technical assistance
(OCRM, 2004; Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program [VCZMP], 2008a).
State agencies and PDCs within the VCZM Program partner with
nongovernmental organizations, such as nonprofits and private businesses, to implement
coastal programs or policies (see, for example, VCZMP, 2006). Partnerships with
nonprofit organizations include The Nature Conservancy and Eastern Shorekeeper.
Partnerships with private organizations include Cherrystone Aquafarms and Southeast
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Expeditions. Nonprofit organizations and private businesses are not identified in the
executive order. Typically, nongovernmental organizations do not receive grant funding
through the VCZM Program.

The Coastal Policy Team
The VCZM Program established the Coastal Policy Team (CPT) to provide a
forum to bring organizations together to develop and implement coastal policies, discuss
coastal resource issues, and resolve conflicts (OCRM, 2004). It is comprised of
representatives from key state agencies and each of the eight coastal PDCs. Each member
of the CPT has voting rights; decisions, such as prioritizing issues and funding strategies,
are based on consensus. The CPT provides policy recommendations to the VCZM
Program staff (VCZMP, 2005).
Members of the CPT have access to the coastal geospatial and educational
mapping system (GEMS). This web-based planning tool helps them share information
and align decisions pertaining to land use and resource management. The VCZM
Program contributes considerable funding to this system in order to facilitate
communication and informed decision making among partner organizations. The
accuracy of the system relies on the data quality provided by the members of the CPT. In
addition to potentially aligning local implementation efforts, another goal of GEMS is to
better inform policy decision making by strengthening linkages between local land use
plans and the state's water use policies (OCRM, 2007). Efforts to train representatives
from key agencies and PDCs on GEMS are currently underway.
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Grant Funding and the Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program
The VCZM Program staff administers grant money funded by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). These funds are used to maintain
ongoing programs, support a large program identified as a main focal area, or help
smaller projects get started. The VCZM Program found it beneficial to fund a long-term
project aligned with their main focal area which is selected every three years (OCRM,
2004). When identifying long-term projects, input is solicited from organizations within
the network and other nongovernmental partners (VCZMP, 2005).
Grant contracts are used to distribute money, define the scope of a particular
project, and formally identify a single organization's responsibility for meeting the
requirements in the grant. Funding is available to coastal states with federally approved
coastal management programs. A lead organization is designated for each project and
becomes legally responsible for implementing the specifications within the grant
contract. This organization has discretion to work with other government agencies and
nongovernmental partners to achieve project goals; these relationships are not specified
in the grant and may occur more informally. Partnering organizations are often involved
in project implementation even if they do not receive grant funding from the VCZM
Program. Each project is assigned a grant coordinator and a project manager from the
staff of the VCZM Program. The grant coordinator ensures the grant money is used as
intended. The project manager may act as a facilitator between the program and the lead
organization responsible for local project implementation. Project management typically
goes beyond the terms specified in the grant contract. While grant funding is important, it
is one part of the overall strategy for a particular initiative.
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The Virginia Seaside Heritage Program
In 2002, the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program became the main focal area for
the VCZM Program (VCZMP, 2007). As a result, this program receives significant
funding and coastal management expertise from the VCZM Program; support is
scheduled to continue through September of 2008. The Virginia Seaside Heritage
Program, and more specifically the interactions that occur between the organizations
involved in implementing this program, provide the focus for this study.
The primary goals of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program are to restore coastal
habitats and replenish aquatic resources along Virginia's Eastern Shore while promoting
sustainable economic activities such as ecotourism and aquaculture (VCZMP, 2007;
2008c). Aquatic resources include underwater grasses, oysters, scallops, finfish,
waterfowl, and shorebirds (OCRM, 2007). The presence of these aquatic resources within
the waters surrounding Virginia's Eastern Shore are dramatically declining due to overharvesting, disease, and habitat loss (VCZMP, 2007; 2008c). In addition to habitat
restoration, aquaculture, and ecotourism, another goal of the Virginia Seaside Heritage
Program is to draft an agreement between key players promoting management strategies
for sustaining coastal resources (VCZMP, 2008b).
A network of federal agencies, Virginia state agencies, local governments, and
nongovernmental organizations implement the policies associated with the Virginia
Seaside Heritage Program. These organizations are identified in Table 1.2. It is through
these partnerships that coastal habitats are restored; aquatic resources are replenished;
and economic development is managed.
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Table 1.2
Network of Organizations in the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program
Organizational Type
Specific Organizations in the Network
Federal Agencies
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Virginia State Agencies/Programs

Department of Environmental Quality
Coastal Zone Management Program
Marine Resources Commission
Department of Conservation & Recreation
Department of Game & Inland Fisheries

Local Government

Accomack County
Northampton County
Accomack-Northampton PDC

Nongovernmental Organizations

The Nature Conservancy
Eastern Shorekeeper
Southeast Expeditions
Cherrystone Aquafarms
College of William & Mary3
Institute of Marine Science3
Center for Conservation Biology3
University of Virginia3

a

Although these academic institutions are state sponsored, they operate autonomously as individual organizations.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this research is to explore interactions between organizations
when working together to implement policy. More specifically, this research explores the
use of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration between government and
nongovernmental organizations during implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage
Program. This study of multiorganizational implementation is important for two reasons.
First, a major contribution of this study is the introduction of the Multiorganizational
Implementation Model (MIM). The strength of the MIM is that it resolves an earlier
model's ambiguities by clearly distinguishing between operationalizations of
cooperation, coordination, and collaboration based on application of the policy
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implementation and interorganizational theory literatures. These distinctions provide
opportunities for consistent theoretical inquiry and improve the model's transferability
for future use in alternative settings.
Second, this is the first time that a model focused on multiorganizational
interactions is applied to a public policy implementation setting. Broadening the scope of
current inquiry to explore different types of interactions may improve our theoretical
understanding of policy implementation in multiorganizational arrangements. A
continuum of interactions gives researchers a different way of looking at the topdown/bottom-up debate while moving beyond a narrow reconciliation of the two
approaches. This application to public policy expands the use of interorganizational
theory and suggests that both literatures may benefit from collective inquiry. For
example, empirical research on informal interactions fills a gap in the current policy
implementation and interorganizational theory literatures which both emphasize formal
interactions deliberately configured to attain policy or organizational goals.

Research Questions
This study examines the following research questions:
1. Does the Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) help explain interactions
in a policy implementation setting?
2. How do administrators perceive the use of cooperation, coordination, or collaboration
when working in a multiorganizational arrangement to implement policy?
3. How are multiorganizational interactions initiated?
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The first two research questions explore the applicability of the MIM and the
perceived use of different types of interactions in a multiorganizational implementation
setting. Variables within all four constructs of the model are explored to address these
two research questions. The third research question explores whether multiorganizational
interactions are initiated formally through legislative mandate or agency rulemaking,
informally through street-level experience or common interests, or a combination of both.
The impetus for collective action variable within the interorganizational policy objective
construct and the formality of the agreement variable within the interorganizational
infrastructure construct of the MIM are explored to address this research question.

Theoretical Framework
The Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) provides the basis for the
conceptual framework within this study. A previous version of this model, developed in
the health education literature, examines multiorganizational arrangements in settings
such as health and human service delivery, medical and social service provision, and
education (see, for example, Edmondson, 2006; LaRocco, 1997; Thatcher, 2007). The
design, assumptions, construct nomenclature, and operationalizations from previous
versions of the model are transformed in this study to eliminate ambiguities and align
with the policy implementation and interorganizational theory literatures. This
transformation results in the development of the MIM.
The Multiorganizational Implementation Model is a theoretical lens that can be
used to explore a continuum of interactions between organizations. Cooperation,
coordination, and collaboration are the interaction terms used to describe this continuum.
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These terms, and their placement along a continuum, are recognized by some researchers
in the public administration, organization theory, and education literatures (see, for
example, Intriligator, 1992; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close,
&Monsey, 2001).
At one end of the spectrum, cooperation represents an interaction between
independent organizations who can individually accomplish the task at hand but
voluntarily and informally work together to build capacity or serve individual interests in
pursuit of simple goals (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, &
Monsey, 2001; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b). At the other end of the spectrum,
collaboration represents an interaction between organizations with collective
responsibility for interconnected tasks who work together voluntarily or by mandate in
pursuit of complex goals which cannot be accomplished by a single organization and are
based on shared interests (Gray, 1989; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich,
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Coordination is placed in the
middle of the two end points and represents an interaction between organizations
requiring some assistance from other organizations to accomplish individual missions in
which formal linkages are mobilized voluntarily or by mandate in pursuit of multifaceted
goals that support common objectives (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich,
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001).
Placement on the continuum of interaction can be viewed through the following
four constructs: interorganizational policy objective, interorganizational infrastructure,
interorganizational procedures, and organizational management. These constructs, and
their relationships with the continuum of interaction, are identified in Figure 1.1. The
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model's four constructs simultaneously influence interactions within multiorganizational
arrangements. Therefore, operationalizations of each construct are used to determine an
arrangement's overall placement along the continuum.

Figure 1.1
The Multiorganizational Implementation Model
Organizational
Management

Interorganizational
Infrastructure

Continuum of Interaction
Cooperation
Coordination
Collaboration

Interorganizational
Policy Objective

Interorganizational
Procedures

Research Design
A single case study design is used to address the research questions in this study.
When focusing on a single case, selection requires careful consideration (Stake, 1995;
Yin, 2003). The VCZM Program is chosen as the setting for this research through
criterion purposeful sampling. Case selection is based on the following criteria: (1) the
program is mandated to implement policy via the Coastal Zone Management Act; (2) the
program is comprised of a network of organizations which frequently interact to

implement policy; (3) no organization within the network has formal authority to direct a
particular type of interaction with other organizations; and (4) a variety of interactions
potentially occur within the program's multiorganizational arrangement involving federal
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and state agencies, local governments, and nongovernmental organizations.
Multiorganizational policy implementation within the VCZM Program represents a
critical case which meets the conditions needed to explore the MIM in a policy setting.
Interactions between the organizations involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside
Heritage Program are the target of this exploratory research.
Data are collected in two ways: (1) semistructured interviews with individuals
involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program, and (2) a review of
organizational documents that provide further insight into interactions during
multiorganizational policy implementation. These data collection strategies are common
to qualitative methodology because they help the researcher gather information-rich
descriptions during inquiry (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003). In addition, these strategies are
often used in research exploring multiorganizational interactions (see, for example, Hall
& O'Toole, 2004; Imperial, 2001; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; O'Toole & Montjoy,
1984).
Standardized, open-ended interview questions are used to gather in-depth
information, limit external influences, organize data, and guide analysis (Patton, 2002;
Stake, 1995). An interview protocol includes predetermined sensitizing themes aligned
with operationalizations of the MIM. Interview participants are selected using snowball
sampling. This strategy helps identify information-rich participants and recognizes that
participants emerge as interviews progress (Patton, 2002). Interviewing begins with
members of the Coastal Policy Team involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside
Heritage Program.
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The researcher uses document review to gather additional data pertaining to
interactions during multiorganizational policy implementation. Memorandums of
understanding between organizations and program evaluations represent some of the
documents reviewed. Data gathered from the review of organizational documents is
compared to data gathered during interviews.
As data are collected through interviews and documents, the researcher uses
content analysis in two ways. First, a deductive approach to data analysis is employed as
the researcher systematically reduces the data gathered into the categories of a
predetermined coding scheme. These categories, based on the operationalizations of the
MIM, ultimately allow the researcher to place each multiorganizational interaction into
one of the following categories: cooperation, coordination, or collaboration. The
researcher gains insight into the study's research questions by comparing the model's
theoretical patterns and the data's empirical patterns. Second, an inductive approach to
data analysis is employed as the researcher makes a purposeful attempt to find patterns
that do not fit into the categories of the predetermined coding scheme. Interviewees are
asked if there are any factors, other than those discussed, that impact interactions between
organizations. As contradictory data emerges, revisions to the theoretical model are
considered (Patton, 2002). This single case study design emphasizes theory verification
by focusing on a critical case (Yin, 2003).
Methodological triangulation and data source triangulation enhance authenticity
(Miles & Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1995). Confidence in research findings increases as
data from interviews and documents are compared. Data remaining in a nonnumerical,
textual form are used to support numerical aggregation and provide context.
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Significance of the Study
This research presents a theoretical lens to explore multiorganizational
arrangements during policy implementation. Development of the Multiorganizational
Implementation Model is a significant contribution of this research. Its application in this
study allows for empirical testing of the model's operationalizations. Clarity of
operationalizations enhances the model's transferability to other settings.
Broadening the scope of current inquiry to explore different types of interactions
may improve our understanding of multiorganizational policy implementation. Linkages
with interorganizational theory can be established to guide the implementation literature
toward a fourth generation of research. Distinguishing between different types of
interactions and identifying the conditions which warrant their use may further our
understanding of how particular interactions can be used as implementation strategies to
help multiorganizational arrangements fulfill policy goals.
An approach that considers a continuum of interactions as implementation
strategies gives researchers a different way of looking at the top-down/bottom-up debate
while moving beyond a narrow reconciliation of the two approaches. More specifically, a
continuum of interactions bridges the two approaches by allowing researchers to look at
the nature of the interaction without having to assume that one approach is more
important to implementation than the other. The formulation of previous implementation
models relies considerably on the preconceived notions of their developers and their
chosen approach to implementation (O'Toole, 1993; Schofield, 2001).
Since the top-down and bottom-up approaches are often seen to embrace
competing variables, the selection of one approach over another involves a value
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judgment based on a limited set of variables considered to be most relevant. These
assumptions limit the researcher to a narrow view of implementation by allowing them to
ignore the relative importance of variables associated with the other approach (O' Toole,
1993). On the other hand, the MIM does not make any presumptions regarding variable
importance, and each approach is considered equally important in analyzing interactions
between organizations during implementation. In moving beyond the constraints inherent
to the top-down and bottom-up approaches, researchers are not restricted to a particular
set of variables and may be able to see implementation for what it really is.
Interactions are formed in a variety of ways (Robinson, 2006). Legislation and
agency rulemaking do not necessarily capture the operational patterns of interaction that
actually occur during implementation (Hall & O'Toole, 2004). The MIM can be used to
further research informal interactions between organizations. If informal interactions are
empirically identified, two assumptions must be reconsidered. The first assumption
involves the multiorganizational implementation literature. Theorists can no longer
assume that formal, coordinated strategies are the only way in which organizations
interact when implementing policy in multiorganizational arrangements. The second
assumption involves interorganizational theory. Researchers can no longer assume that
all interactions are deliberately and formally configured by planning personnel to align
with the type of interaction specified in the interorganizational objective (see, for
example, Thatcher, 2007). The potential for informal interactions to occur in
multiorganizational arrangements must be considered.

19
Limitations
As with all research designs, selecting a case study approach has tradeoffs
(Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Several limitations pertaining to this case study must be
acknowledged. First, this research focuses on the network of organizations working
together to implement the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. Case studies are bounded
by context (Merriam, 1998). Therefore, the findings from this case study are not intended
for generalization or representation of other settings (Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Stake,
1995). Implementation of environmental policy, such as the Coastal Zone Management
Act, may utilize different types of interactions than those in other policy areas. This
limitation is addressed by fully describing this study's sample and setting (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). With this information, other researchers can assess the study's
transferability.
Second, the data collected in this study is based on the interpretations of the
interviewer and the perceptions self-reported by those interviewed (Stake, 1995).
Subjectivity is critical to understanding the context of a particular case (Stake, 1995).
However, this subjectivity can bias research as interviewees and the interviewer may
unintentionally filter textual data (Creswell, 2003). This limitation is addressed by
maintaining a transparent process throughout data analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Each step of the process is revealed to prevent an unintentional filtering of data and
enhance the study's confirmability.
Third, this research on interactions during policy implementation is initially
limited to the variables identified in the MIM. Other factors may influence interactions
between organizations during policy implementation. This limitation is addressed by

20

offering interviewees an opportunity to provide additional information after completing
the series of questions aligned with the operationalizations of the theoretical model. A
search for competing evidence is used to enhance the model's authenticity (Miles &
Huberman, 1994).
Fourth, all variables within the MIM are initially assumed to influence
multiorganizational interactions equally and simultaneously. However, some variables
may influence these interactions more than others. This limitation is addressed through
the use of qualitative methodology. In addition to looking for the verbal mention of
elements in interviews and documents, the researcher uses examples and context
provided by interviewees to give additional meaning to the perceived variation in levels
of importance.
Despite the limitations associated with case study research, its use of in-depth
exploration is well suited for this research. The study's research questions are addressed
through information-rich descriptions. It is through these efforts that the policy
implementation and interorganizational theory literatures may advance.

Subsequent Chapters
This chapter introduces the problem, provides relevant background information
highlighting gaps in the current research, identifies the purpose of this research, explains
the theoretical framework, and gives an overview of the research design. In addition, the
significance of this research and its limitations are discussed. The following chapter
discusses the policy implementation and interorganizational theory literatures. This study
draws from these literatures to present the Multiorganizational Implementation Model.
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Chapter Three provides details on the single case study research design
organizing this research. Methods and data collection procedures are discussed in great
detail in order to enhance the confirmability and dependability of findings. Chapter Four
focuses on analyzing the data collected from interviews and organizational documents.
Chapter Five provides an overview of the study and summarizes research findings.
Theoretical implications are discussed and recommendations for future research are
provided.

22

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview
After numerous policy failures in the 1960s, it became clear that well constructed
policy could ultimately fail from the complexities of implementation (Pressman &
Wildavsky, 1973). Implementation research is represented by three generations, with
much emphasis placed on reconciling the top-down and bottom-up approaches (Elmore,
1985; Goggin, Bowman, Lester, & O'Toole, 1990; Matland, 1990; 1995). Inherent
differences between these two approaches make reconciliation difficult, and circuitous
discussions largely prevent identifying the variables most critical to policy
implementation (Menzel, 1987; O'Toole, 1986; 2000). As a result, conceptual clarity is
elusive. An emphasis on multiorganizational implementation may refocus the literature
and move it toward a fourth generation of research (Imperial, 2001).
Multiorganizational implementation becomes increasingly important as public
organizations face increasing demands, fewer resources, and complex policy problems
(O'Toole, 1993; 1997). Despite its importance, empirical inquiry pertaining to
multiorganizational implementation primarily assumes organizations work together in
mandated, formalized, or hierarchical arrangements (see, for example, Caruson &
MacManus, 2006; Hall & O'Toole, 2000; 2004; Mandell, 1994; Raelin, 1982).
Arrangements that are not mandated, less formal, or nonhierarchical are not considered
empirically within the policy implementation literature despite their utilization in other
disciplines.
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This study links the policy implementation and interorganizational theory
literatures to explore interactions during multiorganizational policy implementation. The
first part of this chapter focuses on the policy implementation literature while the second
part focuses on the interorganizational theory literature. The final section of this chapter
presents the Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM); this theoretical lens
guides inquiry throughout this research.

Policy Implementation
Implementation research is organized into three generations. The first generation,
roughly the period from 1973 to 1978, focuses on highly descriptive studies
implementing authoritative mandates regarding a single policy decision (Matland, 1990).
First generation researchers primarily employ a case study design and routinely focus on
implementation failures within individual organizations. They often face critique for their
pessimistic view of implementation success (Goggin, 1986) and their inabilities to
contribute to a more general theory of implementation (deLeon & deLeon, 2002). Despite
these shortcomings, it is important to acknowledge that this research generates a variety
of lessons learned highlighting the complexities inherent in implementation. By
recognizing difficulties in translating policy into action, researchers became aware of
gross inaccuracies surrounding their perceptions that implementation occurs
automatically after policy decisions are made. As a result, researchers widely
acknowledge the necessity for further study of the implementation process.
The second generation, roughly the period from 1978 to 1985, focuses on
comprehensive theoretical models to highlight two approaches to policy implementation:
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the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach (Matland, 1990). These two
approaches address implementation in very different ways (Schofield, 2001). An inherent
emphasis on competing values, such as bureaucratic authority versus local discretion, is
often referred to as an implementation paradox (Alexander, 1989; Long & Franklin,
2004; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Stoker, 1991).
The search for a conceptual framework that synthesizes the top-down and bottomup approaches continues throughout the third generation of implementation research.
However, synthesizing both approaches into an all encompassing conceptual framework
is significantly complicated by the competing ways in which each approach views
implementation. In order to appreciate these complications, the specific set of
assumptions that guide each approach must be understood.

Top-Down/Bottom-Up Approaches
The top-down approach focuses on the attainment of centralized objectives.
Policy designers play a key role in policy implementation and are assumed to have
abilities to impose policy (Linder & Peters, 1987; Matland, 1990; Mazmanian & Sabatier,
1989; Sabatier, 1986). Policy characteristics and hierarchical controls are critically
important to top-down research (McFarlane, 1989; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989). By
focusing on technical criteria such as statutory clarity, rule promulgation, policy
specificity, and hierarchical monitoring, theorists assume that implementation problems
can be minimized through careful planning (see, for example, Edwards & Sharkansky,
1978; Long & Franklin, 2004; Matland, 1990; Montjoy & O'Toole, 1979; Van Horn,
1979). Centralized control, clear direction, and authoritative monitoring are needed to
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ensure local actors implement policy congruent with the goals of policy designers
(Edwards & Sharkansky, 1978; Long & Franklin, 2004; O'Toole, 1993; Sabatier, 1986).
The top-down approach may be criticized because it does not recognize differentiation of
implementation at the local levels based on street-level discretion (Long & Franklin,
2004; Schofield, 2001).
On the other hand, the bottom-up approach focuses on policy implementation
influenced by policy actors, local initiatives, citizen needs, and contextual factors (Linder
& Peters, 1987; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). Rather than being centrally
controlled, actors throughout the lowest levels of an organization are afforded discretion
to implement policy (Carrington, 2005; Linder & Peters, 1987; Lipsky, 1980; Matland,
1990; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). Administrators use personal judgment to
make decisions at the lowest levels (Carrington, 2005); these decisions cumulatively
create public policy (Lipsky, 1980). As a result, policy continuously evolves and is
refined by interactions at various levels (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002; Linder & Peters,
1987). The bottom-up approach may be criticized because it fails to recognize the
potential for policy characteristics or hierarchical controls to influence the local policy
environment (Schofield, 2001).
While the search for a conceptual framework that synthesizes the top-down and
bottom-up approaches continues throughout the third generation of implementation
research, much of this research focuses on identifying variables specific to each approach
(Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989; O'Toole, 1986). For example, O'Toole (1986) identifies
over 300 variables discussed within the literature for their potential to impact policy
implementation. The number of variables identified in implementation research is
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problematic for three reasons. First, much of the implementation research focuses on case
studies. When the number of variables significantly overwhelms the number of cases, the
data may incorrectly appear to support inferences. Too much information is being used to
explain a small number of cases (Goggin, 1986). Second, it is nearly impossible to
measure the specific effect each variable has on the implementation process while
accounting for numerous interactions. Third, the quantity of variables blinds researchers
from seeing what is truly important.
The circuitous debate comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the topdown/bottom-up approaches must be replaced with research identifying the variables
most critical to policy implementation. This is made more difficult by a lack of
cumulative research (Hjern, 1982; O'Toole, 1986; 2000). The number of variables, wide
variation in their perceived importance, and complexity of interactions paralyze
theoretical advancement (Goggin, 1986; Goggin et al, 1990; O'Toole, 1986; 2000).
Conceptual clarity remains elusive in the absence of a synthesized framework based on
the combined strengths of the top-down and bottom-up approaches (Matland, 1995;
O'Toole, 1991; Saetren, 2005).

Reconciling Top-Down/Bottom-Up Approaches
Researchers acknowledge the importance of reconciling the top-down and
bottom-up implementation approaches (Elmore, 1985; Goggin et al., 1990; Matland,
1990; 1995; O'Toole, 2000). Some of the more common models are based on the
contributions of Elmore (1985), Goggin et al. (1990), and Matland (1990; 1995). Elmore
(1985) applies forward and backward mapping to implementation research. By looking at
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both ends of the implementation process, policy analysts can explore which approach
leads to a more advantageous solution (Elmore, 1985). Goggin et al. (1990) uses a
systems approach to explore how implementers at the state level are influenced by
inducements and constraints from the top (federal) and bottom (state and local) levels of
government. Their "Communications Model" is intended to explore the complexities of
intergovernmental implementation by addressing various components at the federal, state,
and local levels (Goggin et al., 1990). Matland (1990; 1995) uses a contingency approach
to explore adaptive implementation. According to this model, an implementation strategy
is dependent on environmental conflict and statutory ambiguity. By dichotomously
organizing these variables into a typology, four types of implementation strategies are
identified (Matland, 1995).
Their attempts to synthesize the top-down and bottom-up approaches are
commendable, but these models do not account for the multiorganizational arrangements
frequently used to implement policy (see, for example, Hjern & Porter, 1981; Keast et al.,
2004; Lundin, 2007; Mandell, 1994; O'Toole, 1995; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). In
addition, an emphasis on competing implementation approaches minimizes efforts placed
on developing other research areas deserving of inquiry (Schofield, 2001). As
governments face increasingly interconnected problems, it is inevitable that
implementation will occur in a pluralistic environment requiring interaction across
organizational boundaries (Hjern, 1982; Menzel, 1987; O'Toole, 1993; Robinson, 2006).
Implementation success or failure will rely heavily on the organizations involved in
policy implementation and the interdependencies between these organizations
(Alexander, 1989; O'Toole, 1995).
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Interorganizational Implementation
O'Toole (1995) defines interorganizational implementation as two or more
organizations working together to implement public policy. This subset of
implementation literature, also referred to as multiorganizational implementation,
conceptually recognizes the importance and complexity of joint action (see, for example,
Caruson & MacManus, 2006; Elmore, 1985; Menzel, 1987; O'Toole, 1991; Pressman &
Wildavsky, 1973). However, little emphasis is placed on developing a conceptual model
pertaining to the use of different types of multiorganizational interactions during
implementation. While interaction terms such as cooperation, coordination, and
collaboration are clearly defined in the interorganizational theory literature (Gray, 1989;
Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001), they are arbitrarily used in the
multiorganizational implementation literature. Furthermore, the nuances that distinguish
these terms are ignored (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). There is a need to understand
how these interactions impact policy implementation in a multiorganizational setting.
Empirical inquiry within the interorganizational implementation literature
emphasizes formalized interactions based on policy mandate, agency rulemaking, or
organizational procedures. More specifically, the literature focuses on the extent to which
policies identify interorganizational partners (Hall & O'Toole, 2000; 2004), policy
characteristics that induce or constrain interdependence (May, 1995; O'Toole, 1983;
1988; 1995; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984), or the structures used in multiorganizational
implementation (Hall & O'Toole, 2000; 2004; Mandell, 1994; O'Toole, 1989; 1993;
1995; 1997; Raelin, 1980; 1982). These inquiries may help researchers gain some
knowledge pertaining to interactions during multiorganizational implementation, but an
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emphasis on formalized interactions only addresses one portion of the larger picture in
which informal interactions also occur.
Despite the nonhierarchical nature of network arrangements, much of the
literature involving implementation networks also emphasizes formalized interactions
based on organized efforts (see, for example, Hall & O'Toole, 2004; Keast et al., 2004;
Mandell, 1994; Raelin, 1982). This emphasis is ironic when considering the definition of
networks. According to Hall & O'Toole (2004), networks are defined as "two or more
units in which not all major components are encompassed within a single hierarchical
array" (p. 187). Although other than formal relationships seem likely to occur when
organizations work outside their hierarchical boundaries, researchers largely ignore these
relationships when examining network arrangements. Despite a definition to the contrary,
implementation networks are treated by researchers as an extension of the organizational
hierarchy abiding by specifications dictated through policy mandates. The common
thread among these different approaches to empirical inquiry within the
interorganizational implementation literature is that organizations are assumed to work
together in a formalized arrangement based on a requirement to do so.
There are three problems with these approaches. First, the possibility that
multiorganizational implementation may occur outside the boundaries of operational
authority is not considered. An emphasis on formal interactions superficially endorses
top-down inquiry which is supported under the guise of alternative nomenclaturecoordination. It is assumed that all levels of the organization comply with the type of
interaction specified in the mandate, that organizations work together because they are
required to do so, and that local dynamics can be ignored. Researchers fail to consider the
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relationships that informally develop outside of the organizational hierarchy despite their
potential impact on multiorganizational implementation. Informal interactions between
organizations are important (Keast et al., 2004), and the way in which different
arrangements form should be examined empirically (Robinson, 2006).
Second, an emphasis on formal interactions incorrectly assumes that relationships
between organizations can be predetermined, centrally controlled, and monitored to meet
policy goals. This approach requires the variables most important to multiorganizational
relationships during policy implementation to be theoretically identified and empirically
examined. An exclusively top-down approach fails to consider that legislators are limited
in their abilities to foresee and specify the interactions required in complex
implementation settings (O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). Once again, informal interactions
may play an important role in multiorganizational implementation; it would be difficult to
accurately capture them in the policy mandate. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that policy
mandates can account for all potential interactions within implementation settings.
Third, a formal approach to organizational arrangements within the
implementation literature perpetuates the top-down/bottom-up debate even though
O'Toole (2000) declared an ending to this debate nearly a decade ago. It is one thing to
theoretically support one approach over another after careful consideration, but it is
entirely different when one approach is supported based on ignorance of the other.
Resolution of the top-down/bottom-up debate requires equal consideration of both
approaches. Policy implementation involves more than carrying out a combination of
statutory clauses (see, for example, Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973); it requires an
understanding of the linkages that occur between the organizations responsible for
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implementation (Hjern, 1982). Elements of both approaches are needed to examine fully
the relationships between organizations because they are impacted by top-down
characteristics such as mandate characteristics in addition to bottom-up characteristics
such as interorganizational dynamics within the local implementation environment.
Therefore, examination of multiorganizational interactions should occur without
assuming that one approach is more important to implementation than the other.
Furthermore, resolving the paradoxical nature of the top-down and bottom-up approaches
requires an acknowledgment of both approaches.
Collective action lies at the heart of multiorganizational implementation
(O'Toole, 1991). Researchers often use terms such as cooperation, coordination, or
collaboration to describe interactions in multiorganizational implementation (see, for
example, Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Lundin, 2007;
Mandell & Steelman, 2003; May, 1995; O'Toole, 1983; 1988; 1989; Robinson, 2006).
While these terms are more clearly defined in the interorganizational theory and
education literatures (see, for example, Gray, 1985; 1989; Intriligator, 1992; Mattessich,
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001), the nuances that distinguish these terms go unnoticed
when applied in a multiorganizational implementation setting. As a result, interaction
terms are used arbitrarily and interchangeably to describe relationships within the
implementation literature. To date, researchers have not linked cooperation, coordination,
or collaboration collectively to multiorganizational implementation. The development of
a conceptual model that distinguishes between each type of interaction may broaden our
understanding of multiorganizational implementation and help identify the appropriate
application for each type of interaction within this setting.
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Interorganizational Theory
Today's public managers often face complex social problems that do not abide by
bureaucratic boundaries (Kettl, 2003). Interdependencies between government agencies
and nongovernmental partners can be used to generate a variety of multiorganizational
arrangements. These arrangements are also referred to as "interorganizational
innovations" and may increase government's capacity for action (Mandell & Steelman,
2003). The terms used most commonly in the public administration literature to describe
multiorganizational interactions are cooperation, coordination, and collaboration (see, for
example, Agranoff, 2006; Caruson & MacManus, 2006; Keast & Brown, 2002; Thomson
& Perry, 2006). It is important for practitioners and scholars to understand each of these
terms and how they differ from one another (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mandell &
Steelman, 2003). Therefore, the following section broadly describes each of these terms
and their placement along a continuum of interaction.

The Continuum of Interaction
Some public administration theorists describe cooperation, coordination, and
collaboration as falling along a continuum of increased interaction (Bryson, Crosby, &
Stone, 2006; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey,
2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006). At one end of the spectrum, cooperation is an interaction
between independent organizations who can individually accomplish the task at hand but
may voluntarily and informally work together within existing organizational structures
and policies to build capacity or serve individual interests in pursuit of simple, short-term
goals (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001;
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O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b). The desire to work together may be triggered by changes in
external factors and the desire to avoid negative impacts associated with these factors
(Ospina & Yaroni, 2003). There is no need to define a mission, structure, or planning
effort common to the organizations within the arrangement (Mattessich, Murray-Close, &
Monsey, 2001). Cooperation may take place without involving organizational leaders
(Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007).
While cooperation is identified as an interaction term on the continuum, literature
pertaining to cooperation is elusive. The few articles that appear to focus solely on
cooperative interactions are plagued by a lack of definition, misapplication of the term, or
a tendency to interchange cooperation with other interaction terms such as coordination
and collaboration (see, for example, Althaus & Yarwood, 1993; Callahan, 2007;
Lambright, 1997). The research conducted by Ospina & Yaroni (2003) on labor
management provides one exception to these problems. In studies where cooperation is
defined and identified as one of three terms on the continuum of interaction, empirical
research is lacking (see, for example, Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001;
O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b). Efforts to decipher cooperation from other interaction
terms are addressed in the research conducted by Keast, Brown, & Mandell (2007)
regarding administrators' perceptions of differences between the terms cooperation,
coordination, and collaboration. However, research solely focused on cooperative
interactions and its application to public organizations has yet to develop fully in the
interorganizational theory literature.
Coordination is placed in the middle of the two end points. It is an interaction that
links organizations in specific areas because some assistance from other organizations is
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needed to accomplish the individual mission (Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998;
Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Agencies typically use this type of interaction to pursue
longer-term goals based on repeatable tasks (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey,
2001). The desire to work together may be voluntary or mandated based on a benefit to
achieving individual and compatible mission areas that support common objectives.
Although leaders within the individual organizations retain authority over decision
making, there may be some overlap in resources, infrastructure, and procedures.
Therefore, coordination often implies the need for some shared planning where roles and
responsibilities are formally defined (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001).
Coordination is typically characterized by instrumental processes that rely on
formally structured relationships and hierarchical control to link the infrastructures of
individual organizations (see, for example, Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Mandell, 1994; Van
de Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). As a result,
coordination is often perceived as a formal approach to interaction based on a
requirement for organizations to work together (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007).
However, less formal ways to view coordination are acknowledged in the literature
(Chisholm, 1989; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Kettl, 2003; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984;
Wise, 2006).
Van de Ven and Walker (1984) use the term "mobilization coordination" to
describe less formal, ad hoc relationships in their longitudinal study of early childhood
development organizations. Based on a questionnaire administered to 14 agency
directors, they conclude that the use of formal or informal approaches to coordination
largely depends on the types of resources used to create interdependencies between
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organizations. An interdependence based on financial resources generates a more formal
approach to coordination; on the other hand a more informal approach to coordination
occurs when aligning resources pertaining to client referrals (Van de Ven & Walker,
1984). A less formal approach to coordination is also recognized by Kettl (2003); he uses
the term "contingent coordination" to describe a flexible and adaptable network approach
to coordination. Mandell and Steelman (2003) also differentiate between "intermittent
coordination" and "regular coordination" (p. 203). According to Chisholm (1989), an
informal approach to coordination may initially be facilitated by more formal
organizational policies and activities.
The commonality among this subset of the literature is that interactions other than
coordination are not considered. Without this consideration, it is difficult to determine the
existence of an informal approach to coordination. Perhaps the informal approach to
coordination may be better explained by a different interaction term altogether.
At the other end of the spectrum, collaboration is based on interdependence
among multiple organizations that share responsibility for interconnected tasks and work
together to pursue collectively complex goals that cannot be accomplished by a single
organization (Gray, 1989; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, &
Monsey, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006). This type of interaction typically requires great
levels of commitment as stakeholders within a particular problem domain frequently
interact to develop shared norms, rules, and processes used to make collective decisions
(Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Wood & Gray, 1991).
Collaboration is further characterized by organizations that establish a collective unit in
which individual organizations relinquish some autonomy to develop new infrastructure
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and procedures to support mutually beneficial interactions in which decisions are made
jointly (Intriligator, 1992; 1994; Mandell, 1994; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey,
2001). As a result, organizational boundaries are often blurred (Keast, Brown, &
Mandell, 2007) and significant efforts are needed to align planning efforts (Mattessich,
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). This process goes well beyond the instrumental
approach emphasized by coordination (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007).
Collaboration is not appropriate for use in all situations (Keast, Brown, &
Mandell, 2007). Collaborative interactions may be most appropriate under certain
conditions: when other types of interaction have failed; when complex situations of crisis
occur; when problems are so interconnected that responsibility is shared; or when there is
a win-win situation based on mutual interest (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Imperial,
2005; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Keast et al., 2004). Organizations are limited in
their abilities to exploit their collaborative capacity when faced with different statutory
responsibilities, different constituencies, competing interests, a lack of slack resources,
procedural rigidity, institutional or budgetary constraints, power asymmetries, ideological
differences, power disparities, or a history of conflict (Huxham, 2003; Imperial, 2001).
It may be particularly difficult for public organizations to sustain collaborative
relationships because they are often faced with conventional bureaucratic systems that do
not inherently accommodate shared power and joint decision making (Keast, Brown, &
Mandell, 2007). Keast, Brown, and Mandell (2007) use interviews and focus groups to
gather information from 40 practitioners pertaining to their understanding of cooperation,
coordination, and collaboration. The findings from this research suggest a tendency
among practitioners to revert to coordinated interactions. A majority of their participants,
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representing multiple levels of government, indicate that collaborative interactions are
beneficial but very difficult to sustain within public organizations (Keast, Brown, &
Mandell, 2007).
In order to sustain a collaborative relationship, personnel representing each
organization within the arrangement must have discretion to negotiate rules and make
organizational decisions based on the evolution of group deliberation (Mattessich,
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). According to Lipsky (1980), the theory of discretion
explains how decisions are made at the lower levels of an organization to cumulatively
create public policy. Therefore, discretionary judgment is at odds with the command and
control authority inherent to bureaucratic organizations. An emphasis on stovepipe
specializations, hierarchical structures, and formal governance mechanisms may make it
difficult for administrators to obtain the discretion needed to make decisions within the
collaborative arrangement and sustain horizontal relationships.

Empirical Differentiation of Terms
Researchers often ignore the differences between cooperation, coordination, and
collaboration because empirical inquiry into these interaction terms is largely
undeveloped within the interorganizational theory literature. In fact, it appears that only
one article within the literature addresses empirical differences between these terms. In
the research conducted by Keast, Brown, and Mandell (2007), interaction terms are
distinguished across five dimensions: time to establish the interaction, goals, structural
linkages, formality, and risks or rewards. While these dimensions provide a good start,
much still needs to be done to understand empirically the different elements within each
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interaction term (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Little else has been done to compare
these three terms or their relative use within public organizations. A detailed conceptual
framework does not currently exist.
A lack of conceptual clarity related to interaction terms impacts the
interorganizational theory literature in three ways. First, there is a tendency to broadly
categorize interaction terms with little regard for the definitions that distinguish them
from other types of interactions (Caruson & MacManus, 2006; Imperial, 2001; Keast,
Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mandell & Steelman, 2003). Although practitioners seemingly
understand that these terms have different meanings (Keast, Brown, Mandell, 2007), this
same level of understanding is not reflected in the literature where definition overlap runs
rampant. Without acknowledging and defining each of these terms, researchers cannot
properly consider the relative placement of the interaction on which they are focused. In
addition, researchers seem to forego conveniently difficult discussions concerning
definitions of interaction terms. The lack of a common language prevents reliable
communication and collective understanding (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). Conceptual
advancement is stunted by definition overlap, ambiguity, and disregard.
Second, the appropriate application of each term cannot be acknowledged when
they are used interchangeably. This blurs the boundaries between cooperation,
coordination, and collaboration research. More specifically, much of the empirical
research within the interaction literature focuses on preconditions, factors, or triggers that
influence a particular interaction (see, for example, Jennings, 1994; Kuska, 2005; Ospina
& Yaroni, 2003; Reilly, 2001). The difficulty with this line of inquiry is that many of the
same factors are identified as influences to cooperation, coordination, and collaboration.
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While many of the same factors may influence each type of interaction, it seems likely
that these factors will influence each type of interaction to different degrees. Since these
distinctions are not made, there is confusion surrounding the optimal use of each
interaction term (Keast, Mandell, & Brown, 2007). More needs to be done to better
understand the contextual factors that help or hinder each type of interaction (Mandell &
Steelman, 2003).
Third, researchers often assume that the interaction of interest actually occurs
(see, for example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Imperial, 2001; Jennings & Krane,
1994; Kettl, 2003). The presence of a particular interaction term is not tested empirically
in relation to other types of interactions. Grounded theory is used by Imperial (2001) to
identify factors that help or hinder collaboration during the development and
implementation of six watershed programs. Collaboration is assumed to exist, and terms
such as coordination and cooperation are not introduced or defined. It is disconcerting
that this assumption is common within the interorganizational theory literature but not
acknowledged.
Of the three interaction terms, it seems that collaboration is most emphasized
within the current public administration literature. This emphasis focuses on factors that
help or hinder collaboration (see, for example, Imperial, 2001; Kuska, 2005; Mattessich,
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Reilly, 2001), collaborative management (see, for
example, Agranoff, 2006; Bingham, Nabatchi, & O'Leary, 2005; Goldsmith & Eggers,
2004; McGuire, 2006; Meier & O'Toole, 2003), or the process of collaboration (see, for
example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Reilly, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006).
However, the literature's emphasis on collaboration between public organizations may
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not be warranted if public administrators tend to revert to coordinated interactions as
suggested by Keast, Brown, & Mandell (2007). Needless to say, it is important to
differentiate empirically between the multiorganizational interactions that occur within
the public sector. This differentiation requires a conceptual framework to highlight
differences between cooperation, coordination, and collaboration.
In order to enhance conceptual clarity and promote empirical progress,
interorganizational theorists should look outside the literature. Multiorganizational
interactions are also considered within the education literature (see, for example, Fagan,
1997; Goldman & Intriligator, 1990; Intriligator, 1994; 1992; LaRocco, 1997; Thatcher,
2007). The following section of this literature review describes the development of the
Interorganizational Arrangement Model within the education literature.

Interorganizational Arrangement Model
The Interorganizational Arrangement Model (IAM) was originally developed in
the health education literature (Goldman & Intriligator, 1990; Intriligator, 1992; 1994). It
is used to examine interorganizational arrangements in settings such as health and human
service delivery, medical and social service provision, and education (Fagan, 1997;
Intriligator, 1992; LaRocco, 1997; Thatcher, 2007). More specifically, the IAM is a
theoretical lens that can be used to explore relationships between organizations.
These relationships fall along a continuum of increased interdependence;
cooperation, coordination, and collaboration are the interaction terms used to describe
this continuum (Intriligator, 1992; 1994). The placement of these terms on the continuum
is consistent with the interorganization theory literature. At one end of the spectrum,
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cooperation represents independent organizations who can individually accomplish the
goals at hand. At the other end of the spectrum, collaboration represents interdependent
organizations who must work together in order to accomplish the goals collectively
identified. Coordination is placed in the middle of the two end points and represents
organizations that require some assistance from other organizations in order to meet their
individual goals. Placement on the continuum of interaction is measured by variables
organized into the following four constructs: collective objective, collaborative
infrastructure, collaborative procedures, and collaborative leadership (Thatcher, 2007).
The relationships between the constructs of this model are identified in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1
The Interorganizational Arrangement Model
Collaborative
Infrastructure

Collaborative
Procedures

Collaborative
Leadership

According to the I AM, successful interorganizational efforts require use of the
same type of interaction in all constructs (Intriligator, 1992; Thatcher, 2007). The type of
interaction appropriate for the collective effort is determined by the interaction identified
within the collective objective (Intriligator, 1992; Thatcher, 2007). The IAM assumes that
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interactions are not self-organizing. Instead, interagency planners must develop
interactions within multiorganizational arrangements that are consistent with the
collective objective (Intriligator, 1992; Thatcher, 2007).
The collective objective represents the goal that agencies work together to achieve
(Intriligator, 1992; 1994). Four variables characterize the collective objective: time,
complexity, single agency role, and the impetus for collective action (Thatcher, 2007).
The level of interaction required by the collective objective drives the level of interaction
desired throughout the remainder of the conceptual framework (Intriligator, 1992; 1994;
Thatcher, 2007). Once the level of interaction required by the collective objective is
identified, the level of interaction within the collaborative infrastructure, collaborative
procedures, and collaborative leadership constructs are examined in order to categorize
the type of interaction between organizations (Thatcher, 2007).
Collaborative infrastructure focuses on the organizational structures used to
formalize and support relationships between organizations in the arrangement (Thatcher,
2007). Five variables characterize the construct of collaborative infrastructure: design,
formality of the agreement, organizational autonomy, policy authority, and key
personnel. Collaborative procedures are the processes developed to support operations
within the arrangement (Thatcher, 2007). Five variables characterize the construct of
collaborative procedures: information sharing, decision making, resolution of turf issues,
resource allocation, and systems thinking. Collaborative leadership is the ways in which
behaviors of the member organizations support the arrangement (Thatcher, 2007). Five
variables characterize the construct of collaborative leadership: incentives, commitment,
trust, risk taking, and willingness to change.
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Critique of the Interorganizational Arrangement Model
While the constructs and variables within the IAM provide a needed structure for
deciphering between different interaction terms, there are five limitations that must be
addressed. First, the model assumes that effective achievement of the collective objective
requires all variables to operate at the same level of interdependence on the continuum
(see, for example, Thatcher, 2007). Effective designs are those in which the type of
interaction is aligned throughout all aspects of the arrangement. This assertion is not
supported by previous research in which variation is prevalent. Based on the findings of
Thatcher (2007), Fagan (1997), LaRocco (1997), and Olson (1996), it appears to be
exceedingly difficult, if not unrealistic, to align empirically all variables within the same
type of interaction. The IAM's assumption fails to consider that there may be differences
in the relative importance of each variable in terms of achieving the interagency goal. If
the relative importance of each factor varies then an interagency arrangement may be
effective even if all factors do not operate within the same type of interaction.
Second, the IAM assumes interorganizational interactions are formally and
specifically planned based on the type of interaction necessitated by the collective
objective (Goldman & Intriligator, 1990; Intriligator, 1994; 1992; LaRocco, 1997;
Thatcher, 2007). After the type of interaction is determined by the collective objective,
interagency planners strive to design an interorganizational arrangement aligned with this
type of interaction. Success is based on the extent to which planners generate the
conditions and relationships needed to link the appropriate interaction to the desired goal
(Intriligator, 1992). In assuming that interactions are controlled by an elite group of
planning personnel in a formal way, the model perpetuates an unwarranted emphasis on
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top-down implementation. Formal and specific planning may not be the impetus for all
interactions that occur. The informal interactions that potentially occur in
interorganizational settings are ignored despite Thatcher's (2007) development of the
impetus for collective action variable.
Third, nomenclature within the IAM biases it towards collaborative interactions.
Thatcher (2007) places unnecessary emphasis on collaborative interactions by adding
"collaborative" to all construct nomenclature. A model used to explore three different
types of interaction terms should not exceedingly emphasize one term to the detriment of
others. By doing so, an inherent bias on collaboration as the desired end is created. While
the IAM acknowledges that no one interaction is inherently better than another and each
has the potential to be effective if used in the appropriate circumstance, the model's
nomenclature defies this assumption. In addition, the leadership construct should be
renamed entirely. Thatcher's (2007) definition of this construct suggests that a specific
group of people oversee the arrangement. While oversight may be evident in coordinative
interactions, it is not a component of cooperative or collaborative arrangements.
Interorganizational cooperation typically occurs as relationships form between lower
levels of organizational structures. While leaders can emerge during the early stages of
interorganizational collaboration, the interaction is sustained by partners holding
positions of equal authority. Therefore, the definition's emphasis on oversight is
misplaced.
Fourth, operationalizations within the IAM are unclear. Ambiguity makes it
difficult to widely apply the IAM to other research settings, because linking the data
collected to the model's current operationalizations is challenging. In order to expand the
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application of this model to other settings, the operationalizations must be further
clarified and supported by the literature.
Fifth, the current model inaccurately portrays collaboration as an arrangement in
which participants align their interests with the new organizational arrangement without
consideration for the interests of their individual organizations. This is inconsistent with
the broader collaboration literature, which portrays this type of interaction in a far more
complicated manner than acknowledged by the model. According to the public
administration literature, a commitment to the collective objective does not decrease
stakeholders' commitments to their individual organizations (Keast et al, 2004).
Organizations often struggle with dual commitments to their individual organizations and
the multiorganizational arrangement (Mandell & Steelman, 2003; O'Leary & Bingham,
2007a). In fact, collaboration occurs when stakeholders work together to solve one
another's interests without giving up any of their own (Wood & Gray, 1991). This
inconsistency between the education and interorganizational theory literatures is
addressed in the next section while the complex nature of collaboration is acknowledged.
Ambiguity in the original model's design, assumptions, construct nomenclature,
and operationalizations are problematic. Extensive changes to this model improve its
transferability to other areas. These changes are further explained in the following section
as the model transforms into the Multiorganizational Implementation Model.

Multiorganizational Implementation Model
The Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) provides the theoretical
basis for this study. This section begins by explaining the transformation leading to the
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development of this model. Ambiguities from an earlier model are eliminated by
significantly altering its design, assumptions, construct nomenclature, and
operationalizations. The terms used to describe interactions within the MIM continue to
represent a continuum of increased interaction and are identified as cooperation,
coordination, and collaboration (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Keast, Brown, &
Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006).
The definitions of these terms align with the policy implementation and
interorganizational theory literatures.
The design of the MIM suggests that all four of the model's constructs
simultaneously impact the interaction continuum. Placement along the continuum of
interaction is measured by variables organized into the following four constructs:
interorganizational policy objective, interorganizational infrastructure, interorganizational
procedures, and organizational management. Relationships between the model's
constructs and the continuum are illustrated in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2
The Multiorganizational Implementation Model
Interorganizational
Infrastructure

Organizational
Management

Continuum of Interaction
Cooperation
Coordination
Collaboration

Interorganizational
Policy Objective

Interorganizational
Procedures

Rather than assuming that the policy objective drives the type of interaction
present in the other constructs, each construct is assumed to impact the continuum of
interaction independently and collectively. Implementation of the interorganizational
policy objective does not require all constructs to operate at the same level of
interdependence. This eliminates the education literature's assumption that effective
interactions are formally planned to align with the type of interaction identified in the
collective objective. By acknowledging that formal planning may not be the impetus for
all interactions, there is room within the MIM to account for informal interactions. While
not pictorially expressed, the relative importance of the model's variables may differ in
their impact on interactions during multiorganizational implementation. Discussion
during interviews enhances meaning and provides context regarding the impact of the

model's variables.
Changes to construct nomenclature eliminate an inherent bias towards
collaboration. By replacing "collaborative" with "interorganizational" in the construct
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nomenclature, the MIM acknowledges the potential for one of three interactions to take
place. This change supports the model's theoretical focus on distinguishing different
types of interactions. An additional nomenclature change is made to replace the
collaborative leadership construct with a construct called organizational management.
Through this change, the MIM acknowledges that arrangements, depending on the type
of interaction, may be managed in different ways. Therefore, this model does not assume
that all types of interactions are overseen by formally identified personnel.
Operationalizations of the MIM constructs are developed through alignment with
the policy implementation and interorganizational theory literatures. These revisions
eliminate ambiguity and help the researcher clearly distinguish between the three types of
interactions. In addition, these operationalizations acknowledge the complexities of
collaborative interactions expressed in the interorganizational theory literature.
Operationalizations for each interaction term are used to determine a partnerships overall
placement along the continuum. The variables used to operationalize the model's
constructs are identified in Table 2.1. While Thatcher (2007) utilizes the same variable
nomenclature, construct nomenclature is significantly different.
The remainder of this section focuses on linking the policy implementation and
interorganizational theory literatures to the operationalizations of the MIM. Through
these linkages, constructs are explained and theoretical support for opreationalizations is
conveyed. Theoretical support is presented during discussion of the model's constructs.
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Table 2.1
Constructs and Variables of the Multiorganizational Implementation Model
Interorganizational Interorganizational Intel-organizational Organizational
Policy Objective
Infrastructure
Procedures
Management
Time
Design
Information Sharing Incentives
Difficulty

Formality of the
Agreement

Decision Making

Commitment

Role of Single
Organization

Organizational
Autonomy

Resolution of Turf
Issues

Trust

Impetus for
Collective Action

Policy Authority

Resource Allocation

Risk Taking

Key Personnel

Systems Thinking

Willingness to
Change

Interorganizational Policy Objective Construct
The interorganizational policy objective represents a policy mandated goal that
organizations work together to achieve (Caruson & MacManus, 2006; O'Toole, 1983;
1991; 1995; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984; Raelin, 1980; 1982). Four variables characterize
the construct of interorganizational policy objective: time, difficulty, role of single
organization, and the impetus for collective action (Thatcher, 2007). Table 2.2 displays
the operationalizations of each variable within the interorganizational policy objective
construct and places them along the continuum of interaction. These revisions align with
the use of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration in the policy implementation and
interorganizational theory literatures. Theoretical support for these operationalizations is
provided.
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Table 2.2
Variable Operationalizations: Inter organizational Policy Objective Construct
Variable
Time

Cooperation
Short-term

Coordination
Longer-term

Collaboration
Long-term, evolutionary nature

Difficulty

Simple task

Multifaceted tasks, repeatable

Complex tasks that are highly
varied and diverse; or
situations of crisis.

Role of Single
Organizations

Organizations are independent;
it is possible for them to
accomplish the task
individually.

Organizations require some
assistance from other
organizations to accomplish
individual goals/missions.

Organizations are
interdependent; each
organization is one element of
the larger system.

Impetus for
Collective
Action

Typically voluntary,
organizations initiate collective
action because it is helpful to
their world of work and it
builds capacity that serves the
individual organization.

Voluntary or mandated,
linkages are mobilized because
compatible mission areas
mutually increase abilities to
achieve individual goals.

Voluntary or mandated,
organizations with mutual or
complementary interests come
together because they cannot
achieve the desired goal or
address the identified problem
without working together.

Changes in external factors
trigger organizations to search
for new solutions.

An interagency liaison or
boundary spanner may forge
these relationships to meet
resource needs or shared
interests.
Legislative mandate or grant
contracts may enhance
cohesion or minimize
duplication.

Organizations share
responsibility for tasks that are
interconnected or cannot be
accomplished individually.
A lead agency or convening
organization brings relevant
stakeholders together and
legitimizes collective action.

In a cooperative interaction, independent organizations voluntarily work together
to pursue a short-term goal involving relatively simple tasks (Keast, Brown, & Mandell,
2007; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b; Thomas, 1997). Although it is possible to achieve
organizational goals by working alone, personnel within each organization make a
deliberate decision to work together because it is helpful to their world of work (Keast,
Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Kuska, 2005; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b; Rogers & Whetten,
1982). This decision is informal and based on recognized opportunities to share
information, build capacity, or generate synergy that serves individual organizations
(Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, Monsey, 2001; May, 1995;
Thomas, 1997). The desire to work together may be triggered by changes in external
factors and the desire to avoid negative impacts (Osparina & Yaroni, 2003).
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In a coordinated interaction, organizations establish formal relationships to pursue
longer-term goals aligned with repeatable tasks deemed to be compatible with each
organization's individual interests (Jennings, 1994; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007;
Mandell, 1994; Mattessich, Murray-Close, and Monsey, 2001; Schlossberg, 2004).
Organizations are semiautonomous and some outside assistance is needed to accomplish
organizational goals. This notion is supported by the interviews conducted by Keast,
Brown, & Mandell (2007), in which a majority of respondents indicate that coordination
is used to "drive" a particular initiative or outcome. These relationships are typically
formed for two reasons. First, organizations may be mandated to work together (see, for
example, Caruson & MacManus, 2006; Hall & O'Toole, 2004; Mandell, 1994; O'Toole,
1983; 1991; 1995; Raelin, 1980). Coordination can be mandated by government to
reorganize, minimize duplication, minimize conflict, or promote cohesion (Boston, 1992;
Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998). For example, the Department of Homeland
Security was established to support coordinated intergovernmental responses to national
disasters, enhance role clarity, and minimize duplication (Wise & Nader, 2002).
Second, organizations may work together in a coordinative relationship based on
increased abilities to achieve individual goals due to compatible mission areas (Jennings,
1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Jennings & Krane, 1994; Kettl, 2003; Van de Ven &
Walker, 1984). In Jennings' (1994) study on state and local level employment and
training programs, 26% of respondents indicate that shared role definitions are an
important factor in forming coordination. Domain similarity may facilitate relationships
between organizations based on complementary resources and shared professional skills
(Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). Therefore, a coordinative interaction is mutually
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beneficial (Peters, 1998; Schlossberg, 2004). Linkages of exchange are typically
established between the organizations (Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Jennings
& Krane, 1994; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984); a boundary spanner, interagency liaison,
or facilitator may help forge these linkages (Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998;
Kapucu, 2006; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). In their research
pertaining to the employment and training services under the Job Training Partnership
Act, Jennings & Ewalt (1998) conclude that 71% of respondents use interdepartmental
liaisons as a coordination technique. This finding is consistent with Jennings' earlier
work (1994).
In a collaborative interaction, organizations establish highly interdependent
relationships that evolve as organizations interact with one another to attain long-term
goals (Huxham, 2003; Keast et al., 2004; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b; Thomson & Perry,
2006). Interdependence develops as organizations share responsibility for highly complex
problems or crisis that prevents them from acting alone (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006;
Gray, 1985; Imperial, 2005; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Each organization is
considered an essential element of the larger interdependent system (Mandell, 1994).
Collaborative membership can be voluntary or mandated (Agranoff, 2006;
Imperial, 2005). While a contractual arrangement or statutory action may be used to bring
participating organizations together, interpersonal relationships must go beyond the terms
of the contract (Keast et al., 2004; Mandell, 1994). The extent of the relationship can
change based on the environment or the extent to which collective action is reciprocated
among partnering organizations (Thomson & Perry, 2006). If multiorganizational
implementation does not occur as expected, organizations may renegotiate their

53
commitment to the arrangement (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). These
changes will reshape the dynamics in the interaction (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). Since
collaboration is time consuming and costly, this interaction should only be used when
addressing a highly complex problem, in times of crisis, or when other forms of
interaction will not suffice (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Gray, 1985; Imperial, 2005;
Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Keast et al, 2004; Thomson & Perry, 2006).
A convening or referent organization plays a significant role in establishing the
collaborative (Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2006; McNamara, Leavitt, & Morris, 2008;
Wood & Gray, 1991). This organization legitimizes the arrangement by identifying an
important problem and bringing relevant stakeholders together to address a particular
purpose (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Wood & Gray, 1991). Through resource and
information exchange, a referent organization facilitates interactions between
organizations and generates stability within the organizational environment (Morris &
Burns, 1997). According to Gray (1989), a referent organization must have the following:
power to persuade stakeholder participation, credibility among stakeholders, abilities to
establish collaborative processes, and capabilities to identify relevant stakeholders. Since
personnel within the convening organization do not have formal authority over other
organizations within the collaborative network, informal influence must be generated
through expertise and credibility (Gray, 1989; Keast et al., 2004; Wood & Gray, 1991). It
is essential that all members of the collaboration perceive the convener to hold legitimate
authority to organize the arrangement (Gray, 1985).
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Interorganizational Infrastructure Construct
Interorganizational infrastructure focuses on the ways in which organizations
within the multiorganizational arrangement generate and structure relationships. Five
variables characterize the construct of interorganizational infrastructure: design, formality
of the agreement, organizational autonomy, policy authority, and key personnel
(Thatcher, 2007). Table 2.3 displays the revised operationalizations of each variable
within the interorganizational infrastructure construct and places them along the
continuum of interaction. These revisions are aligned with the use of cooperation,
coordination, and collaboration within the public administration and organization theory
literatures. Theoretical support for these operationalizations is provided.
In a cooperative interaction, a commonly defined structure does not exist because
organizations work within their existing organizational structures (Keast, Brown, &
Mandell, 2007). The simplicity of tasks does not require an interagency staff, a
multiorganizational structure, or a collective planning effort (Reilly, 2001). Organizations
informally work together based on a mutual benefit where individual organizational
interests are emphasized (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Therefore, organizations
retain separate entities, maintain individual control of resources, and make independent
policy decisions (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Pre-existing policies, established by
the individual organizations are utilized and remain unchanged (Keast, Brown, &
Mandell, 2007). Since cooperative interactions usually occur at the lower levels of an
organization and involve few resources (2007), leaders from individual organizations are
not typically involved in decisions to work together.
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Table 2.3
Variable Operationalizations: Interorganizational Infrastructure Construct
Variable
Design

Cooperation
Individuals work independently
within existing organizational
structures; an interagency staff
is unnecessary.

Coordination
Each organization's hierarchical
structure is used to centrally
manage specialized roles and
responsibilities.

Collaboration
Partner organizations jointly
develop shared power
arrangements to support
mutually beneficial interests.

Centralization may involve
reorganization or consolidation
of programs/activities.

New program structures are
developed based on the needs of
a specific policy/goal.
An administrative staff is
present to sustain collective
efforts.

Formality of
the Agreement

Individual organizations
informally agree to work
together to achieve individual
goals.

Mechanisms, such as
contractual or nonfinancial
agreements, formalize
relationships between
organizations.

Key stakeholders jointly draft a
shared purpose and develop a
course of action based on
mutually agreed upon roles and
responsibilities, rules, goals, and
organizational boundaries.

Agreements, clearly identifying
each organization's roles and
responsibilities, are often
developed and/or reviewed by a
higher authority.
Organizational
Autonomy

Organizations are fully
autonomous.

Organizations are semiautonomous; individual
organizations require some
assistance from other
organizations to achieve goals.

Organizations are not
autonomous; operations within
organizations are intertwined.

Policy
Authority

No multiorganizational policy
decisions are made.

Organizations maintain
individual authority over the
policies that govern their
respective organizations.

Partner organizations jointly
develop policies and procedures
that govern the collective group.

Preexisting policies, established
by the individual organizations,
are followed.

Key Personnel

Organizational leadership is not
involved in decisions to work
together.

Policies pertaining to
coordinated efforts may be
developed, but they are
compatible with the policies
already established within the
individual organizations.

Multiorganizational policies and
procedures include working
rules that specify which
stakeholders can make
decisions, who will guide
collective actions, and the
distribution of costs/benefits.

There is a distinction between
leaders and managers; leaders
make decisions while managers
implement and administer these
decisions.

Although no one is typically in
charge, a lead organization may
propose policies/rules to which
the collective group must
mutually agree to implement.

A facilitator may be identified
to coordinate actions at the local
level.

Membership, role definitions,
and responsibilities adapt to the
task at hand.
Each role is considered equally
important.
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In a coordinated interaction, formal relationships are emphasized within a
hierarchical structure to specialize roles and responsibilities between otherwise
independent organizations (Jennings, 1994; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Reilly,
2001; Mandell, 1994). Administrative efforts are centrally controlled and local level
planning is minimized to maintain control over organizational components (Jennings &
Ewalt, 1998; Jennings & Krane, 1994). Centralization may involve reorganization or
consolidation to minimize duplication (Boston, 1992; Jennings, 1994). Relationships
between organizations are often formalized through contractual or nonfinancial
agreements (Jennings & Krane, 1994). In their research of the Job Opportunities and
Basic Skills Program, Jennings & Krane (1994) conclude that organizations enter into
contractual or nonfinancial agreements to leverage resources and maximize the number
of clients receiving services. Contractual agreements between local agencies establish
areas for joint action and outline roles and responsibilities; these contracts are reviewed
by a regional authority representative of local organizations (Jennings & Krane, 1994).
Organizations participating in coordinated activities are considered
semiautonomous (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). They maintain individual authority
over the policies that govern their respective organizations, but they agree to participate
in some specific collective activity (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Since
organizations focus on their individual missions (Jennings, 1994), policies established for
the collective arrangement must be congruent with those of the individual organizations.
The leaders within each organization make their own policy decisions and managers are
expected to implement these decisions (Thomson & Perry, 2006). A liaison may be
designated to facilitate and guide interactions between organizations at the local level

57
(Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt. 1998; Mandell & Steelman, 2003; Schlossberg,
2004). These boundary spanners can be used to broker relationships and identify areas of
interdependence (Keast et al., 2004; Thomson & Perry, 2006).
In a collaborative interaction, organizations jointly develop a structure of shared
power to address collective interests (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001).
While this structure can take many forms, it is important to recognize that individual
organizations coexist within a new program structure (Mandell, 1994; Mattessich,
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). Administrative staff may be used to bring organizations
together and implement collective policies (Thomson & Perry, 2006). In Agranoff s
(2006) research on public management networks, a staff element is present in all of the
networks analyzed. These personnel are involved in all operations of the collaboration.
It is important for partnering organizations to understand their roles and
responsibilities (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Reilly, 2001; Thomson &
Perry, 2006). In order for this to occur, key stakeholders must establish shared rules,
develop a collective purpose, and jointly decide on a course of action (Bryson, Crosby, &
Stone, 2006; Imperial, 2000; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). As a result,
organizations relinquish some autonomy to the collective unit. Formal and informal
agreements can be used among partnering organizations, and the benefits of both should
be considered (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Imperial 2005; Thomson & Perry, 2006).
Informal agreements may easily support the evolutionary nature of collaborations;
changes are made as the arrangement grows, partners change, or the problem domain
shifts (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). On the other hand, stability can be created by
formalizing the social norms and agreements that establish over time (Imperial, 2005).
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Multiorganizational policies generate working rules to specify which stakeholders can
make decisions, who will guide collective actions, and the distribution of costs or
benefits.
While no one is typically in charge of a collaborative arrangement, this does not
mean that all organizations are always of equal status (Keast et al., 2004; Mandell, 1994).
Often, policy mandates or agency rules identify a lead organization responsible for
implementation. While other organizations are not under the control of the lead agency,
this organization can propose formal rules for the collective group to consider (Keast et
al., 2004). Even when certain organizations are more influential than others, they
recognize that combined efforts are needed to accomplish the objective (Mandell, 1994).
Dynamics surrounding the collaborative arrangement are in constant flux
(Huxham, 2003; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Reilly, 2001). Therefore,
changes to membership may be required and personnel must develop competencies for
multiple roles (Gray, 1985; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Despite the needed flexibility
among personnel, it is important for the collaborative group to identify sponsors and
champions among its formal and informal leaders. Sponsors provide authority and
resources to legitimize the collaboration while champions have the expertise to sustain
daily operations (Agranoff, 2006; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Mandell, 1999;
Mandell & Steelman, 2003). In Agranoff s (2006) research on public management
networks, champions play a significant role in encouraging other organizations to support
the collaborative arrangement.
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Interorganizational Procedures Construct
Interorganizational procedures are the processes developed to support operations
or sustain relationships within the multiorganizational arrangement. Five variables
characterize the construct of interorganizational procedures: information sharing,
decision making, resolution of turf issues, resource allocation, and systems thinking
(Thatcher, 2007). Table 2.4 displays the revised operationalizations of each variable
within the interorganizational procedures construct and places them along the continuum
of interaction. These revisions are aligned with the use of cooperation, coordination, and
collaboration within the public administration and organization theory literatures.
Theoretical support for these operationalizations is provided.
In a cooperative interaction, communication is an important factor in developing
and sustaining the arrangement. An emphasis is placed on sharing information to create
harmonized efforts (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Nylen, 2007). Dialogue is
maintained through informal communication channels to allow information sharing
among participants (Ospina & Yaroni, 2003). While basic information is initially shared,
continuous dialogue creates opportunities for discussing a wider range of topics (2003).
Since each organization retains their autonomy (Keast, Brown, Mandell, 2007), joint
decision making processes are not developed. Instead, organizational systems remain
unchanged and operational decisions are independently made by each organization. Turf
issues are avoided, and organizational systems remain independent. Discretionary funds
may be used in pursuit of individual goals; resources are not pooled. Units of exchange
are determined at the lowest possible level.
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Table 2.4
Variable Operationalizations: Inter organizational Procedures Construct
Variable
Information
Sharing

Cooperation
Dialogue is maintained through
informal relationships between
participants.
Basic information is initially
shared. Continuous dialogue
creates opportunities for
discussing a wider range of
topics.

Coordination
Formal and informal
communication channels are
used to link vertical and
horizontal organizational
levels.

Collaboration
Emphasize open and frequent
communications between
partners to reduce information
asymmetries.
Formal and informal channels
are used to widely disseminate
information concerning the
collective group.
Understanding enhanced by a
willingness to share
information about individual
organizations and what
can/cannot be offered to the
collective group.

Decision
Making

Decisions are made
independently; rules that guide
collective decision making are
not necessary.

Centralized decision making is
practiced; a lead
organization(s) dominates the
decision making process.

Participative decision making
based on consensus and
compromise, generates rules to
govern activities and
relationships between
organizations.
Representatives have latitude
to negotiate rules and
deliberate agreements to
identify common ground.

Resolution of
Turf Issues

Turf issues between
participating organizations are
avoided based on
organizational tendencies to
function independently

A neutral facilitator, outside
convener, or full-time
coordinator is employed to
resolve turf issues.

Conflicting roles based on
incongruent demands from
individual organization and
group.
Consider adjusting policies and
procedures to reduce conflict
while maximizing common
ground.

Resource
Allocation

Discretionary funds may be
used in the pursuit of
individual goals.

Organizations exchange
resources to increase each
organization's abilities to
achieve individual goals.

Pooled resources; allocation is
based on balancing evolving
needs of the collective group
with individual constraints.

Mandates or grant
arrangements may provide
resources.

Individual organizations have
resources, skills, or knowledge
needed to achieve collective
goal.

Resources are not pooled.
Units of exchange are
determined at the lowest
possible level.

Resource needs may be
satisfied by a preexisting
program within an individual
organization.
Systems
Thinking

Organizational systems remain
unchanged.

Compatible information
systems can enhance
coordination.

Organizational resources are
allocated to support the
activities of the collective unit.
Databases are integrated to
create linkages and share
information between multiple
layers of partner organizations.
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In a coordinated interaction, formal and informal communication channels are
used to exchange information within and across organizational boundaries (Boston, 1992;
Jennings, 1994). In Jennings' (1994) study of employment and training activities in the
Job Training Partnership Act, the following formal information channels are identified:
working partnerships, regular meetings of staff from different units, and
interdepartmental liaisons. Sixty percent of respondents indicate that working
partnerships and regular meetings of staff from different units contribute very much to
coordination; more than 50% of respondents indicate that interdepartmental liaisons
contribute very much to coordination (Jennings, 1994).
Some of the informal information channels identified include workshops or
common geographical boundaries. Seventy-eight percent of respondents indicate that
they use workshops as a coordination technique (Jennings & Ewalt, 1998). Based on
increased opportunities for interaction and information sharing, Jennings & Krane (1994)
determine that collocation enhances coordination. Interorganizational interactions can
occur between the top and lower levels of multiple organizations (Kapucu, 2006).
Therefore, formal and informal communication channels are important to linking vertical
and horizontal organizational levels. Organizational systems can be designed to facilitate
increased communication between organizations. Incompatible organizational systems
may prevent coordination (Jennings & Krane, 1994).
The decision making process is highly centralized and dominated by the lead
agency (Jennings & Krane, 1994). Issues related to turf can be barriers to coordination
(Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Jennings & Krane, 1994). A neutral facilitator, separate from a
boundary spanner or convener, can be used to help organizations recognize that they may
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have different goals that should be respected by the collective group (Schlossberg, 2004).
This coordinator, whether full-time or part-time, should be dedicated to resolving
conflicts (Schlossberg, 2004). In studies conducted by Jennings & Ewalt (1998) and
Jennings & Krane (1994), resource limitations are also identified as a potential barrier to
coordination. Resources are the physical property and financial assets used to achieve the
organization's missions (Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Krane, 1994). For example,
Jennings (1994) concludes that more than 50% of respondents indicate that joint program
funding contribute very much to coordination. Resource exchange is often an important
element of coordination (Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Jennings & Krane,
1994; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). Organizations may combine complementary
resources to create mutually beneficial relationships that enhance each organization's
abilities to achieve individual goals (Peters, 1998; Schlossberg, 2004; Van de Ven &
Walker, 1984). Although it is unlikely, policy mandates may include a provision for joint
resources (O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984).
In collaborative interactions, an emphasis is placed on open and frequent
communications between partners (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Information pertaining to
individual organizations and the collective arrangement can be passed through formal
channels or informally through personnel interactions (Mattessich, Murray-Close, &
Monsey, 2001). When information is shared amongst all partners, a common knowledge
base is built to promote understanding (Imperial, 2001; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007).
In addition, sharing information can reduce information asymmetries provided that
organizations clearly state what they can and cannot offer the multiorganizational
arrangement.
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Decisions regarding the arrangement's direction and operations are made
collectively (Mandell, 1994). Joint decision making relies on consensus and compromise
to bridge differences among individual organizations (Agranoff, 2006; Mandell, 1999;
Mandell & Steelman, 2003; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Reilly, 2001;
Thomson & Perry, 2006). In order to identify common ground, representatives of
individual organizations must have discretion to negotiate rules and make organizational
decisions based on group deliberation (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001).
Discretion involves the use of personal judgment to make a decision between multiple
alternatives (Carrington, 2005). Turf issues may arise as each organization is placed in
conflicting roles based on incongruent demands from the individual and collective
organizations (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Considerations are given to adjusting policies
and procedures to reduce conflict (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). In
Agranoff s (2006) research on 14 collaborative networks involving managers in federal,
state, and local governments, problems related to turf do not significantly impact the
network.
An organization's abilities to collaborate can be hindered by a lack of staffing,
funding, or expertise. Therefore, the presence of consistent financial and personnel
support is important (Imperial, 2001; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). To
overcome these limitations, organizations often pool their resources (Gray, 1985; Keast et
al., 2004; Nylen, 2007). For example, Imperial's (2005) research indicates that resources
are pooled in various ways ranging from informal sharing of equipment to more formal
methods of combining financial resources and collocating staffing units. In addition,
Agranoff s (2006) research on collaborative networks indicates that government
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managers are willing to pool resources. However, decisions are difficult to make when
some agencies are unwilling to contribute to the pool of resources (Agranoff, 2006).
Interorganizational systems are developed to involve personnel from multiple
layers within partnering organizations (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). It is
important to involve people representing a variety of organizational positions. In his
study of watersheds, Imperial (2005) finds that interagency databases, joint research, and
joint technical information are used to share knowledge during collaborative activities.

Organizational Management Construct
Organizational management pertains to the way in which behaviors within and
between member organizations support the multiorganizational arrangement. Five
variables characterize the construct of organizational management: incentives,
commitment, trust, risk taking, and willingness to change (Thatcher, 2007). Table 2.5
displays the revised operationalizations of each variable within the organizational
management construct and places them along the continuum of interaction. These
revisions are aligned with the use of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration within
the public administration and organization theory literatures. Theoretical support for
these operationalizations is provided.
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Table 2.5
Variable Operationalizations: Organizational Management Construct
Variable
Incentives

Cooperation
Opportunities for synergistic
benefits are realized based on
the desire to avoid negative
impacts resulting from changes
in external factors.

Coordination
Statutes or grant contracts may
provide funding or resource
incentives to support the
collective effort.

Collaboration
Incentives are provided by the
collective group and individual
organizations to encourage
individuals to stay involved in
the collective effort.

Leaders identify benefits in
working together and
emphasize the importance of
these benefits to subordinates.
Commitment

Work is completed as part of
the regular job responsibilities
conducted within the
individual organization.
Interests of the individual
organization remain
paramount.

A supervisory administrative
body actively encourages
organizations to work together.
Linkages between
organizations are recognized
when benefits are perceived to
outweigh the costs.

Colleagues may encourage
each other to work with
personnel in other
organizations.

Willingness to
Change

Participating organizations
maintain complete
independence in establishing
the rules, roles and
responsibilities, and policies to
govern the organization.

Trust relationships are not
required, but can develop when
organizations consistently
share honest information.

Participation is justified by
perceptions that the collective
interest serves each
organization's interests.
Mutual commitment expands
as organizations reciprocate
collective action.

Leaders explore modifications
to standard operating
procedures when supporting
operational goals aligned with
individual organizational
missions.

Partner organizations mutually
adjust to the rules, roles and
responsibilities, and policies
collectively established to
govern the collective unit.
Changes to an organization's
standard operating procedures
are considered when needed to
align with those of the
collective unit.

An organization's standard
operating procedures are not
modified.

Trust

Members are committed to
intra- and inter-organizational
partners; collective interests
must constantly be balanced
with self-interests.

Leaders work closely to create
relationships based on trust.

Trust between organizations is
necessary.
Partners reinforce trust in each
other by sharing information
through open communication.
A history of supportive
interactions sustains and
legitimizes relationships.

Risk Taking

Organizations do not generally
engage in risk taking behavior.
Characterized by low levels of
risk.

Some interdependencies may
be formed based on resource
needs.
Characterized by moderate
levels of risk.

Integrated approaches develop
and create dependency.
Adherence to shared policies
may require organizations to
depart from normal behavior.
Characterized by high levels of
risk.
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In cooperative interactions, incentives to interact are based on recognizing
opportunities for synergistic benefits (Thomas, 1997). Cooperative behavior may be
triggered by changes in external factors and an organization's desire to identify common
ground in hopes of avoiding negative impacts (Ospina & Yaroni, 2003). When engaging
in cooperative interaction, organizations do not need to make any changes to their current
operations or missions (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Since interests of the individual
organizations remain paramount, the collective effort is aligned with each organization's
standard operating procedures. Organizations maintain complete independence in
establishing the rules, roles and responsibilities, and policies that govern their
involvement with the collective action (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Trust
relationships are not required, but can develop when organizations consistently share
honest information (Ospina & Yaroni, 2003). Since organizational policies and
operations remain independent, cooperative relationships are considered to have low
levels of risk (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007).
In coordinated interaction, incentives to participate in the collective action can
come from two sources. First, statutory provisions may provide funding incentives to
support the collective effort (Jennings, 1994). Provisions within a grant contract may
designate an interorganizational liaison and require organizations to work together to
implement the goals of the grant (Schlossberg, 2004). Second, leaders within the
hierarchical structure may identify a benefit in working together and communicate the
importance of coordination to their subordinates (Jennings, 1994; Schlossberg, 2004). In
Jennings (1994), 70% of administrators indicate that leaders play an important role in
establishing commitment to coordination. The importance placed on support from
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leadership is significantly higher than the importance placed on financial sanctions,
interpersonal relations, or interagency recognition. Therefore, an organization's
supervisory level must be actively involved to encourage coordination.
Organizations are committed to the relationship provided that their interests
outweigh the costs. Partnerships between member organizations are formalized to ensure
clear role definition (Jennings, 1994). Although individual organizations retain authority
over decision making, joint planning and information- sharing does occur (Keast, Brown,
& Mandell, 2007). As a result of these processes, modifications to an individual
organization's standard operating procedures may be explored when it is in support of its
mission. An emphasis is placed on developing trust among the leaders in charge of the
individual organizations (Jennings & Krane, 1994). Since interdependencies can form on
the basis of resource exchange, coordinated relationships are considered to have moderate
levels of risk (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007).
In a collaborative interaction, incentives are provided by the collective and
individual organizations to encourage individuals to stay involved with the collaborative
effort (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). Organizations and individuals
should be rewarded for their participation in the collaborative effort (Imperial, 2005;
Gray, 1985). Imperial's (2005) research on collaboration within watershed programs
indicates that the presence of rewards provides incentives for organizations to continue to
work together. The effects of the incentives must be monitored to ensure they motivate
members as intended (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001).
Power imbalances and competing organizational interests may create tension and
conflict among members of the collaborative arrangement (Mandell & Steelman, 2003;
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Thomson & Perry, 2006). It is important to recognize each participant's struggle to meet
the commitments of the interorganizational unit while also supporting the potentially
conflicting interests of their individual organizations (Keast et al., 2004; Mandell, 1994;
Mandell & Steelman, 2003; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007a; Thomson & Perry, 2006). The
term "program rationale" is used to describe the mindset toward the collective
arrangement as a legitimate influence over individual behavior (Mandell, 1994). While
this commitment to the collective arrangement plays an important role in facilitating joint
agreements (Mandell, 1994), it does not decrease members' commitments to their
individual organizations (Keast et al., 2004). Despite potentially different interests,
collaboration typically occurs when stakeholders work together to resolve inherently
complex problems without giving up any of their own interests (Thomson & Perry, 2006;
Wood & Gray, 1991). The extent to which individual organizational interests are met will
determine an organization's willingness to support and commit to the collective endeavor
(Imperial, 2001; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). Participation is justified
based on a perception that the collective interest also serves an organization's individual
interests (Thomson & Perry, 2006).
In order for a collaborative arrangement to accomplish the desired objective, two
or more organizations must mutually adjust to collective policies and procedures
(Mandell, 1999). Partner organizations become interdependent as integrated policies and
operations are established (Imperial, 2000; 2005). Changes to an organization's standard
operating procedures are made when needed to align with those jointly developed by the
organizations within the collective unit. It can be challenging to establish policies and
procedures for the entire group to follow, because group membership is comprised of
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many different organizations with different views (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). When
members are unable to accommodate other organizations, a collaborative arrangement
will not be established (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). The history of interactions between
organizations will affect the extent to which organizations are willing to change (Mandell
& Steelman, 2003). As participants gain a broader view of their relationships with other
organizations, some of the bureaucratic boundaries preventing change may dissolve
(Keast et al., 2004). It is through this process that a new value set can be established to
change the views of individual participants (Keast et al., 2004).
The likelihood that collective action will occur increases when members have a
reputation for trustworthiness (Huxham, 2003; Keast et al., 2004; Thomson & Perry,
2006). It is important for organizations within the arrangement to believe that partners are
committed to the collective objective, will act within the established rules, and honestly
negotiations with other organizations. This trust is also referred to as an "ethic of
collaboration" (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 25). While trust is a critical component of
collaborations, it takes time and resources to develop and sustain (Bryson, Crosby, &
Stone, 2006; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Prior relationships and open communications may
help partners develop mutual understanding and reduce vulnerability (Bryson, Crosby, &
Stone, 2006; Huxham, 2003; Mandell, 1999; Mandell & Steelman, 2003). Trust
facilitates sustained relationships between partners as an emphasis on formal
organizational roles and contractual arrangements diminish (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone,
2006; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Collaborative arrangements involve high levels of risk
(Keast et al., 2004). As partner organizations develop integrated policies and operations,
dependency between organizations is created (Imperial, 2000; 2005).

Summary
Increased levels of interaction are not inherently more desirable, and a specific
interaction will not be effective in all settings (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Keast et
al., 2004; Mandell & Steelman, 2003; Thatcher, 2007). Costs, challenges, and risks
increase as interactions proceed along the continuum (Agranoff, 2006; Nylen, 2007;
Schlossberg, 2004; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Since there are several types of interactions
to consider, the appropriate interaction for a particular situation must be carefully chosen.
This study uses the Multiorganizational Implementation Model to explore the
types of interactions used in multiorganizational arrangements. This model distinguishes
between interaction terms and aligns operationalizations with the policy implementation
and interorganizational theory literatures. The operationalizations of these variables are
critical to placing multiorganizational relationships on the continuum of interaction.
Application of the MIM allows for empirical testing of operationalizations. Its use in a
policy implementation setting will help determine the extent to which the model can be
used to explain interactions between organizations. In addition, a potential for informal
interactions between organizations is acknowledged by assuming that variables within
each of the four constructs simultaneously impact the continuum of interaction. The MIM
guides the development of research questions for this study.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

General Approach to Research
This chapter presents the research approach used in this study and includes
discussion pertaining to selection of the setting, research design, data collection, variable
definitions, data analysis techniques, and limitations. The purpose of this inquiry is to
examine the helpfulness of the Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) in
exploring interactions between organizations, the use of different types of interactions
during public policy implementation, and the ways in which these interactions are
initiated.
The model presented in this study uses the policy implementation and
interorganizational theory literatures to explore cooperation, coordination, and
collaboration through the constructs of interorganizational policy objective,
interorganizational infrastructure, interorganizational procedures, and organizational
management. Data collected from semistructured interviews and a review of
organizational documents provides the information needed to examine the helpfulness of
the MIM in exploring interactions between organizations implementing the Virginia
Seaside Heritage Program, the use of different types of interactions during
implementation, and the ways in which multiorganizational interactions are initiated
between government and nongovernmental organizations.

72

Selection of the Setting
The Coastal Zone Management (VCZM) Program, and more specifically their
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program, provides the setting for this case study. When
focusing research on a single case, selection of the case requires careful consideration
(Stake, 1995; 2000; Yin, 2003). It is important that there are opportunities, within the
selected case, for the researcher to observe the phenomena of interest (Stake, 2000).
The VCZM Program was selected as the setting for this research through criterion
purposeful sampling. This type of sampling strategy is used when it is important that the
site meet particular criteria (Patton, 2002). Therefore, the following criteria guide case
selection: (1) the program is mandated to implement policy via the Coastal Zone
Management Act; (2) the program is comprised of a network of organizations which
frequently interact to implement policy; (3) no organization within the network has
formal authority to direct a particular type of interaction with other organizations; and
(4) a variety of interactions potentially occur within the program's multiorganizational
arrangement involving federal and state agencies, local governments, and
nongovernmental organizations. The VCZM Program represents a critical case which is
examined to advance understanding of interactions during multiorganizational
implementation and the applicability of the MIM in a policy setting. The interactions that
occur between organizations involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage
Program are the target of this exploratory research.
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Research Design
This single case study research design allows for exploration of interactions
during multiorganizational implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program.
This type of design is particularly useful for refining theory or identifying complexities
worthy of further research (Stake, 2000). A qualitative methodology is used to enhance
understanding of particular phenomena, acknowledge the complexity of the situation,
recognize the importance of context, and allow for exploration of new ideas (Marshall &
Rossman, 1999; Stake, 1995). In this study, interactions between organizations during
program implementation are the unit of analysis and are explored through the perceptions
of administrators and organizational documents. Relationships between organizations are
used as the unit of analysis in previous implementation research (see, for example,
Menzel, 1987).
More specifically, interactions between organizations implementing the Virginia
Seaside Heritage Program are of particular interest to this study. In order to examine fully
the nature of these interactions, textual data are collected from semistructured interviews
and organizational documents. Different data sources are used to corroborate findings and
enhance authenticity (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003). Due to the unit of analysis
employed in this case study design, the use of different data sources is especially
important. Although interactions between organizations are the unit of analysis,
individuals are interviewed to collect data pertaining to these interactions. In order to
collect data and draw conclusions from an organizational perspective, interviews should
not provide the sole source of data. This situation can create conflict within the design if
unintended changes are made to the unit of analysis (Yin, 2003). To maintain a consistent
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unit of analysis, document review is also utilized. Conclusions pertaining to interactions
during multiorganizational implementation require individual and organizational sources
of information.
Content analysis allows the researcher to categorize data collected through
interviews and document review. The researcher uses categories from a prestructured
coding scheme to guide a deductive approach to data analysis. In addition, a purposeful
attempt is made to identify factors that impact interactions during multiorganizational
implementation but are not accounted for in the model. For textual data that does not fit
into these prestructured categories, the researcher uses an inductive approach to identify
emerging patterns that can be used to revise the MIM.
A qualitative methodology suits this research because it emphasizes the need to
explore and describe particular phenomena (Creswell, 2003). This method allows for
exploration of the multiorganizational interactions that occur during policy
implementation. Within the policy implementation literature, scholars acknowledge the
existence of a cases-variables problem particular to case study research (see, for example,
Goggin, 1986; O'Toole, 2000; 1986). When the number of variables significantly
overwhelms the number of cases, the data may incorrectly appear to support inferences
because too much information is being used to explain a small number of cases (Goggin,
1986). The explanatory power of each variable diminishes while research becomes
increasingly complicated and impractical. Quantitative methods fail to resolve the
conflicts inherent to the top-down/bottom-up approaches. The use of qualitative methods
allows the researcher to thoroughly explore complex interactions between organizations
in a way that cannot be done through quantitative methods.
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Pilot Study
A pilot study is conducted prior to conducting interviews with participants
involved in the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. This pilot study provides
opportunities to refine the content and procedures of the interview protocol (Yin, 2003).
Participants for the pilot study are selected based on their involvement with the VCZM
Program's Dragon Run Watershed. For this project, government and nongovernmental
organizations work together to address issues of economic development, habitat
restoration, and natural resource preservation pertaining to this pristine waterway located
in Virginia's Middle Peninsula. This setting is selected for the pilot study because it
meets the criteria used to select the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program as the setting for
the case study. Upon completion of each pilot interview, a report is compiled detailing
lessons learned (Yin, 2003). Revisions are made to the interview protocol, and the final
draft is included in Appendix A. Availability of the interview protocol enhances
replication of this qualitative case study in different settings (Creswell, 2003).

Data Collection
Data are collected in two ways: (1) semistructured interviews with individuals
implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program, and (2) a review of documents
related to the Coastal Zone Management Act, implementation of the program, or
interactions with other organizations. These data collection strategies are common to
qualitative methodology and employed simultaneously (Yin, 2003). Interviews are
frequently used to collect data on cooperative, coordinative, or collaborative interactions
(see, for example, Imperial, 2001; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Kuska, 2005). In
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addition, document review is common to data collection pertaining to multiorganizational
implementation (see, for example, Hall & O'Toole, 2004; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984).
Data are collected from May through June 2008. Table 3.1 summarizes the relationship
between the study's research questions and data collection strategies.
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Table 3.1
Research Questions, Data Collection Strategies, and Information Collected
Research Questions

Does the revised
Multiorganizational
Implementation Model
(MIM) help explain
interactions in a policy
implementation setting?

Data
Collection
Strategy
Semistructured
Interviews

Collection & Analysis of Information

Develop interview protocol aligned with broad, open-ended questions that
speak to the four constructs of the MIM. Determine the extent to which
the MIM is applicable to a policy setting by using content analysis to see
how patterns from the textual data provided during interviews match
patterns within the operationalizations of the MIM. If factors other than
those outlined in the model emerge, this information can be used to build
theory and further revise the MIM.

Document
Review

Documents that speak to relationships between organizations during
policy implementation are reviewed and content analysis is used to
determine the extent to which operationalizations in the MIM are
supported. If factors other than those outlined in the MIM emerge, this
information can be used to build theory and further revise the model.

How do administrators
perceive the use of
cooperation,
coordination, or
collaboration when
working in a
multiorganizational
arrangement to
implement policy?

Semistructured
Interviews

Probe responses to broad, open-ended questions with more specific
questions. Content analysis is used to analyze responses to these probes.
Textual data are organized into the categories of the pre-structured coding
scheme. The researcher uses the coding scheme to identify patterns and
determine which of the three interaction terms best describes the
relationship of interest.

Document
Review

Documents that speak to relationships between organizations during
policy implementation are reviewed and content analysis is used to
analyze the text within the documents. Textual data are organized into the
categories of the pre-structured coding scheme. The researcher uses the
coding scheme to identify patterns and determine which of the three
interaction terms best describes the relationship of interest. This
information may or may not corroborate the perceptions expressed by
administrators during interviews.

How are
multiorganizational
interactions initiated?

Semistructured
Interviews

Focus on the impetus for collective action variable within the
interorganizational policy objective construct and the formality of the
agreement variable within the interorganizational infrastructure construct
of the MIM. If interviewees do not initially offer information pertaining to
these variables, probing questions are used to guide inquiry. Content
analysis is used to analyze responses. Textual data are organized into the
categories of the pre-structured coding scheme pertaining to the
applicable variables. The researcher uses the coding scheme to identify
patterns and explore how multiorganizational interactions are initiated.
Interactions are likely to be initiated in three ways: (1) formally initiated
through legislative mandates or agency rulemaking; (2) informally
initiated through street-level experience or common interests; or (3) a
combination of both.

Document
Review

Organizational and legislative documents are reviewed to collect
additional information on the ways in which multiorganizational
interactions are initiated. Particular areas of interest include the context in
which multiorganizational activities occur and the ways in which they are
supported by individual organizations and the collective arrangements.
Content analysis is used to analyze responses. Textual data are organized
into the categories of the prestructured coding scheme pertaining to the
applicable variables.
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Interviews
Interviews provide an important source of data in case study research and allow
researchers to explore the views of multiple people (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). Qualitative
interviews may be described as "a conversation with a purpose" because of the tendency
for in-depth discussion to arise (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 108). A semistructured
interview, or focused interview, is particularly useful in this research because it allows
the researcher to guide inquiry by focusing on specific questions while also allowing for
conversation through open-ended questions (Yin, 2003).
In this study, semistructured interviews are conducted to gather in-depth
information from administrators representing a variety of organizations within the
network implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. Interviews are an
appropriate data collection strategy for this research because they facilitate exploration of
multiple views. It is through the information-rich data gathered from interviews that the
researcher explores the research questions.
As is common in qualitative research, the researcher becomes highly involved as
the instrument for data collection (Creswell, 2003; Rossman & Marshall, 1999). An
interview protocol guides conversations between the researcher and participants in the
study (Yin, 2003). The predetermined wording and sequence of questions enhances
comparability of responses and limits interviewer influence (Patton, 2002). In addition,
standardized interview questions focus the interview on sensitizing concepts aligned with
the variables in the MIM and guide data analysis (Stake, 1995). According to Creswell
(2003), the following components are included in the interview protocol: (1) a heading,
(2) instructions for the interviewer, (3) the research questions guiding the study, (4)
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follow-up questions, (5) space for interviewers to write comments, and (6) space for the
interviewer to record additional notes.
A prestructured coding scheme, based on sensitizing themes, helps link the textual
data collected to operationalizations of the MIM. Three types of questions are included in
the interview process: (1) background questions, (2) broad open-ended questions, and
(3) more specific probing questions. First, participants are asked to fill out a preinterview
questionnaire which contains a series of background questions. These background
questions also request some demographic information. It is through these questions that
the researcher gains a better understanding of each participant's history in implementing
the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. The preinterview questionnaire is included in
Appendix B.
Second, the interview protocol includes open-ended questions that generally
speak to the four constructs of the MIM. These questions are written broadly so as not to
bias participant responses or lead them to provide answers that align with the model's
operationalizations. The data collected from these questions help the researcher
determine if the MIM is helpful in explaining multiorganizational interactions during
implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. In addition, open-ended
questioning provides an opportunity for the researcher to identify patterns within
participant responses that are not accounted for by the revised model.
Third, more specific probing questions are used to seek additional information or
clarify previous responses (Merriam, 1998). While these questions are also open-ended,
they are phrased to guide inquiry more specifically to the operationalizations of the
model's constructs. The textual data gathered from these responses helps the researcher
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explore participants' perceptions regarding the use of cooperation, coordination, or
collaboration during implementation and the way in which interactions are initiated in
this setting.
Throughout discussions with interviewees, the interviewer has flexibility to use
informal conversational interview techniques. There are three benefits to this technique.
First, the interviewer has the opportunity to pursue questions that emerge during the
course of the standardized interview conversation (Patton, 2002). This allows the
researcher to clarify responses with follow-up questions. Second, the interview can be
tailored to the experiences and positions of the interviewee. Third, there are opportunities
for interviewees to provide unsolicited feedback. Data gathered from these questions
provides information-rich support and clarification to discussions pertaining to
standardized interview questions.
Sampling in qualitative research tends to involve a relatively small group of
people, be purposive in nature, and evolve with the study (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
These characteristics also appear in this case study. The sampling frame consists of
participants representing the organizations involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside
Heritage Program. Interview participants are selected using snowball sampling. This
sampling strategy is used to identify information-rich participants and allow
knowledgeable informants to emerge as interviews progress (Yin, 2003; Marshall &
Rossman, 1999; Miles & Huberman, 1994). A chain forms as additional participants are
identified and interviewed based on the recommendations of previous interviewees
(Patton, 2002). It is through this involvement that participants become informants (Yin,
2003). Although overdependence on knowledgeable informants is not recommended,
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they provide critical insights into the case study and access to relevant personnel. While it
is important to interview people directly involved in the case study, insight can also be
gained by interviewing those who operate at the peripheries (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Interviewing begins with members of the Coastal Policy Team who are involved in
implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program.
The researcher calls potential participants, as they are identified, to explain the
purpose of the research and ask for an interview. The researcher begins each interview
with an introductory statement. This statement introduces the researcher to the
interviewee, explains the purpose of collecting the information asked, and identifies the
intended use for the information. In addition, the statement explains interviewee
confidentiality and provides information regarding the protection of interviewee identity.
A letter of informed consent is presented to interviewees for their signature; this letter is
included in Appendix C. Lastly, the researcher seeks permission from each participant to
record the interview (Yin, 2003). Although the researcher takes field notes throughout the
interview process, audio recordings allow the researcher to fully concentrate on
interviewee responses and probe for clarification when needed. The researcher uses audio
recordings in postinterview reviews to ensure accuracy of data and recreate exact
quotations and insights. Upon completion of each interview, the researcher transcribes
each interview verbatim (Creswell, 2003). These verbatim transcriptions provide the raw
data needed for data analysis (Patton, 2002). Transcriptions are emailed to interviewees
to provide them with an opportunity to make revisions to the document.
Advantages associated with using interviews as a data collection strategy include
allowing the researcher to control inquiry, gaining participants' perspectives on particular
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topics of interest, and the potential to gather a variety of information (Marshall &
Rossman, 1999; Creswell, 2003). The disadvantages associated with using interviews as a
data collection strategy include the possibility that interview participants and the
interviewer may unintentionally filter data during the interview process to create bias
(Creswell, 2003). In addition, participants may not have equal skills or abilities when it
comes to articulating their perceptions (Creswell, 2003).

Document Review
Organizational documents are another important source of data because they help
the researcher understand the contextual setting of the research and the participants
involved (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Analysis of organizational documents is a
particularly useful data collection strategy based on its potential to corroborate data
gathered from other sources (Yin, 2003). As previously mentioned, data source
triangulation is especially important in this case study. Although the interactions between
organizations during program implementation are the unit of analysis, they are explored
through the perceptions of the individuals interviewed. In order to collect data and draw
conclusions from an organizational perspective, interviews should not provide the sole
source of data.
There are several additional advantages to using document review as a data
collection strategy. First, document review allows the researcher to gain an organizational
perspective that cannot be solely provided by interviewees (Yin, 2003). Second, this type
of data collection is particularly useful because it allows the researcher to gather
secondary information in an unobtrusive manner (Creswell, 2003). This additional
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information may be pertinent to the context of the research or the participants involved
(Marshall & Rossman, 1999). More specifically, memoranda of understanding between
organizations, policy mandates, meeting minutes, memos, program evaluations, or other
archival data are reviewed (Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Yin, 2003). The documents
listed in Appendix D are reviewed in order to provide further insight into the
multiorganizational interactions used during implementation of the Virginia Seaside
Heritage Program. These documents are particularly useful for exploring the context in
which interactions occur, the history of interactions between organizations, and the
formality in which interactions are initiated.
Although there are many advantages associated with document review, it is
important to remember that these documents are developed for a purpose other than this
research (Yin, 2003). Therefore, the researcher must judge the applicability of each
document to the study's research questions (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). In addition, the
accuracy and authenticity of the information contained in the documents must be
considered (Creswell, 2003; Merriam, 1998).

Definition of Terms
Analytic categories are needed to describe and analyze interactions between
organizations involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). These analytic categories include the interaction terms, constructs, and
variables within the MIM. They are defined in this section. When considering the
proposed definitions, keep in mind the ambiguity of the operationalizations in the original
model. While construct operationalizations are transformed for this study, the exact
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points along the continuum in which one interaction crosses the threshold to another
interaction are still unclear and are not addressed in the public administration,
interorganizational theory, policy implementation, or education literatures. Findings may
clarify placement of each interaction's threshold along the continuum.

Interaction Terms
1. Cooperation - An interaction between independent organizations that can
individually accomplish the task at hand but voluntarily and informally work
together, within existing organizational structures and policies, to build capacity
or serve individual interests in pursuit of simple, short-term goals (Keast, Brown,
& Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; O'Leary &
Bingham, 2007b). Cooperation is further characterized as an interaction in which
autonomous organizations independently maintain authority, missions, resources,
infrastructure, and procedures (Intriligator, 1994; Mattessich, Murray-Close, &
Monsey, 2001). Cooperation may take place without involving the leaders of the
organizations involved (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007).
2. Coordination - An interaction between organizations requiring some assistance to
accomplish individual missions in which linkages are mobilized voluntarily or by
mandate in pursuit of multifaceted, longer-term goals that support common
objectives (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, and
Monsey, 2001). Coordination is further characterized as an interaction in which
formal relationships, hierarchical structure, and centralized control are used to
link resources, infrastructure, or procedures in ways that are compatible with the
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semiautonomous organizations whose leaders retain authority over decision
making (Intriligator, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Mandell, 1994).
3. Collaboration - An interaction between organizations with collective
responsibility for interconnected tasks who work together voluntarily or by
mandate in pursuit of complex goals which cannot be accomplished by a single
organization and are based on shared interests (Gray, 1989; Keast, Brown, &
Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Thomson & Perry,
2006). Collaboration is further characterized as an interaction in which individual
organizations relinquish some autonomy to a new program arrangement by
mutually adjusting to collective decisions regarding mission, resource
distribution, infrastructure, and shared procedures to reduce conflict and support
shared interests (Intriligator, 1994; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001;
Mandell, 1994; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Although commitments to individual
organizations remain important, these relationships require partner organizations
to reciprocate commitment to collective activities through the allocation of
resources, staff, and funding (Agranoff, 2006; Imperial, 2001; Mattessich,
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001).

Interorganizational Policy Objective Construct and Variables
1. Interorganizational Policy Objective - The policy goal that organizations work
together to achieve. Four variables are used to operationalize this construct: time,
difficulty, role of single organization, and the impetus for collective action
(Thatcher, 2007).
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2. Time - The length of time that the multiorganizational arrangement is expected to
work together to accomplish the policy objective (Intriligator, 1994).
3. Difficulty - The complexity of the tasks that the multiorganizational arrangement
undertakes to accomplish the policy objective.
4. Role of Single Organization - The roles individual organizations assume to
accomplish the policy objective.
5. Impetus for Collective Action - The reason for developing the multiorganizational
arrangement and the way in which it was developed (Thatcher, 2007).

Interorganizational Infrastructure Construct and Variables
1. Interorganizational Infrastructure - The way in which an organization structures
and formalizes its relationships with other organizations in the
multiorganizational arrangement (Thatcher, 2007). Five variables are used to
operationalize this construct: design, the formality of the agreement,
organizational autonomy, policy authority, and key personnel.
2. Design - The administrative structure used to support the multiorganizational
arrangement (Thatcher, 2007).
3. Formality of the Agreement - The way in which individual organizations agree on
their roles and responsibilities within the multiorganizational arrangement
(Thatcher, 2007).
4. Organizational Autonomy - The degree in which each partnering organization
independently operates, and the extent that their operating procedures and policies
are adapted by the multiorganizational arrangement (Thatcher, 2007).
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5. Policy Authority - The authority given to the multiorganizational arrangement to
develop policies that guide operations in pursuit of the collective objective
(Thatcher, 2007).
6. Key Personnel - Personnel who are responsible for bringing together the
multiorganizational arrangement (Thatcher, 2007).

Interorganizational Procedures Construct and Variables
1. Interorganizational Procedures - The processes developed to support operations
or sustain relationships within the multiorganizational arrangement in pursuit of
the policy objective (Thatcher, 2007). Five variables are used to operationalize
this construct: information sharing, decision making, resolution of turf issues,
resource allocation, and systems thinking.
2. Information Sharing - The ways in which personnel within the
multiorganizational arrangement use information and communication processes to
attain the policy objective (Thatcher, 2007).
3. Decision Making - The ways in which the organizations within the
multiorganizational arrangement make implementation decisions pertaining to the
policy objective.
4. Resolution of Turf Issues - The process used for solving conflicts between
organizations within the arrangement (Thatcher, 2007).
5. Resource Allocation - The contributions allocated by individual organizations to
the multiorganizational arrangement in support of the policy objective (Thatcher,
2007).
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6. Systems Thinking - The extent to which individual organizational systems are
expanded and integrated to attain the policy objective (Thatcher, 2007).

Organizational Management Construct and Variables
1. Organizational Management - The level of support generated within and between
organizations to support the multiorganizational arrangement. Five variables are
used to operationalize this construct: incentives, commitment, willingness to
change, trust, and risk taking.
2. Incentives - The intrinsic and extrinsic rewards provided to individuals and
participating organizations to encourage support for the multiorganizational
arrangement (Thatcher, 2007).
3. Commitment - The dedication of individuals and participating organizations to
implement the policy objective (Thatcher, 2007).
4. Trust - The extent to which trustworthy relationships between organizations
within the multiorganizational arrangement are built.
5. Risk Taking - The extent to which the multiorganizational arrangement functions
in ways that deviate from standards within the member organizations in order to
achieve the collective objective (Thatcher, 2007).
6. Willingness to Change - The extent to which member organizations are willing to
alter their standard operating procedures in support of the multiorganizational
arrangement (Thatcher, 2007).
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Data Analysis Techniques
Consistent with qualitative methods, this study simultaneously conducts data
collection and analysis (Creswell, 2003; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002).
Ongoing analysis focuses data collection while accounting for emerging patterns. Content
analysis, a form of data reduction, describes the data collected by identifying "the
mention of specific items" (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 117). It allows the researcher
to identify meanings and summarize patterns within textual data (Creswell, 2003; Miles
& Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002). "Data reduction is a form of analysis that sharpens,
sorts, focuses, discards, and organizes data in such a way that "final" conclusions can be
drawn and verified" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 11). As data are collected through
interviews and document review, the researcher uses content analysis to reduce data into
the categories of a prestructured coding scheme and identify emerging patterns.
First, the researcher reviews all textual data and focuses analysis on patterns that
align with categories of the prestructured coding scheme (Patton, 2002).
Operationalizations of the MIM's constructs provide the basis for the coding scheme.
Therefore, data analysis initially occurs through a deductive approach in which an
existing framework is used to verify theory and assess linkages with qualitative data
(Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003). Coding labels are used to identify
each variable in the model and each type of interaction. These short-hand designations
are used to assign meaning to data and guide analysis by linking data with the study's
research questions (Merriam, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1995).
Once textual data are coded, the data are numerically aggregated or left in textual
form. For numerical aggregation, the researcher uses quantification to identify the
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number of times a particular phenomenon emerges within the content of the interviews or
organizational documents (Merriam, 1998). As patterns emerge, the data are reduced and
numerically aggregated into the interaction categories of cooperation, coordination, or
collaboration. While numerical aggregation allows the researcher to get a feel for patterns
within the data, the meaning within the text is essential to qualitative research (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). It is also important to analyze textual data in nonnumerical form.
Exact comments from interviewees provide context to the research that may be lost
during numerical aggregation (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This context is especially
important in qualitative research because close examination of individual responses
allows the researcher to identify meaningful information (Stake, 1995). Emerging
patterns from this textual data are also mapped to the categories within the predetermined
coding scheme to enrich numerical aggregation. A deductive approach to data analysis is
appropriate for this research because operationalizations of the theoretical constructs help
the researcher better understand the data.
Second, content analysis allows the researcher to identify emerging data patterns
that do not fit into the predetermined categories of the coding scheme. Inquiry is sensitive
to recurring patterns that provide alternative explanations to initial insights (Marshall &
Rossman, 1999; Patton, 2002). Through an inductive approach, efforts are made to
identify data that do not align with the theoretical model's operationalizations. The
researcher interprets these patterns to attach meaning and further refine theory (Marshall
& Rossman, 1999).
Content analysis provides insight into the study's research questions. Congruence
between textual data and variable operationalizations helps the research verify and refine
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the operationalizations introduced within the Multiorganizational Implementation Model.
This type of analysis is appropriate for this study because it allows the researcher to
explore the helpfulness of the theoretical model in explaining interactions in a policy
implementation setting, administrators' perceptions regarding the use of interactions
during policy implementation, and the ways in which multiorganizational interactions are
initiated.

Strategies for Enhancing Authenticity, Confirmability, and Transferability
Four strategies are used to enhance the authenticity, transferability, and
confirmability of findings: data source corroboration, review of transcripts by interview
participants, specificity, and the use of rich descriptions. First, corroboration of
complementary data sources enhances the authenticity of this study's findings (Miles &
Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002). It is through triangulation that researchers clarify
meaning and prevent misinterpretation (Stake, 2000). Triangulation of data sources is
established by comparing data gathered from documents with data gathered from
interviews. Data collected from both sources are compared to address inconsistencies,
corroborate findings, and illuminate different approaches to the same phenomena (Patton,
2002). Both data sources are used to explore multiorganizational interactions.
Second, authenticity is enhanced when interview participants have the opportunity
to review the verbatim transcript of the interview (Patton, 2002). An audit of textual data
is created through this review process (Miles & Huberman, 1994). More specifically,
reactions from this review give the researcher an idea as to how participants perceive the
accuracy of the transcript (Patton, 2002).
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Third, all aspects of the research design are specifically described to enhance the
conflrmability and dependability of data collection and analysis (Miles & Huberman,
1994). Sampling strategies, the preinterview questionnaire, and the interview protocol are
presented and accurately document the researcher's actions throughout data collection
and analysis. Data collection strategies are predetermined and systematically followed by
the researcher to minimize error and bias. Interviews are recorded and reviewed to ensure
accuracy.
Fourth, rich descriptions enhance the transferability of findings (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). Characteristics of the sample and setting are fully described to allow
comparisons with other research (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In addition, the researcher
uses the participants' own language when possible to preserve their perspectives and
provide context to the research.

Summary
The purpose of this inquiry is to explore the helpfulness of the
Multiorganizational Implementation Model in explaining interactions between
organizations when working together to implement policy, the perceived use of different
types of interactions, and the ways in which multiorganizational interactions are initiated
during implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. The proposed case
study research design explores these areas of interest by collecting data through
semistructured interviews and a review of organizational documents. In addition to
presenting the overall research design, this chapter discusses data collection strategies,
variable definitions, and data analysis techniques.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS

Overview of Analysis
This chapter presents the analysis of data collected through semistructured
interviews and a review of documents. In total, 34 interview transcriptions and eight
documents are reviewed to explore interactions during multiorganizational policy
implementation. Textual data from these interviews and documents are analyzed using a
predetermined coding scheme aligned with the operationalizations of the
Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM). Upon completion of coding, the
researcher organizes the data based on each element of the model. Data are numerically
summarized using the table identified in Appendix E. Data left in textual form are also
linked to the elements in this table to enhance meaning and context. Results of analysis
are organized by the study's research questions and are presented throughout this chapter.

Discussion of Sample
Participants for this study are selected using a snowball sampling strategy. By
asking each interviewee the following question the researcher identifies individuals
representing organizations within the implementation network: "Who do you work with
on a regular basis to implement the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program (VSHP)?" Based
on responses to this question, participants representing 15 organizations are involved in
this study. A breakdown of participants based on organizational sector affiliation is
presented in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1
Participants Interviewed based on Organizational Sector Affiliation
Organizational Affiliation
Federal Agencies
Virginia State Agencies
Local Government
Nongovernmental Organizations
Total Number or Participants

Number of Participants Interviewed
1
18
6
9
34

Organizations representing these sectors, within the implementation network, are
identified in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2
Network of Organizations in the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program
Organizational Type
Federal Agencies

Specific Organizations in the Network
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Eastern Shore
National Wildlife Refuge

State Agencies/Programs

Secretariat of Natural Resources
Department of Environmental Quality
Coastal Zone Management Program
Marine Resources Commission
Habitat Management
Oyster Conservation
Department of Conservation & Recreation
Planning & Recreation Division
Natural Heritage Division
Department of Game & Inland Fisheries
Watchable Wildlife Division
Nongame Division

Local Government

Accomack County
Planning
Soil & Water Conservation District
Northampton County
Accomack-Northampton Planning District
Commission

The Nature Conservancy
Eastern Shorekeeper
Southeast Expeditions
Cherrystone Aquafarms
College of William & Marya
Institute of Marine Science8
Center for Conservation Biologya
University of Virginia"
' Although these academic institutions are state sponsored, they operate autonomously as individual organizations.
Nongovernmental Organizations
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Analysis of the Multiorganizational Implementation Model
The constructs of the theoretical model are analyzed to address the following
research question: Does the Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) help
explain interactions in a policy implementation setting? As data are collected through
interviews and document review, the researcher uses content analysis to analyze the data.
The tables presented in this section are based on the combined data collected through
interviews and document review. Data are organized into categories of the predetermined
coding scheme aligned with the operationalizations of the theoretical model.
The utility of the MIM to help explain interactions in a policy implementation
setting is explored by identifying patterns within the textual data that speak to the
following four constructs: interorganizational policy objective, interorganizational
infrastructure, interorganizational procedures, and organizational management. Elements
within all four constructs are present in the coding of interviews and documents. The
percentages of elements within each construct are identified in Table 4.3. Congruence
between the textual data gathered and the operationalizations of the model's constructs
are of particular interest. Pattern matching is used to determine the extent to which the
data's empirical patterns match the model's theoretical patterns (Yin, 2003).
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Table 4.3
Percentage of Elements Explained by Construct - Interviews and Documents
Cooperation
Coordination
Collaboration
Total
Interorganizational
Policy Objective

33(8%)

112(27%)

264(65%)

409

% for
Construct
29%

Interorganzational
Infrastructure

61(23%)

82(30%)

129(47%)

272

19%

Interorganizational
Procedures

96(23%)

86(20%)

240(57%)

422

30%

Organizational
Management
Total

83 (27%)

56(18%)

171 (55%)

310

22%

1413

100%,

Analysis of the Interorganizational Policy Objective Construct
For the VSHP, the interorganizational policy objective represents the program
goals the organizations are working together to achieve. More specifically, the program
goals focus on the preservation and management of natural resources on Virginia's
Eastern Shore. In the MIM, the interorganizational policy objective construct is
characterized by four variables: time, difficulty, role of single organization, and the
impetus for collective action. Data, gathered through interviews and documents, are
coded based on the operationalizations of each variable. Twenty-nine percent of the
elements identified in this study are within the policy objective construct, and the number
of times each element is identified in the data is displayed in Table 4.4. Data left in
textual form are also presented to provide context for the numbers displayed.
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Table 4.4
Interorganizational Policy Objective - Elements Present in Interview & Document Data
Variable

Time

Difficulty

Coordination
Elements

Hits

Collaboration
Elements

Hits

Short-term

Longer-term

0

Long-term

36

Evolutionary nature

21

Complex tasks that
are highly varied or
diverse

33

Situations of crisis

23

Interdependent; each
organization is one
element of the larger
system

25

Simple task

Role of
Single
Organizations

Impetus for
Collective
Action

Total

Cooperationi
Elements
Hits
1

1

Multifaceted tasks,
repeatable

3

5

6

Linkages are
mobilized because
compatible mission
areas mutually
increase abilities to
achieve individual
goals

41

Complementary
interests in attaining
mutual goals

46

Build capacity
to serve
individual
interests

8

An interagency
liaison or boundary
spanner may forge
relationships to meet
resource needs or
shared interests

8

Cannot achieve the
desired goal without
working together

33

Changes in
external factors
trigger
organizations to
search for new
solutions

0

Legislative mandate
or grant contracts
enhance cohesion or
minimize duplication

55

A lead agency or
convener brings
relevant stakeholders
together

47

17

Voluntarily
initiate
collective action
because helpful
to world of
work

33

112

58 (14%)

60(15%)

Organizations require
some assistance from
other organizations to
accomplish
individual
goals/missions

Independent;
possible to
accomplish the
task
individually

Total Hits
(% for
construct)

47(11%)

244 (60%)

264

409

In terms of the utility of the interorganizational policy objective construct within
the MIM, the data gathered through this study suggests that the time, difficulty, role of
single organizations, and impetus for collective action variables help to explain
interactions between organizations. Of these four variables, the impetus for collective
action appears most important for this construct. This variable accounts for 60% of the
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elements mentioned during interviews or within organizational documents. In the VSHP,
the ways in which the multiorganizational arrangement develops is mentioned more than
4 times as often as the other variables within this construct.
There seems to be two driving forces for the development of the
multiorganizational arrangement within this study. First, organizations work together
because it helps them achieve their individual or mutual goals. These two elements
account for 36% of the impetus for collective action variable. Discussion during an
interview reveals the importance placed on these elements. "It behooves us to work with
the Coastal Zone Management Program because the whole is greater than the sum of the
parts. So working together helps us achieve what we need to do as an organization."
Second, organizations work together based on the presence of a legislative
mandate/grant contract or a convener. These two elements account for another 42% of the
impetus for collective action variable. The Virginia Coastal Zone Management (VCZM)
Program convenes the VSHP, and its staff plays a particularly important role in this
study. It is mentioned in an interview that the VCZM Program staff "d[oes] a good job of
bringing the right people in and helping them understand that creating this regional
coalition was not only possible but beneficial to everyone." In addition, the presence of a
stable funding stream helps lure organizations to the table. The VCZM Program
distributes one half of a million dollars annually to organizations within the program. An
interviewee suggests that the VCZM Program draws attention from organizations because
of the grant money available. The money that the VCZM Program brings to the table
enables personnel to make their projects a reality without having to spend time "chasing
funding." Other interviewees agree by saying, "Longevity of funding is critical," and
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"The money enables the work to move forward." Another interviewee provides a reason
for the criticality of funding, "Virginia spends less than 1% of its budget on natural
resources. The environment is the underdog in the state budget and in the national budget
when it comes down to it." In conjunction with the presence of a convener, the benefits
associated with a source of funding should not be underestimated.
There are elements associated with this construct that are not mentioned or are
only mentioned one time throughout interviews and documents. In terms of the time
variable, the "short-term" and "longer-term" elements are only mentioned one time or not
at all respectively. Absence of these elements may be attributed to the inherently long
time frame associated with environmental work. In terms of the difficulty variable, the
"simple task" element is only mentioned one time. Although the literature suggests that
organizations work together to pursue relatively simple tasks (see, for example, Keast,
Brown, & Mandell, 2007; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b), it is not the case for
organizations in this study. While almost one quarter of interview participants indicate
that some tasks could be considered relatively simple, their responses are framed in a
larger context indicating that the number of people involved in the program, tremendous
diversity of tasks associated with the goals of the program, and interdependencies
between tasks make the situation increasingly more complex. While not relevant in this
study, these elements may occur more frequently in a different policy arena and should
be further explored in other settings before they are removed from the model.
Another element that is seemingly not found in the coding of the interviews and
documents is "changes in external factors trigger organizations to search for new
solutions." Changes in external factors such as rising sea level, increases in population,
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and pressures to develop land are discussed. However, these situations are discussed in
the sense that they are so complicated that organizations have to work together because
no organization can address these problems individually. Therefore, these references are
coded under the element of "situations of crisis" or "cannot achieve the desired goal
without working together." Changes in external factors seem to generate collaborative
arrangements because organizations cannot achieve the desired goal without working
together. The findings from this study do not align with the literature, which suggests that
cooperative arrangements may be triggered by external factors and the desire to avoid
negative impacts associated with these factors (see, for example, Osparina & Yaroni,
2003). As a result of this research, the "changes in external factors" element is removed
from the impetus for collective action variable under cooperation and acknowledged as a
supporting statement for the existing elements within the same variable in collaboration.

Analysis of the Interoganizational Infrastructure Construct
The interorganizational infrastructure construct focuses on the ways in which
relationships within the multiorganizational arrangement are generated and structured.
Five variables characterize the construct of interorganizational infrastructure: design,
formality of the agreement, organizational autonomy, policy authority, and key
personnel. Data, gathered through interviews and document review, is coded based on the
operationalizations of each variable. Nineteen percent of the elements identified in this
study are within the interorganizational infrastructure construct, and the number of times
each element is identified in the data is displayed in Table 4.5. In addition, textual data
are linked to the numerically aggregated data to provide meaning and context.
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Table 4.5
Inter organizational Infrastructure - Elements Present in Interview & Document Data
Variable

Design

Formality of
the Agreement

Organizational
Autonomy

Policy
Authority

Key Personnel

Cooperation
Elements
Hits

Elements

Hits

Elements

Hits

Work within
existing
organizational
structure

6

Hierarchical structure is
used to centrally
manage roles and
responsibilities

3

Jointly develop shared
power arrangements to
address collective
interests

14

Interagency staff
unnecessary

0

Centralization may
involve program
reorganization or
consolidation

0

New program structure

25

An administrative
element is present to
sustain collective efforts

11

Mechanisms, such as
contractual or nonfinancial agreements,
formalize relationships

31

Stakeholders jointly
develop course of action

10

Agreements, clearly
identifying roles and
responsibilities, are
often developed or
reviewed by a higher
authority

15

Mutually agreed upon
roles & responsibilities,
rules, goals, or
boundaries

8

Semiautonomous;
require some assistance
from other organizations
to achieve goals

9

Not autonomous;
operations within
organizations are
intertwined

12

Informally work
together to
achieve individual
goals

Fully autonomous

22

2

Coordination

13

Organizations maintain
individual authority
over the policies that
govern their respective
organizations

1

Jointly develop policies
and procedures that
govern the collective
group

19

Preexisting
policies followed

12

Policies developed for
the collective group are
compatible with policies
established in individual
organizations

3

Pol icies/procedures
include working rules
that specify which
stakeholders can make
decisions, who will
guide collective action,
& distribution of
costs/benefits

5

Organizational
leadership not
involved in
decisions to work
together

6

Leaders in each
organization make
decisions

8

No one in charge

5

Managers implement
decisions

3

Lead organization
proposes policies/rules
for the collective group
to consider

9

9

Membership, roles, and
responsibilities adapt to
the task at hand

8

Each role is considered
equally important

3

61

82

Total Hits
(% for
construct)

59 (22%)

86 (32%)

23 (8%)

No interorganizational
policy decisions
made

Facilitator may
coordinate actions at
local level

Total

Collaboration

53 (19%)

51 (19%)

129
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In terms of the utility of the interorganizational infrastructure construct within the
MIM, data gathered through this study suggests that the design, formality of the
agreement, organizational autonomy, policy authority, and key personnel variables help
to explain interactions between organizations. Of these four variables, the elements
pertaining to the formality of the agreement variable are most emphasized. This variable
accounts for 32% of the elements within the infrastructure construct. In the VSHP, it
appears that there are two prominent ways in which organizations agree on their roles and
responsibilities within the arrangement. First, the "contracts or nonfinancial agreements
formalize relationships" element accounts for more than one third of the number of times
elements within the formality of the agreement variable are mentioned. In their research
on the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Program, Jennings & Krane (1994) find that
contractual or nonfinancial agreements are used to generate relationships between
organizations. Their finding is consistent with this study. Within the VSHP, grant
contracts are also used to establish and sustain relationships between organizations.
For example, the Accomack-Northampton Planning District Commission (PDC)
receives a technical assistance grant from the VCZM Program annually. This grant
requires a minimum standard of interaction between the PDC and the local governments.
An interviewee describes the importance placed on grant contracts in formalizing
relationships, "The grant contract provides the conduit for the flow of information from
the state through the planning district commission to the localities. And just as
importantly, from the localities back up to the state." In addition, an organization may
receive grant funding from the VCZM Program and subcontract with another
organization to complete a particular project. This can be seen in the building of an
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observation platform in the town of Willis Wharf. The Virginia Department of Game and
Inland Fisheries (DGIF) receives grant funding from the VCZM Program to design and
build the observation platform. While DGIF completes the design of the platform, they
subcontract with Northampton County to construct it. In this instance, the original grant
and subsequent contracts define each organization's role and responsibilities. Much like
the research conducted by Jennings and Krane (1994), contractual arrangements between
agencies outline roles and responsibilities. In this study, over 40% of interviewees
mention the uses of grant contracts or nonfmancial agreements to formalize relationships.
Second, organizations informally work together to achieve individual goals. This
element accounts for another quarter of the times elements within this variable are
mentioned. Informal interactions are prevalent among the participants involved in the
VSHP, and relationships go well beyond the stipulations in grant contracts. There appear
to be two explanations to support these informal interactions. First, there are longstanding relationships between this group of people, and they work with each other on a
variety of projects outside of the VSHP. An interviewee describes these long-standing
relationships, "There are a lot of people who have been on the Coastal Policy Team for
the last 20 years. It's the continuity of the relationships that have been really helpful."
This point is supported in another interview, "So there [is] a core group that has gotten
really good at working together over the last 15 years. When different things come up, we
know to call each other. . . . Having those long standing relationships really helps in
terms of pulling the partners together." Comments made by this interviewee convey the
evolutionary nature of relationships in the implementation network. As the specifics of a
situation emerge, organizations with expertise in the necessary areas are brought together.

104
In addition, geographic proximity lends itself to informal interactions. An
interviewee explains how opportunities for informal interactions are created among
personnel involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program,
There is a physical opportunity for people that live on Virginia's Eastern Shore.
There are only two counties and there is really only one highway. And that helps.
There are only 50,000 people on the Virginia portion of the Eastern Shore. So you
see people at church and the grocery store.
Almost 50% of the participants in the VSHP live and work on the Eastern Shore. This
proximity is an important factor to acknowledge within the multiorganizational
arrangement.
There are elements associated with this construct that are not mentioned or are
only mentioned one time throughout interviews and documents. In terms of design, the
"interagency staff is unnecessary" element is not mentioned. One reason that this element
may not be mentioned is because it seems closely related to the "organizations work
within their existing organizational structures" element within the cooperative design.
After additional review, it may be too difficult to decipher between these two elements.
The literature suggests that cooperative interactions occur informally, and limited
connections can be established through existing organizational structures (see, for
example, Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Reilly, 2001). Since this type of interaction
typically occurs between personnel at the lower levels of organizations (Keast, Brown, &
Mandell, 2007), it is implied that an interagency staff is not necessary. This study
supports this assumption. As a result, the "interagency staff is unnecessary" element is
removed from the design variable within the model.
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In addition, the "centralization may involve program reorganization or
consolidation" element within the design variable is not mentioned in this study. It is
interesting that formalized mechanisms, such as contractual or nonfinancial agreements,
account for more than 10% of the elements present from this construct. However,
centralization is rarely mentioned. Therefore, the formalization within this program
comes from grant contracts rather than a hierarchical design. Despite what is said in the
literature (see, for example, Boston, 1992; Jennings, 1994), a hierarchical structure is not
used in this study to enhance centralization based on a desire to reorganize or minimize
duplication. Instead, the presence of a formalized structure is associated with the
distribution of money. Since the absence of this element may also be attributed to the
network design of the program, this element should be further explored in other settings
before it is taken out of the model.
The "organizations maintain individual authority over the policies that govern
their respective organizations" element is only identified once in the interviews and
documents. This may be due to the presence of the Coastal Policy Team (CPT), which is
comprised of resource administrators and managers from each of the state agencies
involved in the VSHP. As the literature suggests, the policies that govern individual
organizations are maintained (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Each agency operates
under specific regulatory authorities and legal policies. However, this authority does not
appear in the forefront of the data collected. Instead, interviewees place emphasis on the
discretion given to the resource administrators and managers representing the CPT.
Within the boundaries of their regulatory authorities, representatives make governing
decisions to guide their divisions and the collective group. An interviewee explains the

106
relationship between individual agency authorities and collective governing in the
following manner,
The CPT determines what the focal area is going to be and what is going to be
done within that focal area. How particular projects are implemented comes under
the regulatory functions of the agencies involved. But the program itself, the way
it [i]s set up and the goals identified, that [i]s decided by the CPT.
This presence of discretion in collaborative interactions is supported by the literature
(see, for example, Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). An interview participant
explains how this discretion is used, "By creating a Coastal Policy Team, you do have
upper level administrators involved, but they are the administrators focused on the
resources issues. So we issue good judgment as to where the resources need to be
applied."
Discretion allows managers to work across organizational boundaries to jointly
develop policies. Despite the literature coupling hierarchical authority with bureaucratic
organizations, implementation of the VSHP does not require significant time
commitments from upper level personnel. Instead, resource administrators have
discretion to make collective decisions with partners. Several interviewees attribute this
presence of discretion to the success of the VSHP. Discretion may be given more freely
when programs are successful. Since collaborative decisions require discretion,
sustaining these interactions may also require a certain amount of success. Although the
element of "organizations maintain individual authority over the policies that govern their
respective organizations" is not prevalent in this study, it may be important in a different
setting. This element remains in the model for further exploration.
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Analysis of the Interorganizational Procedures Construct
The interorganizational procedures construct focuses on the processes developed
to support operations or sustain relationships within the multiorganizational arrangement.
Five variables characterize the construct of interorganizational procedures: information
sharing, decision making, resolution of turf issues, resource allocation, and systems
thinking. Data, gathered through interviews and documents, are coded based on the
operationalizations of each variable. Thirty percent of the elements identified in this
study are within the interorganizational procedures construct, and the number of times
each element is identified in the data is displayed in Table 4.6. Textual data is also
presented to convey meaning and contextual support for the aggregated numbers.
In terms of the utility of the interorganizational procedures construct within the
MIM, data gathered through this study suggests that the information sharing, decision
making, resolution of turf issues, resource allocation, and systems thinking variables help
explain interactions between organizations. Of these four variables, elements pertaining
to the information sharing and resource allocation variables are most prevalent. The
information sharing variable accounts for 34% of the elements within the
interorganizational procedures construct. In the VSHP, there are three ways in which the
multiorganizational arrangement develops processes to support operations or sustain
relationships.
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Table 4.6
Inter organizational Procedures - Elements Present in Interview & Document Data
Variable

Information
Sharing

Decision
Making

Resolution of
Turf Issues

Resource
Allocation

Systems
Thinking

Total

Cooperation
Elements
Hits

Elements

Hits

Dialogue
maintained
through informal
relationships

43

Communication
channels are used to link
vertical & horizontal
organizational levels

12

Basic information
is shared

14

Decisions are
made
independently

Coordination

27

Communication
channels are used to
widely disseminate info
related to group

17

Understanding is
enhanced by a
willingness to share info
about organizations
which may include what
can/cannot be offered to
the collective group

31

Centralized

Participative decision
making through
consensus &
compromise

45

Lead organization
dominates process

Personnel have latitude
to negotiate rules and
deliberate agreements to
find common ground

4

Conflicting roles;
incongruent demands
between individual
organization & group

8

Consideration given to
adjusting policies or
procedures to reduce
conflict; common
ground maximized

15

Pooled resources

19

Organizations have
resources, skills, or
knowledge needed to
achieve goals

25

Allocate staff, time, or
funding to support
collective unit

24

Resources allocated by
balancing needs of
group & individual
organizations

1

Integrate systems to
share info & foster
linkages across
organizations

24

12

Discretionary
funds are used to
pursue individual
goals

Exchange resources to
improve abilities to
reach individual goals

Resources are not
pooled

Resources may be
provided though
mandate or grant
arrangements

42

Units of exchange
are determined at
the lowest levels

12

Resource needs satisfied
by a preexisting
program within an
individual organization

12

Organizational
systems are
unchanged

10

Compatible information
systems

2

96

Hits

Open & frequent
communication

Resolved through
neutral facilitator or
convener

Turf issues are
avoided

Collaboration
Elements

Total Hits
(% for
construct)

144 (34%)

56(13%)

42(10%)

144(34%)

36 (9%)
240
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First, dialogue is maintained through informal relationships. This element
accounts for almost one third of the number of times elements are mentioned within the
information sharing variable. Its presence is consistent with the literature, which indicates
that informal communication channels are used to maintain dialogue and share
information among participants (see, for example, Ospina & Yaroni, 2003). Personnel
implementing the VSHP often communicate through channels such as email, adhoc
working groups, or by seeing each other in the field. An interviewee suggests that
visibility between field workers is important for communication. "I'll see partners on the
dock or on the water or in the coffee shop. And we talk about what is going on with
different projects."
Second, personnel frequently communicate to support operations or sustain
relationships within the interorganizational arrangement. This element accounts for
almost one fifth of the number of times elements are mentioned within this variable. The
presence of this element aligns with the literature, which emphasizes how open
communication can reduce information asymmetries (see, for example, Thomson &
Perry, 2006). An interview participant explains communication among partners in the
following manner, "We are always talking to each other and bringing each other in on
different projects. . . . We come to the table on a regular basis. So it keeps that
partnership and the relationships going."
Third, understanding between organizations is enhanced by a willingness to share
information about organizations, which may include what can or cannot be offered to the
collective group. This element accounts for more than one fifth of the number of times
elements are mentioned within this variable. Its presence within the study aligns with the
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literature and emphasizes the need for organizations to share information in order to
create a base of common knowledge and promote understanding (see, for example, Keast,
Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Imperial, 2001). An interviewee acknowledges a high level of
understanding among organizations, "We've gotten to be extremely good coworkers even
though we are in different agencies. We know what each other can do, we know what
talents we can bring to the table, we know the expertise that we each have, and we know
when we can work together on what things."
In the interorganizational procedures construct, there are elements that are not
mentioned or are only mentioned one time throughout interviews and document review.
In terms of decision making, the "centralized" element is not mentioned. The absence of
this element may be due to the way in which natural resource agencies are structured in
Virginia. This structure is discussed during an interview, "In Virginia, we don't have a
single resource agency. We have a number of agencies within a secretariat of natural
resources but each has their own agency head, their own budgets, and their own specific
missions." Virginia's natural resource agencies have equal representation on the CPT.
Since distinct legal authorities guide each agency, no organization has the authority to tell
another organization what to do. Therefore, decision making is not structured to be a
centralized process. In addition, the very nature of environmental sustainability does not
lend itself to centralized solutions. An interviewee suggests that nonregulatory
environmental issues, such as sustainability, do not lend themselves to command and
control decisions. "Other environmental issues like water quality monitoring, are much
more command and control. It is the land-based, nonpoint source sustainable ecosystem
stuff that does not have that sort of command and control." Since the absence of this
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element may be specific to this case study, it should be further explored before it is
removed from the model.
In addition, the "resources allocated by balancing needs of group and individual
organizations" element within the resource allocation variable is only mentioned one time
in this study. When looking at the other elements within collaborative resource allocation,
this element may not be mentioned for two reasons. First, participants may assume that
they balance these needs when referring to the "pooled resources" element within this
variable. As organizations determine what resources they can contribute to the collective
unit, they likely balance their organization's needs with those of the larger group. Second,
a high degree of alignment between organizational missions may make a balancing of
needs unnecessary. An interviewee describes mission alignment in the following way,
"Most of the projects we are working on are related directly to our agency's mission." In
this study, each organization's interests align nicely with the program's broader goals of
habitat conservation and restoration. Therefore, a balancing of needs is unnecessary
because both sets of needs are simultaneously fulfilled. This element is combined with
the "pooled resources" element within this variable in the final version of the MIM.

Analysis of the Organizational Management Construct
The organizational management construct focuses on the way in which behaviors
within and between member organizations support the interorganizational arrangement.
Five variables characterize the construct of organizational management: incentives,
commitment, trust, risk taking, and willingness to change. Data, gathered through
interviews and documents, are coded based on the operationalizations of each variable.
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Twenty-two percent of the elements identified in this study are within the organizational
management construct, and the number of times each element is identified in the data is
displayed in Table 4.7. Textual data are linked to the aggregated numbers to maintain the
meaning and context of the words.
In terms of the utility of the organizational management construct within the
MIM, the data gathered through this study suggests that the incentives, commitment,
trust, risk taking, and willingness to change variables help to explain interactions between
organizations. Of these five variables, elements pertaining to the commitment variable
are most emphasized within this construct; they account for 31% of the elements
identified. In the VSHP, there are three prominent ways in which support for the
interorganizational arrangement is generated within and between organizations.
First, a history of supportive behavior or long-standing relationships generates
support for the interorganizational arrangement. This element accounts for almost 90% of
the number of times elements are identified within the trust variable, and it accounts for
more than 40% of the number of times elements are identified within the entire construct.
In addition, this element is mentioned by more than 80% of participants during
interviews. Findings are consistent with the literature, which indicates that a history of
interactions between organizations enhances trust between organizations (see, for
example, Mandell & Steelman, 2003). An interviewee describes the history between
organizations involved in implementing the VSHP in the following manner, "The secret
of success [is] the continuity of the personnel over time. And that is not something that
you can really control, that is just luck. And I think the fact that we have known each
other for about 20 years now and we know what we are each about."
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Table 4.7
Organizational Management - Elements Present in Interview & Document Data
Variable

Incentives

Commitment

Willingness to
Change

Trust

Cooperation
Elements
Hits

Coordination

Collaboration
Elements

Elements

Hits

Statutes or grant
contracts provide
funding

22

Incentives are provided
by the individual
organizations to
encourage involvement

9

Leadership
communicates
importance

11

Incentives are provided
by the collective group
to encourage
involvement

16

Hits

Opportunities for
synergistic
benefits are
realized based on
the desire to avoid
negative impacts
resulting from
changes in
external factors

4

Work completed
as part of regular
job responsibilities

16

Encouraged by
supervisory
administrative body

1

Committed to own
organization and the
collective group - need
to balance interests

14

Interests of
individual
organization
paramount

17

Linkages recognized
when benefits are
perceived to outweigh
costs

10

Collective interest
serves each
organization's
individual interests

21

Colleagues may
encourage each
other to work with
personnel in other
organizations

3

Relationships are
impacted by the extent
to which collective
action is reciprocated

15

Organizations
maintain complete
independence in
establishing rules,
roles, & policies to
govern their
organization

8

Mutually adjust

3

An organization's
standard operating
procedures remain
unchanged by the
collective effort

7

Trust relationships
are not required
but can develop

0

Leaders explore
modifications to SOP
when program goals
align with individual
organizational missions

9

Total Hits
(% for
construct)

62 (20%)

97(31%)

40(13%)

Leaders work closely to
create relationships
based on trust

1

Changes to SOPs are
considered when needed
to align with the group

13

Trust is necessary

6

Share information
openly

3

History of supportive
behavior or longstanding relationships

70

80 (26%)

Risk Taking

Total

Do not engage in
risk taking
behavior

1

Some interdependence
based on resource needs

1

Integrated approaches
create dependency

1

Low levels of risk

27

Moderate levels of risk

1

Depart from normal
behavior

0

High levels of risk

0

83

56

171

31 (10%)
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Second, funding provided through statutes or grant contracts generates support for
the multiorganizational arrangement. In terms of the VSHP, funding incentives come
from grant contracts. Although the literature identifies the potential for these incentives to
occur through statutory provisions (see, for example, Jennings, 1994), that is not the case
in this study. In fact, an interviewee specifically mentions that unfunded mandates often
promulgate requirements pertaining to environmental sustainability. "The state gives the
local governments the authority to do something, but they don't provide funding to
support those initiatives." Due to the lack of funding from statutes, this element is revised
to say "grant contracts may provide funding" in the final MIM.
Third, support for the multiorganizational arrangement is generated when the
collective interest serves the individual interests of the organizations involved. This
element accounts for more than one fifth of the number of times elements are identified
within this variable. Its presence within the study aligns with the literature, which
recognizes that commitments to the collective arrangement do not diminish commitments
to individual organizations (see, for example, Keast et al., 2004). Discussion during an
interview indicates that the collective interest is attained through individual
organizational interests, "We are meeting our agency's objectives but we are also
furthering the whole effort." The findings from this study also align with the literature by
acknowledging that the extent to which the collective interest serves the interests of
individual organizations determines the extent to which they are willing to support
collective endeavors (see, for example, Imperial, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006).
Interactions within the collective group not only enable organizations to meet their
objectives, but they also enable the collective group to surpass the level to which they
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would meet these objectives when working individually. An interviewee explains how
multiorganizational interactions create opportunities for individual organizations, "This
program gives us the opportunity to do work that we otherwise would not be able to do
and achieve a part of our mission that would otherwise not be possible. It is an
opportunity to be successful in a way that would be impossible otherwise."
Within the organizational management construct, there are elements not
mentioned or only mentioned one time throughout interviews and documents. In terms of
the commitment variable, the "encouraged by supervisory administrative body" element
is only mentioned one time. Jennings' (1994) research suggests that 70% of the
administrators involved in the study indicate that leaders play an important role in
encouraging coordination. In the VSHP, interviewees and documents do not suggest this
same level of importance. The absence of this element may be attributed to the degree in
which participants want to protect the resource and the program's success. An interview
participant expresses the multiorganizational arrangement's commitment,
All the people within these organizations care so deeply about the place—every
one of them. I can't think of one person in th[e] VSHP partnership that I would
say is not just deeply and personally committed to saving this place and making it
better.
This finding suggests that if there is a high degree of personal commitment within
organizations then encouragement from a supervisory body may be less necessary.
In addition, the absence of involvement from top management may be attributed
to the success of the program. An interviewee suggests that successful projects, coupled
with zero complications, do not require great involvement from top leadership. "Trust is

116
built through successful accomplishment of various projects that we work on and positive
reinforcement." Discussion during another interview also reveals a relationship between
program success and managerial trust. "People above us see and hear about the success of
the program. And as long as they are hearing that, they aren't going to get involved.
They'll say good job, keep doing it." Absence of this element could be specific to this
study because individuals may commit more easily to environmental issues. Before this
element is removed from the model, it is worth further exploration in a different setting.
In terms of the trust variable, the "leaders work closely to create relationships
based on trust" element is only mentioned one time and the "trust relationships are not
required but can develop" element is not mentioned at all. The irrelevance of these
elements may be due to high levels of trust that permeate organizational boundaries.
When personnel work together for great lengths of time, as they have in this study,
leaders may not need to facilitate relationships based on trust. The literature's emphasis
on organizational leaders developing trust amongst each other (see, for example, Jennings
& Krane, 1994) is simply not found in this study. Since these results may be particular to
the history of long-standing relationships between participants of the VSHP, these
elements are left in the model for further study.
Within the risk taking variable, six of the seven elements are only mentioned one
time or not at all during interviews or document review. The only repeated element
within this variable is "low levels of risk." As the literature suggests, partner
organizations undoubtedly generate dependencies as integrated policies and operations
form (see, for example, Imperial, 2005). However, this study does not support the
assertion that collaborative arrangements involve high levels of risk (see, for example,
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Keast et al, 2004). In fact, not one interviewee suggests that there are high levels of risk
associated with working together. On the contrary, an interviewee emphasizes low levels
of risk within the multiorganizational arrangement, "The risk is fairly low. And the trust
is fairly high." This sediment is echoed throughout many interviews. The literature fails
to acknowledge that the risk associated with dependencies can be minimized through
high levels of trust and long-standing relationships. The emphasis that this study places
on low levels of risk mitigates the presence of all other elements within this variable.
Regardless of the type of interaction, it seems that personnel will work together if
it benefits their own organization to some degree. Findings from this study suggest that
low levels of risk are associated with each type of interaction. If the interaction is too
risky, the organization is not likely to become involved. Although cooperative
interactions are typically associated with not engaging in risk taking behavior (see, for
example, Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007), higher levels of risk associated with
coordinative and collaborative interactions may be mitigated by other factors. Therefore,
the risk taking variable is eliminated from the final version of the MIM.

Summary of Findings and Analysis
While ambiguities within the original model make it difficult to distinguish
between the elements associated with the three types of interactions, the findings from
this study eliminate ambiguities while furthering interorganizational theory in two ways:
(1) the MIM helps explain interactions between organizations in this policy
implementation setting; and (2) a finalized version of the MIM is presented. Data from
this study suggests that the MIM is helpful in explaining interactions in
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multiorganizational arrangements. After a review of the public administration and
interorganizational theory literatures, 107 elements are developed to operationalize 19
variables within the four constructs of the MIM. Of these elements, only eight are not
identified in this study's interview transcriptions and documents. Therefore, more than
92% of the elements put forth within the revised model are identified in this study.
Of the eight elements not identified, the following suggestions are made
throughout this section of the chapter to change four of the elements in the model: (1) the
"change in external factors" element is removed from the impetus for collective action
variable under cooperation and acknowledged as a supporting statement for collaborative
elements within the same variable; (2) the "interagency staff is unnecessary" element is
removed from the model because it is too difficult to decipher from the "organizations
work within their existing organizational structures" element; (3) the "depart from normal
behavior" element is removed from the model because the risk taking variable is
eliminated; and (4) the "high levels of risk" element is removed with the elimination of
the risk taking variable. While these elements may be relevant in other settings, the data
gathered from this research strongly suggests their removal from the model. The
following four elements are left in the model for further research: (1) the "longer-term"
element within the time variable; (2) the "centralization may involve program
reorganization or consolidation" element within the design variable; (3) the "centralized"
element within the decision making variable; and (4) the "trust relationships are not
required but can develop" element within the trust variable.
In applying the policy implementation and interorganizational theory literatures to
revise the model's operationalizations, clear distinctions between the three interaction
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terms significantly improve the theoretical model. In addition, these distinctions may
enhance the model's transferability. Other researchers may now subject this model to
empirical testing in settings outside of policy implementation.
The findings suggest that the MIM can be used to enhance theoretical consistency
and improve communication within the interorganizational theory literature. An example
of how this model enhances theoretical consistency can be seen within the coordination
literature. Terms such as "mobilization coordination" (Van de Ven & Walker, 1984),
"contingent coordination" (Kettl, 2003), and "intermittent coordination" (Mandell &
Steelman, 2003) are used to describe less formal coordination in which ad hoc
relationships evolve based on the specifics of a given project. Throughout interviews
from this study, elements associated with these descriptions never once align within the
model's operationalizations of coordination. Instead, informal and ad hoc relationships
are better represented by the operationalizations of cooperation while the evolutionary
nature of the network is better represented by the operationalizations of collaboration.
This suggests that the ways in which researchers identify informal views of coordination
are actually not coordination at all. Instead, a different form of interaction better explains
these views. In using the interorganizational theory literature to clearly distinguish
between each type of interaction within the model, the application of the MIM in turn
fosters theoretical consistency within the literature.
Findings from this analysis also enhance the authenticity of the MIM. In this
study, the researcher does not identify any patterns that do not fit into the categories of
the predetermined coding scheme. Interviewees are given an opportunity to identify other
factors by asking them the following question: "Are there any other factors that would
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help me understand the interactions between organizations when implementing the
VSHP?" Typically, participants use this opportunity to reiterate a point previously made
during the interview. In no instance does a participant mention factors that are not already
captured within the theoretical model. The final draft of the MIM is presented in Tables
4.8 through 4.11.
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Table 4.8
Final Variable Operationalizations: Inter organizational Policy Objective Construct
Variable
Time

Cooperation
Short-term

Coordination
Longer-term

Collaboration
Long-term, evolutionary nature

Difficulty

Simple task

Multifaceted tasks, repeatable

Complex tasks that are highly
varied and diverse; or
situations of crisis

Role of Single
Organizations

Organizations are independent;
it is possible for them to
accomplish the task
individually.

Organizations require some
assistance from other
organizations to accomplish
individual goals/missions.

Organizations are
interdependent; each
organization is one element of
the larger system.

Impetus for
Collective
Action

Typically voluntary,
organizations initiate collective
action because it is helpful to
their world of work and it
builds capacity that serves the
individual organization.

Voluntary or mandated,
linkages are mobilized because
compatible mission areas
mutually increase abilities to
achieve individual goals.

Voluntary or mandated,
organizations with mutual or
complementary interests come
together because they cannot
achieve the desired goal or
address the identified problem
without working together.

An interagency liaison or
boundary spanner may forge
these relationships to meet
resource needs or shared
interests.
Legislative mandate or grant
contracts may enhance
cohesion or minimize
duplication.

Organizations share
responsibility for tasks that are
interconnected or cannot be
accomplished individually.
A lead agency or convening
organization brings relevant
stakeholders together and
legitimizes collective action.
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Table 4.9
Final Variable Operationalizations:
Variable
Design

Inter organizational Infrastructure

Cooperation
Individuals work independently
within existing organizational
structures.

Construct

Coordination
Each organization's hierarchical
structure is used to centrally
manage specialized roles and
responsibilities.

Collaboration
Partner organizations jointly
develop shared power
arrangements to support
mutually beneficial interests.

Centralization may involve
reorganization or consolidation
of programs/activities.

New program structures are
developed based on the needs of
a specific policy/goal.
An administrative staff element
is present to sustain collective
efforts.

Formality of
the Agreement

Individual organizations
informally agree to work
together to achieve individual
goals.

Mechanisms, such as
contractual or nonfinancial
agreements, formalize
relationships between
organizations.

Key stakeholders jointly draft a
shared purpose and develop a
course of action based on
mutually agreed upon roles and
responsibilities, rules, goals, and
organizational boundaries.

Agreements, clearly identifying
each organization's roles and
responsibilities, are often
developed and/or reviewed by a
higher authority.
Organizational
Autonomy

Organizations are fully
autonomous.

Organizations are semiautonomous; individual
organizations require some
assistance from other
organizations to achieve goals.

Organizations are not
autonomous; operations within
organizations are intertwined.

Policy
Authority

No interorganizational policy
decisions are made.

Organizations maintain
individual authority over the
policies that govern their
respective organizations.

Partner organizations jointly
develop policies and procedures
that govern the collective group.

Preexisting policies, established
by the individual organizations,
are followed.

Key Personnel

Organizational leadership is not
involved in decisions to work
together.

Policies pertaining to
coordinated efforts may be
developed, but they are
compatible with the policies
already established within the
individual organizations.
There is a distinction between
leaders and managers; leaders
within each organization make
decisions while managers
implement and administer these
decisions.
A facilitator may be identified
to coordinate actions at the local
level.

Interorganizational policies and
procedures include working
rules that specify which
stakeholders can make
decisions, who will guide
collective actions, and the
distribution of costs/benefits.
Although no one is typically in
charge, a lead organization may
propose policies/rules to which
the collective group must
mutually agree to implement.
Membership, role definitions,
and responsibilities adapt to the
task at hand.
Each role is considered equally
important.
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Table 4.10
Final Variable Operationalizations: Interorganizational Procedures Construct
Variable
Information
Sharing

Cooperation
Dialogue is maintained through
informal relationships between
participants.
Basic information is initially
shared. Continuous dialogue
creates opportunities for
discussing a wider range of
topics.

Coordination
Formal and informal
communication channels are
used to link vertical and
horizontal organizational
levels.

Collaboration
Emphasize open and frequent
communications between
partners to reduce information
asymmetries.
Formal and informal channels
are used to widely disseminate
information concerning the
collective group.
Understanding enhanced by a
willingness to share
information about individual
organizations and what
can/cannot be offered to the
collective group.

Decision
Making

Decisions are made
independently; rules that guide
collective decision making are
not necessary.

Centralized decision making is
practiced; a lead
organization(s) dominates the
decision making process.

Participative decision making
based on consensus and
compromise; generates rules to
govern activities and
relationships between
organizations.
Representatives have latitude
to negotiate rules and
deliberate agreements to
identify common ground.

Resolution of
Turf Issues

Turf issues between
participating organizations are
avoided based on
organizational tendencies to
function independently

A neutral facilitator, outside
convener, or full-time
coordinator is employed to
resolve turf issues.

Conflicting roles based on
incongruent demands from
individual organization and
group.
Consider adjusting policies and
procedures to reduce conflict
while maximizing common
ground.

Resource
Allocation

Discretionary funds may be
used in the pursuit of
individual goals.

Organizations exchange
resources to increase each
organization's abilities to
achieve individual goals.

Pooled resources; allocation is
based on balancing evolving
needs of the collective group
with individual constraints.

Mandates or grant
arrangements may provide
resources.

Individual organizations have
resources, skills, or knowledge
needed to achieve collective

Resources are not pooled.
Units of exchange are
determined at the lowest

goal.

possible level.

Resource needs may be
satisfied by a preexisting
program within an individual
organization
Systems
Thinking

Organizational systems remain
unchanged.

Compatible information
systems can enhance
coordination.

Organizational resources are
allocated to support the
activities of the collective unit.
Databases are integrated to
create linkages and share
information between multiple
layers of partner organizations.
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Table 4.11
Final Variable Operationalizations: Organizational Management Construct
Variable
Incentives

Commitment

Cooperation
Opportunities for synergistic
benefits are realized based on
the desire to avoid negative
impacts resulting from changes
in external factors.

Coordination
Grant contracts may provide
funding or resource incentives
to support the collective effort.

Work is completed as part of
the regular job responsibilities
conducted within the
individual organization.

A supervisory administrative
body actively encourages
organizations to work together.

Interests of the individual
organization remain
paramount.

Leaders identify benefits in
working together and
emphasize the importance of
these benefits to subordinates.

Linkages between
organizations are recognized
when benefits are perceived to
outweigh the costs.

Colleagues may encourage
each other to work with
personnel in other
organizations.
Willingness to
Change

Participating organizations
maintain complete
independence in establishing
the rules, roles and
responsibilities, and policies
that govern the organization.

Trust relationships are not
required, but can develop when
organizations consistently
share honest information.

Members are committed to
intra- and inter-organizational
partners; collective interests
must constantly be balanced
with self-interests.
Participation is justified by
perceptions that the collective
interest serves each
organization's interests.
Mutual commitment expands
as organizations reciprocate
collective action.

Leaders explore modifications
to standard operating
procedures when supporting
operational goals aligned with
individual organizational
missions.

Partner organizations mutually
adjust to the rules, roles and
responsibilities, and policies
collectively established to
govern the collaborative unit.
Changes to an organization's
standard operating procedures
are considered when needed to
align with those of the
collective unit.

An organization's standard
operating procedures remain
unchanged by collective
efforts.
Trust

Collaboration
Incentives are provided by the
collective group and individual
organizations to encourage
individuals to stay involved in
the collective effort.

Leaders work closely to create
relationships based on trust.

Trust between organizations is
necessary.
Partners reinforce trust in each
other by sharing information
through open communication.
A history of supportive
interactions sustains and
legitimizes relationships.

Analysis of Interactions during Policy Implementation
The three types of interactions within the MIM are analyzed to address the
following research question: How do administrators perceive the use of cooperation,
coordination, or collaboration when working in a multiorganizational arrangement to
implement policy? The researcher uses content analysis to analyze the data collected
through interviews and documents. Therefore, textual data are reduced into the categories
of the predetermined coding scheme. This section of the chapter compares the
distribution of data from different sources and explores the perceived use of interactions
throughout the constructs of the MIM.

The Distribution of Interactions in Different Data Sources
The number and percentage of elements recognized within each type of
interaction are identified in Table 4.12. Elements are separated based on recognition
during interviews vice recognition during a review of documents. Interactions are
perceived to be highly collaborative in both the interviews and documents. The
prevalence of this type of interaction in documents is especially interesting when
considering that one half of the documents reviewed are policy mandates, grant contract
requirements, or a memorandum of understanding (MOU). Despite the presence of a
mandate that requires organizations to work together on coastal zone issues and the
presence of documents intending to formalize relationships between organizations, 65%
of the elements emphasized in interviews and documents are associated with
collaborative interactions.
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Table 4.12
Summary of Elements Recognized
„
# of Elements
Type ot
_
..
, / ,Recognized in
Interaction
. ° .
Interviews

in Interviews and Documents
„. ~ # of Elements „. „
% of _
• , •
% of
_ A . Recognized in „ A .
Total
_ °
Total
x
Documents

Combined #
of Elements
Recognized

%of
Total

Cooperation

268

21%

5

3%

273

19%

Coordination

293

23%

43

29%

336

24%

Collaboration

704

56%

100

68%

804

57%

Total

1265

100%

148

100%

1413

100%

When comparing the presence of cooperative and coordinative elements within
interviews and documents, differences are evident. During interviews, cooperative and
coordinative elements are mentioned in a balanced way; slightly more than one fifth of
the elements mentioned during interviews are associated with each of the two types of
interactions. However, this pattern is not found in the documents reviewed. Instead,
emphasis on cooperative and coordinative elements is unbalanced. While elements
associated with coordinative interactions account for more than one quarter of the
elements mentioned in documents, elements associated with cooperative interactions are
hardly mentioned at all. The cooperative interactions that administrators perceive to occur
at operational levels are simply not captured in this study's organizational documents.
Throughout implementation of the VSHP, cooperative interactions occur more
often than documents suggest. In terms of the top-down/bottom-up debate, this suggests
that scholars must look beyond organizational documents to capture fully the interactions
that occur between organizations at operational levels. Contrary to what is assumed by
much of the top-down implementation literature, a policy mandate alone cannot convey
the operational patterns used to implement policy in this multiorganizational setting.
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In order to explore how administrators perceive the use of cooperation,
coordination, and collaboration among the organizations involved in implementing the
VSHP, each interview and document is coded individually by interaction. Table 4.13
displays the distribution of elements along the continuum of interaction for documents
reviewed. A majority of the documents operate at the collaborative end of the interaction
continuum. Two trends are evident when looking at the distribution of data.

Table 4.13
Distribution of Coding by Inter action for each Document Reviewed
Name of Document
Cooperation
Coordination
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
Evaluation Findings for the VCMP November 1999 through July 2003

Collaboration
4
27

Evaluation Findings for the VCMP - August
2003 through May 2006
Executive Order Number 21 - Continuing
the VCMP
MOU for the Southern Tip Partnership
PDC Technical Assistance Grant Minimum
Standards

0

6

0

5

0

3

5

43

Virginia's Eastern Shore Seaside
Management Plan Draft
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program
Accomplishments 2002 - 2008
Total

100

First, five of the eight documents reviewed are intended to formalize relationships
between organizations involved in implementing the VSHP. These documents are the
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) of 1972, Executive Order Number 21, MOU for

the Southern Tip Partnership, PDC Technical Assistance Grant Requirements, and
Virginia's Eastern Shore Seaside Management Plan Draft. Of these documents,
administrators directly involved in the CPT and the VSHP developed the MOU and
Virginia's Eastern Shore Seaside Management Plan Draft. It is interesting that of the five
documents intending to formalize relationships between organizations, these two
documents are the only ones that operate at the collaborative end of the continuum.
Variation of interaction types within organizational documents suggests that
implementation of the VSHP embraces the combined strengths of the top-down and
bottom-up approaches. Since the CZMA of 1972 and Executive Order Number 21 are
explicitly coordinative, a purely top-down approach would prematurely limit interactions
to the descriptions in these documents while ignoring factors in the local policy
environment. Since the documents developed by administrators directly involved in the
CPT and VSHP are collaborative in nature, they obviously see benefits in operating
outside of command-and-control authorities. On the other hand, a purely bottom-up
approach would fail to acknowledge the benefits associated with accountability
mechanisms provided by formalized documents. An interviewee suggests that the VCZM
Program staff developed the PDC Technical Assistance Grant Requirements to hold the
PDCs to specific performance standards. The utility of both approaches within this
research supports the study's assertion that mutliorganizational implementation theory
utilizes the top-down and bottom-up approaches.
Second, independent evaluations conducted by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) support this study's finding that interactions
among organizations involved in implementing the VSHP are collaborative. After a

review of both documents, NOAA evaluators perceive collaborative interactions to occur
between organizations. A majority of the elements mentioned in both evaluations are
aligned with elements associated with collaborative interactions.
Despite the presence of documents intending to formalize arrangements between
organizations, administrators in this study perceive interactions to operate beyond these
mechanisms at an overwhelmingly collaborative level. Almost 70% of interviewees
perceive interactions between organizations involved in implementing the VSHP to be
collaborative in nature. The distribution of elements along the continuum of interaction is
displayed for each interview participant in Table 4.14. Each participant is identified
numerically to maintain anonymity.
The distribution of interview data is especially noteworthy given that the public
administration literature typically associates government organizations with highly
centralized and hierarchical structures; government organizations represent 60% of the
organizations involved in this study. Of the government employees participating in this
study, almost 90% perceive interactions to occur at a collaborative level. This suggests
that government employees involved in implementing the VSHP transcend hierarchical
structures within their individual organizations. In this study, the vertical linkages within
individual organizations seem to be less important to the implementation network than
the horizontal linkages occurring between organizations.
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Table 4.14
Distribution of Coding by Interaction for each Interview Participant
Organizational Sector
Federal/ State Agency

Local Government

Nongovernmental
Organizations

Total

Participant
Identifier
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

6
6
4
4
5
6
1
16
4
7
11
8
7
4
5
3
5
6

21
13
29
36
21

:o

4
0
6
5
7
19
10
12
6
11
3
10
17
12
12
4
9
11
5

8
0
13
6
0
9

13
5
12
4
3
3

21
2
8
17
1
4

7

11
7
13
11
21
8
9
12
3
293

33
16
12
7
19
10
30
29
1
704

IT

14
6
17
11
8
10

•

268

16
12
41
30
19
10
24
18
26
41
1 1
T 1

13

The distribution of data in documents reviewed and interviews leans heavily
towards the collaborative end of the continuum. The tables presented throughout the rest
of this section are based on the combined totals from interviews and documents. This
decision is made because the data gathered through interviews and documents
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collectively speak to administrators' perceptions regarding the use of each type of
interaction within the VSHP.

An Overview of Perceived Interactions
The way in which administrators perceive interactions between organizations
involved in the VSHP is explored by identifying patterns within the textual data that
speak to cooperation, coordination, or collaboration. Elements associated with each of the
three interaction terms are present in the coding of interviews and documents. The
number and percentage of elements within each interaction are identified in Table 4.15.
In aggregate, elements associated with the collaborative end of the continuum are
mentioned twice as often as elements associated with the cooperative or coordinative
areas on the continuum.

Table 4.15
Percentage of Elements Explained by Type of Interaction - Interviews and Documents
Cooperation
33(12%)

Coordination
112(33%)

Collaboration
264(33%)

Interorganzational
Infrastructure

61(22%)

82(24%)

129(16%)

Interorganizational
Procedures

96(35%)

86(26%)

240(30%)

Organizational
Management
Total within
Interaction
% of Combined
Interaction

83(31%)

56(17%)

171(21%)

273

336

804

1413

19%

24%

57%

100%

Interorganizational
Policy Objective

132
In order to explore the perceived use of cooperation, coordination, and
collaboration among organizations within the VSHP, analysis focuses on each variable
within the four constructs of the MIM. Interview and document data are combined.
Within each construct, a determination is made as to where each variable falls along the
continuum of interaction. From this information, an overall determination of interaction
is made for each construct.

The Continuum and Interorganizational Policy Objective
The objective of the VSHP is to preserve and manage natural resources on
Virginia's Eastern Shore. The policy objective is categorized as cooperative,
coordinative, or collaborative based on the perceptions of administrators regarding the
variables of time, difficulty, role of single organizations, and the impetus for collective
action. Data collected from interviews and documents are used to place each variable
along the continuum of interaction. For this study, each variable within the construct is
placed at the collaborative end of the continuum of interaction and is presented in Table
4.16. As a result, the interorganizational policy objective construct is collaborative in
nature. The four variables that characterize the interorganizational policy objective are
described in more detail in this section.
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Table 4.16
Inter organizational Policy Objective - Variable Placement on Interaction Continuum
Collaboration

Total Elements for
Construct
(% for construct)

57

58(14%)

1

56

60(15%)

Role of Single
Organizations

17

15

47(11%)

Impetus for
Collective Action

14

104

33 (8%)

112(27%)

Variable

Cooperation

Coordination

Time
Difficulty

Total Hits for
Interaction
(% for Interaction)

244 (60%)

i d 1 (fii"ii)

409(100%)

The data suggests that the policy objective of the VSHP is located toward the
collaborative end of the continuum in terms of time. More than one half of the elements
identified within this variable are for the long-term nature of the policy objective. The
environmental goals of the VSHP, such as habitat restoration and land preservation on the
seaside of the Eastern Shore, require long-term commitments from the organizations
involved. Although the VSHP was established six years ago, many of the partners began
working together well before the program's creation. For example, four of the
organizations involved in the VSHP own land on the Eastern Shore. An interviewee
describes this commitment to land management in the following way, "Because we are
owners and managers of land, our commitment is in perpetuity." It seems likely that these
organizations will continue to work together, beyond the scope of the VSHP, for as long
as they own land. In many instances, these organizations work together to plan the
purchase and management of these properties.
In addition to the objectives of the program being described as long-term,
interviewees suggest that building the relationships necessary to achieve these objectives
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take a great deal of time. This is especially important on the Eastern Shore because
agencies owning adjacent properties must collectively discuss the management of these
properties. An interviewee makes this point by expressing, "It took 10 years of talking
and consensus to come up with a way to view the whole ecosystem together." As the
literature suggests, the building of these relationships generates interdependencies
between organizations (see, for example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Keast, Brown,
& Mandell, 2007). The creation of interdependencies further supports long-term
relationships. This assertion is supported by an interviewee who explains, "My
perception is that people don't just show up to work on one project and then leave.
People are pretty vested in it."
Another one half of the elements identified within the time variable are associated
with the evolutionary nature of the program's objectives. As the literature suggests,
relationships between organizations involved in implementing the VSHP evolve (see, for
example, Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006).
Organizations assume different roles depending on the project that needs to be completed
and the expertise available among the participating organizations. Much like the literature
suggests (see, for example, Mandell & Steelman, 2003), interactions within the
implementation network are reshaped based on group dynamics and the specific task at
hand. An interviewee explains the importance of this evolution within the group in the
following way, "The timeline and evolution of the process is really what is important.
You couldn't just go out and take the final working relationships we all have and say that
this is how this group functions and plug that in somewhere else. It really [i]s an
evolution." Throughout the discussion, the participant explains that someone facilitates
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the group's evolution by initiating the program, involving stakeholders, and helping the
group build trust. This description aligns with the roles of a convening organization (see,
for example, McNamara, Leavitt, & Morris, 2008; Wood & Gray, 1991).
In addition to the presence of a convener, the group evolves because participants
individually and collectively grow throughout the duration of the project. An interview
participant explains this evolution,
I think anytime you first start a project like this it will be a little rough because
there is distrust.... But with time everyone learns to adjust to each other and
understand each other and learn to live with each other. So I think the partnership
evolve[s] positively over time.
Several interviewees suggest that the CPT initially focuses the group on easier projects,
and they work their way into the projects that are more difficult. Due to the evolutionary
nature of the program, participants have time to grow together. A sense of sustainability
is expressed in an interview, "When September rolls around, the funding for this focal
area will end, but the need for partnership does not. The need to manage the resources in
a collaborative way will not end." As a result, participants are always looking for ways in
which they can work with their partners on projects that grow from those directly
supported by the VSHP. Another interviewee mentions that partners work within a
flexible framework of dynamic processes because projects do not always work out as
intended; this flexibility allows the collective arrangement to make changes as needed.
Based on participants' descriptions of the VSHP objectives, the data suggest that
the policy objective is located toward the collaborative end of the continuum in terms of
difficulty. More than 60% of the elements identified within this variable are for the
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complexity of tasks associated with the program's objectives. According to an interview
discussion, the organizations within the VSHP use an "ecosystem mentality" when
focusing on land management and habitat restoration on the Eastern Shore. As a result,
many people and organizational entities are involved in this regional approach. Of the
participants interviewed, more than 67% indicate that the objectives of the program are
highly complex. Many attribute this complexity to the nature and scale in which the
program is trying to resolve environmental issues. A high level of difficulty can be seen
when looking at a technique the Division of Natural Heritage uses to map Phragmites on
the Eastern Shore. Phragmites is an invasive plant species that disrupts the natural
landscape. This technique is explained during an interview,
We've mapped the entire seaside of the Eastern Shore. For example, we've
developed a technique using low elevation flights with helicopters and global
positioning systems to map Phragmites at a really high scale - a high resolution
with a lot of precision and accuracy with this mapping. We are mapping tiny
patches of Phragmites and essentially doing a census of all the Phragmites on the
seaside of the Eastern Shore. This technique didn't exist before.
Projects encompass highly varied tasks that involve different stakeholders, raise different
issues, and focus on different goals. Some of the projects include shellfish restoration,
shore bird habitat protection, Phragmites control, and the development of ecotourism. As
suggested by the literature (see, for example, Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007),
collaborative interactions are used in the VSHP to address highly complex problems.
Another 30% of the elements identified within the difficulty variable are
associated with the program's objectives addressing a situation of crisis. With great focus
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placed on the Chesapeake Bay, the Eastern Shore historically receives little attention. A
common theme among interviewees is that the seaside of the Eastern Shore is forgotten.
This point is explicitly expressed by an interviewee in the following manner, "The
Seaside is always forgotten because of the Chesapeake Bay. It is one area that is so rich
in natural resources but it can fall through the cracks." In and of itself, a lack of attention
may not be grounds for crisis. However, the seaside of the Eastern Shore is a critically
important environmental area. An interviewee describes the area as "one of the world's
most important biospheres." Another participant agrees, "The Eastern Shore is a jewel.
You have a suite of wildlife resources found on the Eastern Shore that are not only
valuable from a scientific and conservation standpoint but are [also valuable as] major
economic and recreational resources." Grounds for crisis arise because there is an
environmentally significant area faces severe development pressures compounded by
economic stress and a lack of attention.
Based on the textual data collected through interviews and documents, the policy
objective is located toward the collaborative end of the continuum in terms of the roles
single organizations play. About one half of the elements identified within this variable
are associated with interdependencies between organizations. It is important to recognize
the way in which interdependence applies to interactions in this study. The literature
suggests that collaborative interactions occur when single organizations cannot resolve a
problem individually (see, for example, Wood & Gray, 1991) and each organization
becomes one piece of a larger system (see, for example, Mandell, 1994). While interview
responses indicate that participants perceive their organizations to be interdependent with
those of a larger system, this study does not necessarily support the literature's nuances.
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In this study, organizations are not perceived to be unable to function
independently. To the contrary, interviewees suggest that their organizations can operate
individually to make some differences on the Eastern Shore. An interviewee explains that
each organization independently makes technical recommendations, assumes
management roles, and exerts legal authorities. Interdependence comes into play when
interviewees discuss the magnitude, scope, and successes of what they accomplish when
working together. An interviewee clarifies this distinction of interdependence in
collaborative interactions,
Even though each agency can do its own piece fairly well on its own, the
objectives of the VSHP are certainly much broader than any one of the agencies.
Even if we are able to work mostly independently on our little piece of it, it is just
a piece.
Resource administrators and operational personnel alike indicate that they look to find
ways to tie their organizations and research together because they are able to accomplish
more by doing so. This finding is supported in research conducted by Keast, Brown, and
Mandell (2007). Based on data collected in interviews and focus groups with policy
makers and practitioners in the service arena, their research indicates that collaborative
interactions are employed when organizations search for ways to "achieve greater
efficiencies of scale and outcome" (p. 18).
The data suggest that the policy objective of the VSHP is located toward the
collaborative end of the continuum in terms of impetus for collective action. More than
one half of the elements identified within this variable indicate that a convener brings
organizations together, they have complementary interests, or they can better achieve the
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desired goal when working together. First, organizations come together to implement the
VSHP because the VCZM Program plays an important role in convening the group. As
is suggested by the literature (see, for example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006;
McNamara, Leavitt, & Morris, 2008), the VCZM Program serves as a mechanism to
encourage interactions between organizations and establish the collective arrangement.
The importance of identifying a mechanism to bring organizations together is
acknowledged during an interview, "The key is having something to bring these
organizations together. Otherwise they will work together where it benefits them."
Another interviewee suggests that the convening role of the VCZM Program is
especially important because each organization is individually busy and involved in many
other projects. Due to their expertise in facilitating relationships, the VCZM Program
staff has high levels of credibility with their partners. This credibility is frequently
mentioned in interviews and documents. The literature indicates that credibility is an
essential component in influencing the organizations to work together in an arena where
formal authority is nonexistent (see, for example, Wood & Gray, 1991).
Second, organizations come together because they identify complementary
interests. An interviewee expresses this point during an interview, "Our objectives are
clearly a subset of the overall VSHP. The VSHP covers a lot of bases well beyond the
narrow mission of our division. But it is quite aligned." The VCZM Program also plays
an important role in helping organizations recognize when they have complementary
interests that can be better served by working together rather than alone. An interviewee
explains the involvement of the VCZM Program as follows:

The interests of those agencies have significant overlap in those areas that are
particularly ecologically important. In their daily work they often don't think
about that overlap, they only think about what they are doing. My perception is
that when they get together under the auspices of the Coastal Zone Management
Program they tend to look more at how they can work together.
Interviewees indicate that they perceive their own organizational goals to be furthered by
establishing partnerships with other organizations on the Eastern Shore. This desire to
serve individual organizational interests while also meeting collective interests is
supported by the literature (see, for example, Thomson & Perry, 2006).
Third, organizations work together to implement the VSHP because personnel
perceive that they can better achieve the desired goal. Funding concerns appear to drive
this perception as interviewees frequently mention a lack of resources and tight budgets.
Like many public organizations, those involved with the VSHP have fewer resources to
face increasingly complex problems. An interviewee suggests that scarce resources bring
organizations together. "We have a huge mandate and little resources to accomplish it
with. So we have a vested interest to work together." Leveraging resources and money
help organizations achieve their goals. The need to leverage resources is described by an
interviewee as follows:
The job that needs to be done is bigger than any one agency. And things like the
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program give you a vehicle for everyone to work
together . . . to get in the same car and to get to the same place with somebody
else providing the fuel—[the Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program].

The need to leverage funds is also mentioned in tandem with the matching requirement
on funding distributed by the VCZM Program. An interviewee suggests that
multiorganizational interactions are a necessity for implementing the VSHP,
Even if we ha[ve] all the expertise in the world we could never afford to take on
the entire program because we couldn't come up with the match money to do it.
VIMS [Virginia Institute of Marine Science] could come up with the match
money to do it but they probably wouldn't have all the resources in place to say
that they could do it. And by resources I mean personnel, background, and
physical plant resources such as boats, labs, and computer space to do the entire
job. So it is a program that needs to be done as a partnership.

The Continuum and Interorganizational Infrastructure
The VSHP is comprised of a network of organizations that work together to
preserve and manage natural resources on Virginia's Eastern Shore. The infrastructure is
categorized as cooperative, coordinative, or collaborative based on the perceptions of
administrators regarding the variables of design, formality of the agreement,
organizational autonomy, policy authority, and key personnel. Data collected from
interviews and documents are used to place each variable along the continuum of
interaction. Variables within this construct are placed in different areas along the
continuum and are presented in Table 4.17. Despite this variation, the interorganizational
infrastructure construct is collaborative based on the elements emphasized throughout
interviews and documents. The five variables that characterize this construct are
described in more detail in this section.
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Table 4.17
Inter organizational Infrastructure - Variable Placement on Interaction Continuum
Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Design

6

3

50

Total Elements for
Construct
(% for construct)
59 (22%)

Formality of the
Agreement

22

46

18

86 (32%)

Organizational
Autonomy

2

9

12

23 (8%)

Policy Authority

l^

4

24

53 (19%)

Key Personnel

6

20

•>s

51(19%)

61 (22%)

82 (30%)

Variable

Total Hits for
Interaction
(% for Interaction)

i :v«w

'••)

272(100%)

Based on participants' descriptions on the ways in which the mutliorganizational
arrangement is generated and structured, the data suggests that the infrastructure is
located toward the collaborative end of the continuum in terms of design. Over 40% of
the elements identified within this variable are associated with the new program structure
used to implement the VSHP. The creation of a new program structure is consistent with
the literature (see, for example, Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001) and
suggests that participants identify with the horizontal linkages used to implement the
VSHP.
Two types of horizontal structures are used to establish linkages within the
multiorganizational arrangement. The CPT is one type of horizontal structure used to
implement the VSHP. Many interviewees describe this group as providing the leadership
and structure needed to bring the network of participants together. An interviewee
explains the role of the CPT, "Each time you look at a project, it is a collection of
partners that have all come together. And I don't know if those partners would have
necessarily worked as well together if there hadn't been a structure to bring them
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together." This governing body is comprised of representatives from state and local
governments. Participants of this group make programmatic decisions to guide the overall
direction of the VCZM Program. In addition, they make decisions regarding the
distribution of grant funds.
The executive steering committee is a second type of horizontal structure used to
implement the VSHP. This group is comprised of operational personnel who have field
level expertise and are responsible for managing projects on the Eastern Shore. Their
expertise is widely acknowledged by interviewees holding positions on the CPT. During
interviews, many CPT members recognize that personnel at the operational levels have
20 to 30 years of experience in studying these ecosystems, and this knowledge helps
them make sound decisions in terms of project operations.
These findings indicate that multiorganizational implementation requires the
development of horizontal connections between organizations in addition to vertical
connections within organizations. The use of the CPT and executive steering committee
facilitates the involvement of two levels of personnel from each state agency—resource
administrators and operational project leaders. Representatives on the CPT typically
supervise the project leaders on the executive steering committee. In addition,
multiorganizational arrangements may benefit from horizontal connections at more than
one organizational level. Operations within the VSHP appear to run smoothly because
resource administrators are horizontally linked with one another while operational
personnel from the same agencies are also horizontally linked with one another. It is
through these linkages that resource administrators and operational personnel become
aware of the expertise within their own organizations and in other organizations.

144
Textual data suggests that the interorganizational infrastructure construct is
located in the coordinative area of the continuum based on the formality of the agreement
between organizations involved in the VSHP. More than one third of the elements
identified within this variable are attributed towards contractual agreements formalizing
relationships. This is not surprising considering that the VCZM Program awards one half
of a million dollars in grant funds annually to partners involved in the VSHP. As a result,
roles and responsibilities are largely determined by stipulations within the grant. An
interviewee describes the formality of agreements between organizations as "partly grant
driven." Another interviewee says, "[Roles] are usually based on our specific mandates
for regulatory initiatives or controls." Grant contracts are used to identify projects
suitable for collective action and formalize relationships between participants
implementing the VSHP. Contracts are used in a similar manner in the research
conducted by Jennings and Krane (1994). In collaborative interactions, hierarchical forms
of accountability are nonexistent because participants are considered to have equal status.
Therefore, situations involving the distribution of funds require the presence of formal
accountability mechanisms. Since these mechanisms are not inherently present in
collaborative arrangements, grant contracts serve this purpose.
Based on analysis of interview transcriptions and documents, the infrastructure of
the VSHP is located toward the collaborative end of the continuum in terms of
organizational autonomy. More than one half of the elements identified within this
variable are attributed to organizations not being autonomous. A common theme in the
data is that organizations can function independently in their day-to-day operations, but
overall operations are inherently intertwined with those of other organizations
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implementing the VSHP. An interview participant suggests that organizations benefit by
working together, "Everyone could do their job on their own. They are able to do a much
better job by working together." Interviewees recognize that an ecosystem approach to
managing resources on the Eastern Shore requires them to work with other organizations
in order to better meet the program's diverse objectives. Discussion during an interview
reveals why organizations are not autonomous when implementing the VSHP,
The goals of the program are pretty broad so no one agency can do it themselves.
You have to have that mix of expertise and disciplines to cover the bases of all the
different resources that are on the Eastern Shore. . . . [T]here is so much to do that
you need a lot of different hands and you need a lot of different expertise because
of the fact that no one organization has sufficient capabilities and expertise in all
the different disciplines to address the broad range of resource issues that present
themselves on a place like the Seaside.
Recognition that collective efforts are needed to accomplish the totality of the task aligns
with the research (see, for example, Mandell, 1994). Interdependencies are captured
during an interview,
Certainly at the state level we rely on each other quite a bit because everyone has
their own piece of it and if somebody's piece doesn't get done than that has a
major impact on the total objective of the VSHP. It requires all organizations that
are involved to finish the elements they agree to. So the success of the total
project is dependent on each of the elements.
Multiple interviewees convey that each organization addresses one piece of the Eastern
Shore's larger ecosystem, and each piece impacts the larger system.

Interviewees emphasize that their organizations are individual pieces of a larger
ecosystem; this emphasis suggests that collaboration between organizations involved in
implementing the VSHP occurs in a specialized way. Other research on collaboration in
the environmental arena supports this theme (see, for example, McNamara, Leavitt, &
Morris, 2008). Organizations utilize specialized expertise while working on various
projects pertaining to natural resources on the Eastern Shore. It likely takes great
understanding of each organization to align these independent specializations in ways
that meet the goals of the VSHP. The role of the VCZM Program staff in aligning
organizational specializations is described by an interviewee, "It's like being a conductor
of a symphony. You have your different instruments and you know what their specialties
are. So you figure out the right time to bring them in and hopefully it comes together in
one nice piece of music." In this sense, collaborative interactions are purposive to the
extent that the convener brings together a group of organizations with the specializations
needed to carry out the program's objectives.
The data suggests that infrastructure is located toward the cooperative and
collaborative ends of the continuum in terms of policy authority. There is only a one
point difference between the elements identified as cooperative and those identified as
collaborative. In addition, almost one half of the elements identified within this variable
are associated with each of these two interactions. This is important to recognize because
in this study the variable operates at both ends of the continuum. Although the data may
appear contradictory, these seemingly dichotomous views may be attributed to
participants focusing on different levels of policy decision making when answering the
interview question, the sectors involved in the program, and the design of the CPT.
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In the VSHP, local governments and federal/state agencies largely represent the
public sector. These organizations have responsibilities mandated through specific legal
authorities. Personnel representing these organizations may recognize a resource that
would benefit from the development of enforceable policies and gather data to support a
particular policy change, but policy decisions ultimately occur through a political
process. This emphasis on organizations independently following preexisting policies is
aligned with the cooperation literature which suggests that organizations retain separate
identifies and control resources individually when working together (see, for example,
Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). An interviewee expresses a need for each agency to
follow its legal authorities, "For the Eastern Shore group, each agency has to be very
clear in voicing their concerns and their legal authorities or restrictions... . There may be
certain things that an organization just cannot do."
On the other hand, these same participants also indicate that the CPT can make
operational policy changes within the scope of each agency's legal authorities. Two types
of decisions are made by the personnel on this team. First, programmatic decisions occur
at the operational level. An interviewee mentions, "Agencies do develop collective
policies to guide operations." It is through the CPT that decisions are made regarding
commitments to projects and allocation of resources. Another interviewee indicates that
the partners work together to identify the program's focal areas. "We all work together as
a team and we make decisions as a team as to where the focal area will be."
Second, decisions are made regarding the focus of future research. These
decisions are typically guided by a desire to provide state policymakers and citizens with
the information needed to make sound policy decisions regarding land-use on the Eastern
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Shore. In situations where participants of the VSHP desire policy changes that occur
outside their programmatic boundaries, interviewees emphasize that they can influence
the political process through research and the communication of findings. The potential
to influence this process is explained during an interview,
The policies that we develop are probably one of two things. First, deciding as a
group what area we should go in for enforceable policies. . . . Most of the other
policy development has been in terms of seeing a policy need and developing the
information behind it and a recommendation on what policy should be and
presenting that to the appropriate agencies for them to take it to the appropriate
channels.
Although these efforts do not directly change policy, it is through this information
process that interviewees believe they indirectly impact enforceable policies.
This distinction between programmatic policy authorities and more general policy
authorities are not necessarily clear in the literature. The literature suggests that
organizations jointly develop rules and procedures to guide the collective unit (see, for
example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). Although this assertion is supported by the
findings in this study, it is important to consider that these developments occur within the
context of the programmatic level. This may provide a more realistic application of the
policy authority variable during collaborative interactions between public organizations
who are guided by specific legal authorities.
Based on the data collected, the infrastructure of the VSHP is located toward the
collaborative end of the interaction continuum in terms of key personnel. Almost 20% of
the elements within this variable speak to the involvement of the convening organization

in proposing policies and rules for the collective group to consider. An interviewee
describes the role of the convener by saying, "Money brought everyone to the table and
good leadership brought everyone together." The VCZM Program represents the staff
element involved in all operations of the collaborative group; the presence of a staff
element is also identified in Agranoff s (2006) research on public management networks.
The findings from this study align nicely with the literature's discussion on
champions and sponsors (see, for example, Agranoff, 2006; Mandell & Steelman, 2003).
In terms of implementing the VSHP, NOAA acts as a sponsor by providing the authority
and resources to legitimize the implementation network. The VCZM Program staff acts
as the champions for the implementation network because they sustain interactions with
their needed expertise. This theme emerges throughout numerous interviews. An
interviewee reveals the presence of a champion within the multiorganizational
arrangement, "[T]he Coastal Zone Management Program has been a champion and really
got the project going and got people involved." Another interviewee suggests, "From day
one, it was always put forth that the reason this is possible is because it is a regional
approach. We have to all be working together." The results from this study align with
Agranoff s (2006) research on public management networks. In both cases, champions
play a significant role in encouraging organizations to support the collective arrangement.
In addition, more than 15% of the elements within the key personnel variable
speak to the adaptability of membership, roles, and responsibilities. An interview
participant explains why organizations change roles, "Certain groups are involved in
specific projects depending on their expertise." For example, the Virginia Institute of
Marine Science and the Virginia Marine Resources Commission are primarily involved
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in oyster restoration. The Nature Conservancy and the Center for Conservation Biology
are primarily involved in avian research. On the other hand, the Department of
Conservation and Recreation is focused on Phragmites control and providing
opportunities for ecotourism.
Although these examples only represent a fraction of the organizations involved
in the VSHP, a broader look reveals a similar pattern—each organization has a niche
within the bigger group. An interviewee suggests that flexibility is needed to work on the
diverse tasks associated with the VSHP. "You need some flexibility because nothing ever
works completely as planned. You want to be able to retool and regroup in order to have
a dynamic process." Despite a need for the group to adapt to the task at hand, dynamics
within this implementation network stabilize through the specialized nature in which the
organizations come together. Although different tasks require the expertise of different
organizations, it seems that particular subgroups repeatedly work together.

The Continuum and Interorganizational Procedures
Participants within the VSHP indicate that processes within the arrangement
support and sustain relationships. Procedures are categorized as cooperative,
coordinative, or collaborative based on the perceptions of administrators regarding the
variables of information sharing, decision making, resolution of turf issues, resource
allocation, and systems thinking. Data collected from interviews and documents are used
to place each variable along the continuum of interaction. Each variable within the
construct is placed at the collaborative end of the continuum and is presented in Table
4.18. As a result, the interorganizational procedures construct is collaborative in nature.
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The five variables that characterize interorganizational procedures are described in more
detail in this section.

Table 4.18
Interorganizational Procedures - Variable Placement on Interaction Continuum
Variable

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Information Sharing

57

12

75

Total Elements for
Construct
(% for construct)
144 (34%)

Decision Making

4

3

49

56 (13%)

Resolution of Turf
Issues

7

12

23

42(10%)

Resource Allocation

18

57

w)

144(34%)

Systems Thinking

10

2

21

36 (9%)

2-111(57"..)

422 (100%)

Total Hits for
Interaction
(% for Interaction)

96 (23%)

»(20%)

The data suggests that interorganizational procedures are located toward the
collaborative end of the continuum in terms of information sharing. More than 40% of
the elements identified within this variable are attributed to open and frequent
communication and the willingness to share information. Regular meetings among
individuals involved in implementing the VSHP and routine communication among
personnel working at the operational level facilitate collaborative interactions between
organizations. The benefits of communication are described by an interviewee in the
following manner,
I've been in Virginia doing this now for just over 10 years and this certainly
enable [s] me to learn who many of the other players are in the coastal area
working in natural resources. I've learned a lot about who they are, how they
operate, who I can count on, and who not to count on.
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It is through regular meetings of the CPT that partners openly communicate with one
another as they discuss the direction of the VSHP, identify what their organization can
provide to the collective group, and learn more about the other organizations involved in
the program.
In addition, it is common for personnel representing the partnering organizations
to communicate in the course of their daily operations. An interviewee describes daily
communications among organizations implementing the VSHP, "There is so much
routine contact here that when it comes time for all the partners to come together the only
hard part is figuring out a date." These communication linkages are further strengthened
by long standing relationships and geographic proximity among partners on the Eastern
Shore. Another interviewee suggests, "It is completely common to pull up to a boat ramp
and see several partners. And you stop and talk." As is consistent with the literature (see,
for example, Thomson & Perry, 2006), open and frequent communications between
partners involved in implementing the VSHP reduce information asymmetries.
Furthermore, a willingness to share information between organizations facilitates
collaborative interactions between partners implementing the VSHP. As organizations
enhance their understanding of one another, they become increasingly willing to share
information. During interviews, a participant suggests that this willingness to share
information with one another "helps create a real scientific community rather than a
group of scientists." In sharing information on restoring coastal habitats, replenishing
aquatic resources, and promoting sustainable economic activities on the seaside of the
Eastern Shore, the collective group is better able to employ an ecosystem approach. A
sense of understanding within the network is described during an interview, "Now
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everybody understands each others work so completely that they realize that none of their
projects is more important than any others. And they are looking for opportunities to find
ways to help others." As organizations focus on projects that address one piece of the
larger ecosystem, a willingness to share information allows them to become more
knowledgeable in areas that address interrelated pieces of the ecosystem. Developing a
knowledge base through information sharing and understanding is supported by the
literature (see, for example, Imperial, 2001; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007).
Stability among partners involved in the VSHP contributes to this willingness to
share information. An interviewee describes the development of stability within the
multiorganizational arrangement, "It is the same group of organizations that come
together on a regular basis to identify what the resources needs are, to see what people
and money each organization has, and to pool the resources to conduct conservation." In
many instances, the VCZM Program staff encourages organizations to share information.
This point is further explained during an interview, "The VSHP provides platforms for
people to talk in ways and at levels of intimacy that averts problems more than it creates
them."
Interorganizational procedures are located at the collaborative end of the
continuum in terms of decision making. Elements within collaborative decision making
are identified twelve times more often than the elements within cooperation or
coordination. More than 80% of the elements identified within this variable are attributed
to participative decision making based on consensus and compromise. This process is
described by an interview participant, "Decision making is a collegial process. There are
a lot of prioritizations to be made. It is an open, roundtable discussion. And we try to
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come to consensus on what the priorities will be." Another interviewee agrees, "The
discussion happens with all the partners sitting at the table." Much like the literature
suggests (see, for example, Agranoff, 2006; Mandell & Steelman, 2003), consensus and
compromise are an important part of the process. It is common for interview participants
to describe the process as an open discussion. Based on the following statement from an
interviewee, participants perceive themselves to have great input into decisions:
The whole group discusses and decides the priorities. Once the group as a whole
sets the priorities, the partners most applicable to that project talk amongst
themselves about how to carry it out. Small groups form around particular
projects. All the [needed] partners [are] at the table.
It is clear during interviews that participants consider themselves equal stakeholders
when it comes to making decisions.
Interorganizational procedures are located at the collaborative end of the
continuum in terms of resolving turf issues. More than one half of the elements within
this variable are associated with maximizing common ground and recognizing
incongruent demands between individual organizations and the collective group.
Therefore, turf issues are resolved in two ways.
First, participants within the VSHP focus on maximizing common ground in order
to minimize turf issues. Although each organization may have a different interest in
protecting the seaside of Virginia's Eastern Shore, interview responses suggest that
organizations maximize common ground by focusing on the needs of the resource. An
interviewee expresses recognition of this common ground, "It's all different roads leading
to the same destination." A common goal unites the organizations implementing the
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VSHP. This unity is explained in an interview, "When the bottom line is the protection of
the resource, and this is what you are focused on, I think it is easier to resolve these
issues." As personnel from different organizations agree on the need to protect the
resource, interviews also realize no organization can accomplish the goal individually.
An interviewee acknowledges the necessity for organizations to work together, "In a lot
of cases, we've realized that we need each other. And nobody has the resources we used
to have so we can't afford to fight with each other."
Second, participants within the VSHP minimize turf issues by recognizing that
there is potential for incongruent demands between individual organizations and the
collective group. The potential for incongruent demands is also recognized in the
research conducted by Thomson and Perry (2006). The need to balance competing
demands is acknowledged by an interview participant,
There is a balancing act between the interests of the individual organization and
those of the collective group. And the collective has to recognize the mandates
and the limitations of the individual partners. You strive to identify the things that
everyone can support and then you continue the hard work with some of the
tougher issues. These can be addressed, it just takes longer.
In balancing the interests of individual organizations and the collective arrangement, turf
issues do not impact the network of organizations involved in the VSHP. This finding
aligns with Agranoff s (2006) research on collaborative networks involving federal, state,
and local governments. The literature indicates that conflicts between organizations may
be resolved by adjusting policies and procedures (see, for example, Mattessich, MurrayClose, & Monsey, 2001). In this study, resolution of turf issues does not appear to come
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from policy or procedural changes. Instead, findings suggest that there are two other
explanations for the lack of turf issues between the organizations involved in
implementing the VSHP.
First, interview responses indicate that organizations within the implementation
network focus on understanding the different perspectives and concerns of other
participating organizations. "It is not enough to accurately hear what other [people are]
saying, you actually have to understand why they are saying it, what their perspective[s]
[are], and what they really need." Interviewees indicate that they spend great amounts of
time discussing what programs to pursue and how to implement them. When problems
arise, they also spend a great deal of time resolving them. Significant emphasis is placed
on identifying common opportunities that involve projects deemed valuable by a majority
of organizations.
Second, interview responses suggest that a lack of turf issues may be somewhat
predetermined based on the organizations identified to implement the VSHP. The
organizations involved in the VSHP generally have specialized roles based on distinct
mission areas. These organizations are brought to the table because their mission areas
are tangentially related and focus on the seaside of the Eastern Shore. However, mission
specializations help minimize conflicts among partners because the allocation of grant
money and determination of project involvement are often based on the need for a
particular expertise. Therefore, conflict is minimal because organizations do not need to
compete for the same funds or project involvement. This finding suggests that turf issues
can be avoided to some extent based on the organizations brought to the table. Conveners
should give considerable thought to identifying the specializations needed to implement a
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particular objective prior to bringing the organizations together. As a result, the outcome
of collaborative interactions may be related to how well the convener accomplishes this
task.
Interorganizational procedures are located at the collaborative end of the
continuum in terms of resource allocation. The number of times that elements within this
variable are mentioned increase along the continuum of interaction in a linear fashion
from cooperation to collaboration. Almost 30% of the elements within this variable are
associated with resources provided through grant contracts. This element aligns with
coordinative resource allocation and is mentioned more often than any other element. An
interviewee explains the criticality of a stable funding stream in sustaining partnerships
within the VSHP,
When you have money, you can do some things that you could never do. And you
can get people to work with you in ways that they would have never worked with
you before. If you can start paying for things then people start chipping in their
time. The matching aspect a lot of organizations are capable of but if there isn't a
funding source to drive the whole thing then [interaction] is harder to come by.
That has been the story of this program.
A majority of interviewees suggest that the success of the VSHP is possible because of
the funding stream provided by the VCZM Program. An interviewee discusses the impact
of funding, "The funding and the possibilities that the funding creates for action is what
makes the progress possible." Interviewees, employed by public organizations, indicate
that these additional funds directly contribute to the scope of the work they are able to
accomplish.
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The structure of the grant process generates opportunities for organizations to
pool resources around the funding stream. Through a pooling of resources, organizations
implementing the VSHP move toward the collaborative end of the continuum in terms of
resource allocation. An interview participant explains that much of the grant money
distributed by the VCZM Program requires organizations to have a one-to-one match
with nonfederal monies, "The match requirement lends itself nicely to pooling resources.
Often, the money is matched with time and personnel." It is through the matching
requirement that organizations identify opportunities to leverage resources. An
interviewee mentions, "We go out to other organizations and line up funds that will
benefit the Seaside." Leveraging resources enhances the power of the implementation
network. An interview participant makes this point during discussion by expressing,
"Leveraging people's resources is really the best power of the VSHP. They are asking for
a one-to-one dollar match so you have to have funding from elsewhere."
When elements within the resource allocation variable are aggregated by
interaction, it is clear that resource allocation occurs at a collaborative level. Although
this pooling of resources occurs, it may occur in a different way than the literature
suggests. An interviewee explains the applicability of pooled resources to the VSHP,
They are pooled to the extent that everybody contributes. They are not pooled to
the extent that you donate a certain amount of time and somebody else decides
how that time is spent.... [I] f I am going to commit my time or my staffs time to
a specific task, than it [has to be] within our mission and my responsibility.
In some instances, organizations leverage resources because their individual projects
align with the goals of the VSHP. Several interviewees describe this process as
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"piggybacking." In these instances, the VSHP benefits from the completion of additional
projects while individual organizations benefit from additional funds.
Other times, the pooling of resources occurs because organizations have access to
funds that other VSHP participants do not have access to. As these funds are identified by
organizations involved in the VSHP, they often apply them to projects that align with the
initiatives of the multiorganizational arrangement. It is mentioned during an interview
that the cost of land on the Eastern Shore often requires organizations to pool various
funding sources in order to purchase a piece of property.
The most recent acquisition project involved a piece of land contiguous to the
Fish and Wildlife refuge at the Southern Tip. We came together as a group to
figure out what pots of money might be available to buy that piece of land. . . .
The money is coming from all different pots because no one source has enough
cash to pay for it all.
In these situations, resources are generally pooled in the sense that one group may be able
to push an initiative forward in a way that another organization may not be able to. For
example, a nonprofit like The Nature Conservancy (TNC) does not face the same budget
constraints that government organizations face, and they are able to use their money in
ways that public organizations cannot. Therefore, TNC often spearheads land acquisition
on the southern tip of the Eastern Shore because the organization can quickly allocate the
funds and purchase the desired property. Due to the bureaucracy within public
organizations, they are unable to operate at the same speed. As a result, TNC often
purchases land initially and then works with various federal/state agencies to determine
who will repurchase and manage it.
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Furthermore, nonfinancial resources are pooled in a specialized way. Interviewees
frequently mention that their organizations have resources needed to achieve the program
objectives and that these resources are allocated to the collective group. For example,
TNC has access to volunteers and great expertise in terms of land acquisition and bird
habitat management. The Eastern Shorekeeper provides informal enforcement to ensure
restored areas remain undisturbed. Academic institutions, such as The College of William
and Mary and the University of Virginia, provide data that is used to advocate specific
management decisions. The VCZM Program staff members are experts in grant
management and environmental facilitation. These are just a few examples of the ways
nonfinancial resources are pooled in a specialized way. While Agranoff s (2006) research
suggests that government managers contribute resources to collective groups, this study
suggests that the pooling of resources occurs in a specialized way in which each
organization retains control of the resources they provide to the collective group.
Interorganizational procedures are located at the collaborative end of the
continuum in terms of systems thinking. Two-thirds of the elements within this variable
are associated with integrating information systems to foster linkages between
organizations. Much like Imperial's (2005) research, organizations within the VSHP use
interagency databases to make information widely accessible to all participants. The
coastal geospatial and educational mapping system (GEMS) is funded by the VCZM
Program and often cited by interviewees as a useful web-based tool. An interviewee
explains this tool, "Information is housed in one site-the Coastal GEMS program. This
helps keep the organizations aware of what is going on so we know what the other
organizations are doing." Organizations can view land use and resource management
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information through this program. In some instances, the VCZM Program requires
organizations receiving grant funds to produce a data layer to add into Coastal GEMS.
Several interviewees explain that this approach encourages organizations to support the
database and increases organizations' willingness to share information. In addition to
developing and maintaining Coastal GEMS, the VCZM Program helps organizations
identify common needs and see the importance in sharing information.

The Continuum and Organizational Management
Participants within the VSHP indicate that behaviors within and between member
organizations support the multiorganizational arrangement. Organizational management
is categorized as cooperative, coordinative, or collaborative based on the perceptions of
administrators regarding the variables of incentives, commitment, trust, risk taking, and
willingness to change. Data collected from interviews and documents are used to place
each variable along the continuum of interaction. Variables within this construct are
placed in different areas along the continuum and are presented in Table 4.19. Despite
this variation, the organizational management construct operates at a collaborative level
based on the aggregation of elements mentioned. The five variables that characterize
organizational management are described in more detail in this section.
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Table 4.19
Organizational Management - Variable Placement on Interaction Continuum
Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Incentives

4

25

Commitment

36

m
n

Total Elements for
Construct
(% for construct)
62 (20%)

50

97(31%)

Willingness to
Change

15

9

16

40(13%)

Trust

0

1

79

80 (26%)

Risk Taking

28

2

1

31 (10%)

83 (27%)

56(18%)

171 (55%)

310(100%)

Variable

Total Hits for
Interaction
(% for Interaction)

Organizational management is located in the coordinative area of the continuum
in terms of incentives. More than one third of the elements identified within this variable
are attributed to the provision of funds through grant contracts. An interview participant
suggests that money is the carrot that initially brings people to the table.
The VSHP [i]s an effort to get all the researchers in a particular region working
together and to fund them to a level so they c[an] achieve significant success in a
relatively short amount of time and not have to spend all their time chasing
money.
Contrary to Jennings' (1994) research, incentives attached to financial provisions are
emphasized twice as often as incentives linked to leadership support. Incentives based on
funding are discussed during an interview,
Having sufficient funding allowfs] us to work better together because we d[o]n't
have to fight each other. At the end of the day we [a]re able to look at our
priorities and look at our projects, and since we [ajren't needing to compete for
the money, we [a]re able to work better together.

An emphasis on funding rather than leadership support may be explained by the
independence afforded operational personnel and discretion to determine their
involvement in the implementation network. In some instances, interviewees seem
largely removed from the bureaucracy typically associated with government agencies.
While not emphasized as an incentive for participation, findings from this study
acknowledge the time and resources middle level organizational leaders commit to the
VSHP through their involvement on the CPT. Perhaps participants are given increased
levels of independence and discretion because of support from leaders behind the scenes.
Organizational management is located at the collaborative end of the continuum
in terms of commitment. More than one half of the elements identified within this
variable are attributed to the need to balance individual and collective interests, the
collective interest serving the organization's individual interests, and the extent to which
relationships are reciprocated throughout the arrangement. As indicated in the literature
(see, for example, Mandell & Steelman, 2003; Thomson & Perry, 2006), interviewees
suggest that there is a need to balance individual and collective interests. While
organizations involved in implementing the VSHP are committed to the Eastern Shore,
they are also committed to their individual organizations. An interviewee suggests that
interactions occur when these interests intersect, "When we see our missions cross, we
work together. But, we also work independently." Another interviewee adds, "Each
agency participates within the lines of their mission. So if they don't feel a direct
connection with their mission it would not be worth their time to continue to participate."
The literature also suggests that competing interests between the individual organization
and collective group may create tension (see, for example, Mandell & Steelman, 2003;
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Thomson & Perry, 2006). High levels of tension are unfounded in this study, and this
may be because the convener brought specific organizations to the table based on an
identified need for particular expertise. When convening the group, the VCZM Program
staff takes into account a need to balance organizational interests.
In addition, this study indicates that commitment within the VSHP is located at
the collaborative end of the continuum because the missions of individual organizations
advance through the collective group. As the literature acknowledges (see, for example,
Keast et al., 2004; Thomson & Perry, 2006), collaboration occurs between partners
implementing the VSHP because they can resolve complex environmental problems
without diminishing their commitments to individual organizations. Interviewees indicate
that their organizational interests are met while working together. These efforts are
described by an interview participant, "We are meeting our objectives for resource
management and land conservation but we are also furthering the whole effort." An
interviewee acknowledges that individual organizations benefit by working together.
Beyond the funding opportunities, it gives us the opportunity to do work that we
otherwise would not be able to do and achieve a part of our mission that would
otherwise not be possible. It is an opportunity to be successful in a way that would
be impossible otherwise. It creates opportunities to work with other agencies in a
way where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The benefits transcend
your first expectations because of the ideas that are generated.
The VCZM Program staff gives much thought to convening a group of organizations
whose individual interests are served by the collective interest. In addition, they ensure
organizations understand how these interests align.
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Furthermore, relationships between organizations are largely reciprocated within
the implementation network of the VSHP. High levels of reciprocation are seemingly
enhanced by personal commitments from the people involved in implementing the
VSHP. It is evident during interviews that participants feel personally connected to the
work they do. An interviewee explains this connection, "All the people within these
organizations care so deeply about the place—every one of them. I can't think of one
person in that VSHP partnership that I would say is not just deeply and personally
committed to saving this place and making it better."
Organizational management is located at the cooperative and collaborative ends
of the continuum in terms of willingness to change. There is only a one-point difference
between the elements within cooperation and those within collaboration, and more than
one third of the elements identified within this variable align with both types of
interactions. This is important to recognize because in this study the variable operates at
both ends of the continuum. Perhaps these seemingly dichotomous views can be
attributed to the extent to which the government sector is involved in the program and the
design of the CPT. A presence of cooperative elements may be explained when
considering that more than 70% of interview participants are government employees.
Government agencies are mandated by specific legal authorities and responsibilities;
interviewees recognize that their organizational policies are independently established
and must remain unchanged by the collective arrangement. This independence is
acknowledged, "[Organizations] have [their] own internal guidelines and state code." If
changes are in opposition to legal authorities or regulations, organizations are not able to
make changes. Therefore, the cooperative element within the willingness to change

variable may be attributed to the strong presence of government organizations and the
separate legal authorities that guide each organization.
On the other hand, collaborative elements within the willingness to change
variable may be attributed to the presence of the CPT. Interviewees indicate that their
organizations are willing to consider changes to the policies or procedures that govern
project operations within the field. For example, interviewees mention that changes to
comprehensive plans, master plans, and research agendas are made as a result of
activities within the collective arrangement. According to an interview participant, "As
long as it [i]s something that we have control over as an agency, that isn't mandated from
somewhere above the agency, and it is reasonable we w[ill] try to work with the Coastal
Zone Management Program and the Coastal Policy Team to change policies or
procedures." Another interviewee indicates that his division is always looking for "the
innovative way of doing something." Discussions during interviews indicate that the
research being conducted on the seaside of the Eastern Shore can lead to more informed
management and resource practices. Therefore, organizations are willing to make
changes to improve operations provided that it is within the boundaries of their legal
authorities and regulations.
Organizational management is located at the collaborative end of the continuum
in terms of trust. More than 85% of the elements identified within this variable indicate
that there is a history of supportive behavior and long-standing relationships between the
organizations involved in the VSHP. "A history of supportive interactions sustains and
legitimizes relationships" element is mentioned more often than any other within the
entire model. An interviewee explains that many of the players currently involved in
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implementing the VSHP started working together almost 20 years ago to protect the
midatlantic migration corridor--a piece of property on the southern tip of the Eastern
Shore which is an important stopover for migratory songbirds traveling from South and
Central America to Canada. Another interviewee adds that many of the organizations
have "worked together long before the VSHP came along." Twenty years later, the
organizations and people representing these organizations still interact with the VCZM
Program in significant ways. Discussions during interviews suggest that many personnel
spend their entire careers on the Eastern Shore. "The secret of success [is] the continuity
of the personnel over time." Another participant expresses agreement, "And it [is] a very
stable group. The partners that were in it from the beginning are largely still in it." As a
result, these organizations seem to have a deep understanding of the resource and other
organizations involved.
In addition, a common theme among interviewees is that trust within the
multiorganizational arrangement operates at the collaborative end of the continuum
because organizations work together in a variety of ways. Discussion during an interview
reveals that organizations often interact for purposes outside the program's boundaries.
Most of the folks working on the VSHP know each other from other things in the
past and will continue to work together in other venues as well. These are
overlapping organizations and groups that work together for different reasons. So
[the VSHP] is one thing that pulls them together but it is not the only thing that
pulls certain people to the tables.
For example, the Southern Tip Partnership is comprised of a subset of organizations
involved in implementing the VSHP. This group focuses on acquiring and preserving
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land on the southern tip of the Eastern Shore. Other subgroups include the Birding and
Wildlife Festival Committee, the Coastal Virginia Wildlilfe Observatory, the Eastern
Shore Environmental Council, the Watershed Network, and the Avian Partnership. In this
study, many of the same partners work together in different capacities and have done so
for a number of years.
The findings suggest that high levels of trust play an important role in creating
and sustaining collaborative interactions for two reasons. First, participants indicate that
they feel comfortable with other members of the group because they know their partners
will help them achieve the project's deliverables. Building this level of comfort is
described during an interview,
Trust is built through successful accomplishment of various projects that we work
on and positive reinforcement. We build because we are at a point where we
know the person will be there and they will follow through. Actions speak louder
than words when working together.
As a result, trust allows organizations to rely on one another. This reliance is especially
important in collaborative interactions because partners cannot individually achieve the
same goals. An interview participant explains this reliance among researchers,
In order to relate projects and do ecosystem wide research, you have to believe
that other projects have value and that the research is trustworthy and that the
people doing it know what they are doing. You can't go back and pick through the
nitty gritty of their whole project, because you have to focus on yours. So that
level of trust is vital to this system-wide approach.
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These findings suggest that organizations involved in implementing the VSHP employ
the "ethic of collaboration" discussed by Thomson and Perry (2006, p. 25). Interviewees
indicate that they believe their partners are committed to the collective arrangement and
will work in good faith with other organizations.
Second, trust plays an important role in creating and sustaining collaborative
interactions because people become involved on a personal level. An interviewee
discusses this personal involvement, "It is the fact that you see these folks all the time.
The fact that it is a small landscape, very stable staff—people are here for a long time." As
people learn more about one another, they know whom to call when they need help.
Another interviewee attributes the development of personal relationships to the longevity
of the network. "After years of working with one another, you are no longer just working
with an organizational face, but with a specific individual. The partnership evolves from
an organizational relationship into a more personal relationship. You know who you need
to call about certain things."
In addition to perceiving high levels of trust among partners within the network,
interviewees suggest that they also feel high levels of trust with the VCZM Program. An
interviewee explains this relationship, "The Coastal Zone Management Program has a
long history on the Eastern Shore so this [i]s building upon or a reinvestment on past
investments." Although sometimes outside the scope of the VSHP, the staff of the VCZM
Program spends a great deal of time working with these same organizations. This
suggests that high levels of trust between partnering organizations and the convening
organization are needed to sustain collaborative interactions. As is suggested in the
literature (see, for example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006), high levels of trust are
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generated when organizations work together for long periods of time. For the VSHP,
these organizations have worked together for 20 years to develop this high level of trust.
Organizational management is located at the cooperative end of the continuum in
terms of risk taking. More than 85% of the elements identified within this variable
suggest that there are low levels of risk associated with working together. An interviewee
makes the following point pertaining to risk within the VSHP,
There isn't really a risk involved. Each of us has the same objectives and goals.
We are in the same arena. What the agency is really trying to accomplish works
well for all of us. . . . It behooves us to jump in and work together and help
everyone. It is a benefit. It is another means to get where we need to be.
Another interviewee suggests, "[Risk] is minimal. Working together is helpful." High
levels of risk based on dependency between organizations may be mitigated by longstanding relationships and a history that develops over a great deal of time.
The presence of these mitigating factors may explain this study's emphasis on low
levels of risk. The relationship between risk and trust is described during an interview,
"The risk is fairly low. And the trust is fairly high." Although the literature indicates that
collaborative interactions involve high levels of risk (see, for example, Keast et al.,
2004), this assertion is unfounded in this study. Long-standing relationships and high
levels of trust are prerequisites for sustaining collaborative interactions. Despite the
creation of dependencies between organizations, the likelihood of entering into a risky
relationship seems far-fetched. An interviewee reveals how risk is minimized within the
multiorganizational arrangement, "There are hard decisions to make, but the hesitancy is
less when there are 20 other organizations standing with you saying that they agree and
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this needs to be done. And we show up for each other." These findings further support the
removal of the risk taking variable from the final version of the MIM.

Summary of Findings and Analysis
Based on the data collected through interviews and documents, administrators
perceive interactions between organizations involved in the VSHP to be collaborative in
nature. In this study, the interorganizational policy objective, interorganizational
infrastructure, interorganizational procedures, and the organizational management
constructs of the MIM are all found to operate at the collaborative end of the continuum
of interaction. Outcomes from this research are used to analyze the implementation
network, movement of multiorganizational relationships on the continuum of interaction,
reconciliation of the top-down/bottom-up approaches to implementation,
multiorganizational implementation strategies, and the application of collaborative
interactions during policy implementation.

The Implementation Network
Outcomes from this study are used to analyze interactions between organizations
implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. These interactions are explored by
asking each interviewee the following question: "What organizations do you most closely
work with to implement the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program?" When applicable,
interview responses are corroborated with information in documents. An interview
participant describes the multiorganizational arrangement as "a smorgasbord of
organizations." Interactions between organizations in the VSHP are mapped in Figure 4.1

Figure 4.1
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program Implementation Network
Legend
Thin arrows = interactions between the VCZM Program and
organizations not represented on the CPT; interactions between
organizations other than the VCZM Program

Thick arrows = interactions between the VCZM Program and
organizations represented on the CPT

-J
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In the diagram of the VSHP implementation network, circles are used to represent
participating organizations. In some instances, organizations are represented by more
than one circle. This determination was based on an organization fulfilling one of the
following factors: (1) multiple divisions within one organization are highly involved in
the VSHP; (2) multiple divisions within one organization are represented separately on
the Coastal Policy Team (CPT); or (3) multiple divisions within one organization are
located in distinctly different geographic locations. Two types of arrows are used to
convey interactions. Thick arrows represent interactions between the VCZM Program
and organizations represented on the CPT. Thin arrows represent interactions between the
VCZM Program and organizations not represented on the CPT. Thin arrows are also used
to represent interactions between organizations that do not include the VCZM Program.
Interviewees suggest that the strength of these interactions lie in their equality. When
organizations interact to implement the VSHP administrators perceive these relationships
to be of equal importance. These perceptions further emphasize that personnel involved
in the VSHP see themselves as working among partners of equal status.
Mapping multiorganizational interactions is important because it helps identify
organizations that play central roles during implementation of the VSHP. Although the
diagram of the implementation network is not spatially oriented, organizations that play
central roles are identified by looking at the number of connections they have with other
organizations in the network. The organizations more central to the program's
implementation are those with more arrows connecting them to other organizations.
The relative centrality of organizations within the implementation network is
determined by comparing the number of organizational connections. Figure 4.2 is a
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spatial diagram that illustrates the results of this comparison. Organizations most central
to the implementation network are the Department of Environmental Quality, Virginia
Marine Resource Commission, Eastern Shorekeeper, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
Department of Conservation and Recreation, The Nature Conservancy, College of
William and Mary, and Department of Game and Inland Fisheries. Federal/state agencies
and nonprofit organizations comprise the majority of organizations within the core of the
implementation network. Private organizations and local governments comprise the
majority of organizations within the periphery.

Figure 4.2
Relative Centrality of Organizations in the Implementation Network
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Perhaps the centrality of these organizations can be better understood when
looking at the missions of the organizations involved. The centrality of federal/state
agencies is not surprising given that they are required by executive order to participate in
the VCZM Program in some capacity (Kaine, 2006). Evidence that this network operates
beyond command-and-control authority comes from the centrality of nonprofit
organizations. It is not a coincidence that the missions of The Nature Conservancy and
Eastern Shorekeeper align holistically with the goals of the VSHP. Centralized roles
within the implementation network are occupied by organizations whose missions most
align with the goals of the program or policy. This finding suggests that collaborative
interactions require mission alignment among organizations operating within the core of
the implementation network. In addition, a common theme among interviewees is that
nonprofit organizations play an important role in implementing the VSHP because they
can operate in ways, and at speeds, that public organizations are unable to achieve. The
presence of nonprofit organizations within the core of the network may be essential in
developing and sustaining collaborative interactions.

Movement on the Continuum of Interaction
Data from this study are used to explore empirically the movement of
multiorganizational relationships on the continuum of interaction. The following themes
regarding the movement of these interactions emerge during analysis: (1) organizations
appear to operate in some degree along all points of the continuum; (2) placement along
the continuum may vary based on organizational function; and (3) relationships between
organizations do not necessarily progress in a linear manner along the continuum.
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First, data from this study does not support the assumption within the education
literature that effective interactions between organizations are those in which the type of
interaction is aligned throughout all aspects of the arrangement (see, for example,
Thatcher, 2007). Although the aggregated presence of elements indicates that the
implementation network operates at the collaborative end of the continuum for all four of
the model's constructs, this pattern does not hold throughout the analysis of each
interview and document. This suggests that organizations do not operate consistently
within one type of interaction to the exclusion of all others. In fact, all three types of
interactions are identified in 88% of interviews conducted for this study.
This also suggests that different organizations within the collective arrangement
may use different types of interactions when working together. Of all the interactions
between organizations, more than one quarter of them are between organizations that do
not reciprocate the same type of interaction. Therefore, organizations may work together
to implement policy but they may rely on different types of interactions to do so. For
example, almost 90% of interviewees represent federal/state agencies and perceive
collaborative interactions between organizations involved in implementing the VSHP.
Data from this study indicates that 70% of federal/state agencies implementing the VSHP
interact with local governments or nongovernmental organizations. However, only 25%
of interviewees representing local governments and a little less than 50% of interviewees
representing nongovernmental organizations perceive collaborative interactions between
the organizations involved in implementing the VSHP. In this study, each local
government and nongovernmental organization works with at least one federal/state
agency during implementation.
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Interactions that are not reciprocated may be explained when considering the
centrality of organizations within the implementation network. Interactions between
organizations with centralized roles seem to be reciprocated as collaborative in nature. In
many instances interactions are not reciprocated when organizations with centralized
roles work with organizations that do not have centralized roles. In these instances,
organizations central to the network seem to interact at a collaborative level while
organizations less central to the network do not. This finding suggests that organizations
central to the implementation network are more likely to perceive interactions to operate
at the collaborative end of the continuum.
Second, data from this study suggests that the placement of an organization's
interactions on the continuum may vary by function. For example, an interviewee
explains that a particular organization's placement on the continuum of interaction is
perceived to be in the coordinative area for administrative matters such as the exchange
of money or the arrangement of meetings. However, this same organization is perceived
to operate toward the collaborative end of the continuum when making decisions
pertaining to the VSHP. While not always stated explicitly, this pattern emerges
throughout other interviews. Participants directly involved with projects funded through
grant money are more likely to mention elements associated with the coordinative area of
the continuum. On the other hand, participants involved in the collective decision making
process of the CPT are more likely to mention elements associated with the collaborative
end of the continuum. This finding suggests that personnel representing the same
organization may perceive interactions differently depending on the functions they are
involved in.
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Third, data from this study suggests that relationships between organizations do
not necessarily progress in a linear manner along the continuum. In 38% of the
interviews, there is a nonlinear distribution of interactions along the continuum. These
instances occur in the following two scenarios: (1) the number of elements associated
with cooperative and collaborative interactions is higher than the number of elements
associated with coordinative interactions; or (2) the number of elements associated with
coordinative interactions is higher than the number of elements associated with
cooperative or collaborative interactions. When aggregating the mention of elements in
the interorganizational procedures and organizational management constructs of the
MIM, the number of elements associated with cooperative and collaborative interactions
are higher than the number of elements associated with coordinative interactions. In these
constructs, more elements are linked to both ends of the continuum rather than creating a
linear progression along the continuum.
The nonlinearity of these relationships may be explained when considering the
maturity of relationships between organizations involved in the VSHP. It seems
reasonable to suggest that a more linear progression along the continuum may occur in
the beginning stages of the relationship as organizations become increasingly more
interdependent. These findings suggest that once a relationship matures,
multiorganizational relationships may move on the continuum to ensure operations align
with the type of interaction needed to achieve the program's goals. Due to the amount of
time and resources associated with collaboration, this type of interaction does not
continue unless it is needed.
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Reconciling Approaches to Implementation
This study supports the use of multiorganizational arrangements during policy
implementation. Since administrators indicate that they continue to face resource
shortages and complex problems, it is likely that multiorganizational arrangements will
continue to be used in implementation. Therefore, the findings suggest that theorists may
move beyond the top-down/bottom-up debate while acknowledging the strengths of each
approach in two ways: (1) by focusing on the interactions within multiorganizational
arrangements; and (2) by recognizing that multiorganizational implementation action
occurs by linking organizations through middle level personnel.
First, the two approaches historically used to approach implementation may be
reconciled by focusing on multiorganizational interactions. The reason for this is that the
variables within the MIM move along the continuum of interaction without being
inhibited by the set of assumptions that guide either approach to implementation. Since
the MIM considers both approaches to be equally relevant in exploring interactions
between organizations, competition between the two approaches is unnecessary. For
example, the impetus for collective action variable within the policy objective construct
of the MIM has elements associated with the top-down and bottom-up approaches, but
these elements are placed along different points of the continuum. At the cooperative end
of the continuum, organizations initiate collective action because it helps build capacity
within their world of work. Since these actions are typically initiated at the lower levels
of the organization, this element may be associated with the bottom-up approach to
implementation. As this variable moves along the continuum of interaction, more
emphasis is placed on the top-down approach. Within the coordinative areas of the
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continuum, collective action is typically initiated through legislative mandates or grant
contracts. An emphasis on policy mandates may be associated with the top-down
approach to implementation. Despite this variable containing elements associated with
competing implementation approaches, neither is assumed to be more important because
each aligns with a different type of interaction.
This point is further conveyed as the variable moves toward the collaborative end
of the continuum where collective action is initiated because no single organization can
accomplish the task individually. At this point in the continuum, the top-down/bottom-up
debate does not seem applicable. Regardless of the controls administered from the top or
the dynamics occurring at the bottom of single organizations, interactions between
organizations are needed to accomplish the task. Therefore, the top down/bottom-up
debate becomes less important as interactions move toward the collaborative end of the
continuum.
Second, data from this study suggest that the top-down and bottom-up approaches
to implementation may be reconciled by recognizing that multiorganizational
implementation action occurs by horizontally linking organizations through middle level
personnel. Findings from this study support this assertion. Multiorganizational
implementation within the VSHP emphasizes linking organizations through a horizontal
structure in which all representatives are partners of equal status. Even though
hierarchically structured government organizations represent 60% of the organizations
participating in this implementation network, interactions between organizations involved
in the VSHP are overwhelmingly collaborative. This finding suggests that participants
involved in the VSHP transcend the hierarchical structures within their individual
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organizations and associate themselves with the horizontal structures of the collective
arrangement. Two types of horizontal structures are used to establish linkages within the
multiorganizational arrangement.
One type of horizontal structure within the VSHP comes from the CPT.
Representatives from state and local governments participate in this group and make
programmatic decisions to guide the program's overall direction. State agency
representatives, who make up 83% of the CPT members involved in the VSHP, are
resource administrators or mangers selected to participate by the head of their agency.
Pooling field level expertise through the creation of an executive steering
committee creates a second type of horizontal structure in the VSHP. The people
involved in this committee occupy operational positions and often spearhead projects
associated with the VSHP. Their expertise is widely acknowledged by interviewees who
hold positions on the CPT. These interviewees indicate that personnel making decisions
at operational levels have 20 to 30 years experience in studying the ecosystems on the
Eastern Shore. The use of the CPT and executive steering committee facilitates the
involvement of two levels of personnel from each state agency - resource administrators
and operational project leaders. Representatives on the CPT typically supervise the
project leaders on the executive steering committee. Both levels of personnel operate
within the middle levels of their organizations. Neither the resource administrators nor
the project leaders are at the very top or very bottom of their organizational structures.
These findings suggest that multiorganizational implementation requires the development
of horizontal connections within the collective arrangement in addition to the vertical
connections within individual organizations. Furthermore, multiorganizational
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implementation may be optimal when horizontal connections are established at more than
one level and when these connections are made between personnel occupying positions at
the middle levels of organizations.
Multiorganizational implementation within the VSHP also emphasizes the
involvement of middle level personnel when it comes to making decisions. Based on the
self-description from an interviewee, resource administrators on the CPT are considered
"midlevel managers" when looking at their relative placement within individual agencies.
Participants of the CPT see themselves as the right people to be involved in the program
because they can quickly disseminate information throughout the organization when
needed, and they can inform agency directors when problems arise at the operational
level. Therefore, these personnel bridge gaps between the top and bottom of their
respective organizations. They are perfectly situated to generate implementation action
because they are high enough to commit resources to the collective effort and low enough
to be aware of operational issues. Several interviews explain that the strength of the
VCZM Program is based on the involvement of personnel who have the discretion to
direct resources from their individual agencies towards projects aligned with the VSHP.
Interviewees who serve as members of the CPT suggest that they make programmatic
decisions and direct organizational resources based on feedback from personnel at the
operational level.
Involvement of middle level managers in the implementation network is also seen
in the distribution of financial resources. The VCZM Program Manager, who holds a
middle level position in the Department of Environmental Quality, makes decisions
regarding the distribution of grant funds and provides a significant source of leadership to
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the horizontal structures within the implementation network. This suggests that
leadership within networks may come from personnel with positions in the middle of
their organization's structure rather than from those at the top.
It appears that the nexus of the top-down/bottom-up approaches to
implementation occurs because connections are made between middle level personnel
across different organizations who couple the two approaches. They convey the policy
mandate to those at the operational level, they ensure top management is aware of
operational problems, and they make resource decisions that comply with the policy
mandate while supporting operational needs. The involvement of middle level personnel
is described by an interviewee,
What ends up functionally occurring is that in the middle is where everything
happens. That is true for people. The people at the top get called when something
goes wrong or when there is political pressure. The people at the bottom don't
necessarily have all the connections yet. So they might be good working one on
one. But they aren't the people who ensure that the funding stays in place. [This
occurs through] the people in the middle.
Another interview participant associates the program's success with the involvement of
resource administrators. ".. .one of the more effective aspects of [the program is] that the
people directly responsible for management of resources pretty much get to decide where
we get to provide our focus without a whole lot of political oversight." Agreement is
expressed by another interviewee,
The Coastal Policy Team is comprised of the right level of people. We are at the
right level in the organization where we can quickly disseminate top-down if a
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particular problem or program policy arises. We are able to quickly get that down
into the organization because it is one of our primary responsibilities. But it works
just as well the other way. If a problem or need is identified at the program level
or a solution comes to light, we are just as easy to talk to the chief deputy or the
director at any time.
These findings suggest that utilizing multiorganizational implementation may be most
conducive when the following conditions are met: (1) middle level managers are
involved; (2) these managers have the discretion to allocate organizational resources to
collective efforts; and (3) these managers have the expertise and time to understand
issues at the operational level.

Multiorganizational Implementation Strategies
The findings from this study suggest that theoretical understanding of policy
implementation in multiorganizational arrangements may be improved through the
exploration of a range of interactions. Through the use of the MIM, this study is the first
to link cooperation, coordination, and collaboration collectively to multiorganizational
implementation. By looking at the entire continuum of interactions, researchers are better
able to identify the conditions under which it is appropriate to use a particular type of
interaction as an implementation strategy. These conditions may be identified by looking
at the elements most emphasized within each type of interaction. The presence of certain
activities, such as those described in Table 4.20, provide some of the conditions in which
it may be appropriate to utilize a particular type of interaction. For example, if dialogue
can be maintained through informal relationships then cooperative interactions may be an

185
appropriate implementation strategy to use. On the other hand, if legislative mandates or
grant contracts are needed to enhance cohesion then coordinative interactions may be an
appropriate implementation strategy to use. Furthermore, if there is a history of
supportive behavior or long-standing relationships then collaborative interactions may be
an appropriate implementation strategy to use.

Table 4.20
Implementation Strategies - Elements Most Emphasized in Each Type of Interaction
Cooperation
Coordination
Collaboration
Dialogue maintained through
informal relationships

Legislative mandate or grant
contracts enhance cohesion or
minimize duplication

History of supportive behavior or
long-standing relationships

Informally work together to
achieve individual goals

Resources may be provided
through mandate or grant
arrangements

A lead agency or convener brings
relevant stakeholders together

Interest of individual organization
paramount

Linkages are mobilized because
compatible mission areas
mutually increase abilities to
achieve individual goals

Complementary interests in
attaining mutual goals

Independent; possible to
accomplish the task individually

Mechanisms, such as contractual
or nonfinanical agreements,
formalize relationships

Participative decision making
through consensus and
compromise

Work completed as part of
regular job responsibilities

Statutes or grant contracts
provide funding

Understanding is enhanced by a
willingness to share information
about organizations which may
include what can/cannot be
offered to the collective group

Collaborative Interactions during Implementation
Findings from this study reiterate that collaboration is not appropriate for use in
all situations. Participants stress that interactions between partners involved in
implementing the VSHP require great amounts of time and resources to sustain. The
conditions identified within the literature as being conducive for collaboration are
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supported by this research. In this study, 44% of interviewees indicate that there is a
sense of environmental crisis; 50% of interviewees recognize that their organizational
responsibilities towards coastal management on the Eastern Shore interconnect with those
of other organizations; and 76% of interviewees indicate that organizations have mutual
interests. Furthermore, over 80%> of interview participants mention the importance of
trust between partners. This suggests that the development of trust between organizations
is another condition that may determine the extent to which a situation lends itself to
collaborative interactions. Relationships between partners involved in implementing the
VSHP are enhanced by 20 years of working together. Therefore, collaborative
interactions should not be expected to develop quickly or easily because they take great
effort from all organizations involved. Findings from this study confirm that certain
circumstances are more conducive to collaborative interactions.

Analysis of Initiation of Interactions
Variables within the MIM are analyzed to address the following research
question: How are multiorganizational interactions initiated? This research question
guides inquiry into whether interactions are initiated formally through legislative mandate
or agency rulemaking, informally through street-level experience or common interests, or
a combination of both. As textual data are collected from interviews and documents, the
researcher uses content analysis to organize the data into categories of the prestructured
coding scheme. Elements in the impetus for collective action variable within the
interorganizational policy objective construct and the formality of the agreement variable
within the interorganizational infrastructure construct are explored to respond to this
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research question. The following two questions are asked during interviews: (1) What
brought the organizations together to implement the VSHP? (2) How are the roles and
responsibilities for each participating organization determined?

Analysis of Formally Initiated Interactions
Textual data from interviews and documents suggest that organizational
interactions are formally initiated and sustained within the VSHP. The two elements
within the MIM that speak to the formality of interactions are identified in Table 4.21.
Formal interactions within the VSHP are most prevalent when participants speak of grant
contracts. As money changes hands, clear roles and responsibilities are delineated for the
organization awarded the grant. Due to an emphasis on creating horizontal linkages and
involving middle level personnel, the accountability mechanisms typically generated by
bureaucratic organizations do not appear in multiorganizational arrangements. Therefore,
these formalized interactions fill an important gap in creating accountability mechanisms
for the grantee.

Table 4.21
Elements in the Multiorganizational Implementation Model - Formally Initiated
Variable
# of people/ # r f
% of people/
.^. .,
Element of Formal
documents
,
^
documents
within the
, ., .._ , documents
, ., ,._ ,
T ... ,.
, ,„,
Initiation
who identified
.
,
who identified
MIM
.
.
reviewed
,
element
element
Impetus for
Legislative mandate or grant
Collective
contracts enhance cohesion or
„„
,„
^,„
A +• • • A v +27
42
64%
Action
minimize duplication
Formality of
Mechanisms, such as
the
contractual or nonfinancial
Agreement
agreements, formalize
relationships
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The prevalence of formal interactions is consistent with much of the empirical
inquiry within the multiorganizational implementation literature (see, for example, Hall
& O'Toole, 2004; O'Toole, 1995). However, much of this literature focuses on
interactions initiated by policy mandate, agency rulemaking, or organizational
procedures. More specifically, the literature focuses on the extent to which policies
identify organizational partners, policy characteristics that induce or constrain
interdependence, or the structures used in multiorganizational implementation (see, for
example, Hall & O'Toole, 2004; May, 1995; Raelin, 1982). Some organizational
documents pertaining to the VSHP identify multiorganizational partners and the presence
of the CPT, but these documents do not make any specifications regarding the ways in
which organizations should work together. In this study, interviewees do not perceive
formal interactions to be initiated through the methods specified in the literature. For
example, not one interview participant cites a policy mandate as the impetus for
organizations working together. Instead, 64% of interview transcriptions and documents
indicate that interactions are initiated through grant contracts. An interviewee describes
the relationship between funding and multiorganizational interactons, "Partnering
happens as a result of funding. It gives us something to work with." Another participant
expresses agreement, "The money initially br[ings] all of us together." Findings from this
study suggest that formal interactions are initiated by grant contracts rather than policy
mandates, agency rulemaking, or organizational procedures.
Another 43% of the interview transcriptions and documents indicate that roles are
formalized through grant contracts. The formalization of roles is revealed during an
interview, "Our roles for a particular project are defined by the terms of the grant. As a
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grantee, our role is clear. We have a grant document that we agree to and we have to live
up to those terms." Discussion during another interview reveals, "There are certain rules
stipulated within the grant contracts." An example of this formalization of roles can be
seen in the relationship between the VCZM Program and the PDCs. Each year, the
VCZM Program provides a grant fund to each of the PDCs. Along with this grant money,
the staff of the VCZM Program identifies a minimum standard for what each PDC has to
do in return for these funds. For example, they are required to conduct quarterly meetings
and training sessions with local government administrators. According to an interviewee,
these requirements "provide the conduit for flow of information from the state through
the PDC to the localities and just as importantly from the localities back up to the state."
These findings align with the research conducted by Van de Ven and Walker (1984) and
suggest that interdependencies generated through financial resources rely on a formal
approach to interaction.

Analysis of Informally Initiated Interactions
Textual data from interviews and documents suggest that organizational
interactions are also informally initiated and sustained within the VSHP. The two
elements within the MIM that speak to the informality of interactions are identified in
Table 4.22. Informal interactions within the VSHP are most prevalent when participants
speak of working with peers to enhance their abilities to achieve organizational goals.
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Table 4.22
Elements within the Multiorganizational Implementation Model - Informally Initiated
Variable
# of people/ # r f
% of people/
... . xl
Element of Informal
documents
,
.
documents
within the
. . . ,._ , documents
. . . .._ .
T ... ..
,„,,
Initiation
who identified
.
.
who identified
MIM
.
.
reviewed
,
element
element
Impetus for
Voluntarily initiate collective
Collective action because helpful to world
.
.~
1A0/
...
,
4
42
1U /o
Action
oir work
Formality of
the
Agreement

Informally work together to
achieve individual goals

17

42

40%

Informal interactions occur among the organizations involved in the VSHP, but
they seem to be less prevalent than the formal interactions induced by grant contracts.
Consistent with the research conducted by Van de Ven and Walker (1984), ad hoc
relationships are identified in this study when partners align resources. An interviewee
explains the presence of informal relationships, "The Coastal Zone Management Program
officially pull[s] us all together. But we all started talking together informally long before
we came up with the nuts and bolts of it." A common theme among discussions during
interviews is that operational personnel become involved in the VSHP for two reasons:
(1) they are asked by another partner; or (2) they think it will be beneficial to their world
of work.
First, field level personnel often work on projects associated with the VSHP
because other partners pull them in. An interviewee describes these connections within
the multiorganizational arrangement, "Organizations are pulled in as necessary by
working through the Coastal Policy Team. They are contacted when needed." Another
interviewee explains, "A partner recently called me and asked if we wanted to be
involved in a particular project. I called the Coastal Zone Management Program and
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asked if they wanted to jump in on this as well." Discussion during another interview
suggests that these contacts are possible because of long-standing relationships and
information sharing among partners. "Having those long standing relationships really
helps in terms of pulling the partners together. The partners themselves pull in extra
people when they need to." It is important that personnel involved in the VSHP
understand the mission and interests of other organizations because a high level of
understanding helps them know who to call.
Second, operational personnel become involved in the collective arrangement
because it is beneficial to their world of work. This theme is prevalent during interviews.
An interview participant indicates that organizations become involved in the VSHP
because it creates opportunities to utilize expertise and research in new ways.
Our involvement came from us. We ha[ve] been working on Phragmites since the
mid 1990s. For us, it seem[s] that it [i]s an opportunity to work on Phragmites in a
place that is high priority for us and to go at it in a manner that we ha[ve] not had
an opportunity before.

Summary of Findings and Analysis
The data suggests that interactions between organizations involved in
implementing the VSHP are initiated formally and informally. The findings from this
research are important for two reasons: (1) multiorganizational policy implementation
occurs in part through informal relationships; and (2) a majority of interviews perceive
formalized interactions to be initiated through grant contracts. First, this study is the first
to acknowledge that multiorganizational policy implementation occurs in part through
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informal relationships. Although informally initiated interactions are less prevalent
during implementation of the VSHP, their presence is important because it suggests that
interactions are initiated in ways other than the current body of literature explores. In
addition, the presence of informally initiated interactions during multiorganizational
implementation suggests that a top-down approach does not fully capture relationships
that occur outside the boundaries of operational authority.
Second, a majority of interviews perceive formalized interactions to be initiated
through grant contracts. The literature emphasizes formalized interactions deliberately
configured through policy mandates, agency rulemaking, or organizational procedures.
Although interactions are formally initiated, the findings from this study suggest that the
literature's approach to formalized interactions may need to be reconsidered. Interactions
within the VSHP are not necessarily the result of policy mandates, agency rulemaking, or
organizational procedures. Despite the presence of a policy mandate encouraging
organizations to work together, not one interviewee cites this mandate as the impetus for
collective action. Instead, 64% of interviews and documents indicate that interactions are
initiated through grant contracts.

Overview of Findings
This chapter explores the three research questions that guide this study by
analyzing textual data gathered through 34 interviews and the review of eight documents.
Three conclusions are drawn from this analysis: (1) the MIM helps explain interactions in
this policy implementation setting; (2) administrators perceive interactions within the
multiorganizational arrangement to operate at the collaborative end of the continuum
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when implementing policy; and (3) interactions within this multiorganizational
arrangement are initiated formally and informally. The next chapter summarizes the
research conducted for this study.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overview
This research focuses on interactions between government and nongovernmental
organizations involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program (VSHP)
on Virginia's Eastern Shore. The beginning of this chapter summarizes the study's
research. This is followed by responses to the study's three research questions and a
discussion of contributions to theoretical inquiry. Recommendations are made for future
research and limitations are acknowledged.

Summary of Research
The purpose of this research is to explore interactions between organizations
when working together to implement policy. The Multiorganizational Implementation
Model (MIM) is presented as the theoretical basis for exploring the use of cooperation,
coordination, and collaboration between government and nongovernmental organizations
during implementation of the VSHP. This study is important because it marks the first
time that a model linking the policy implementation and interorganizational theory
literatures is used to explore empirically different types of interactions.
The following three research questions guide exploration in this study: (1) Does
the MIM help explain interactions in a policy implementation setting? (2) How do
administrators perceive the use of cooperation, coordination, or collaboration when
working in a multiorganizational arrangement to implement policy? (3) How are
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multiorganizational interactions initiated? A single case study design is used to address
these research questions. Therefore, interactions between organizations are explored by
looking at the utility of the MIM, the perceived use of different types of interactions
during policy implementation, and the ways in which these interactions are initiated.
Data are collected in two ways: (1) semistructured interviews with individuals
involved in implementing the VSHP; and (2) a review of organizational documents that
provide further insight into interactions during multiorganizational policy
implementation. Specifically, 34 semistructured interviews with individuals involved in
implementing the VSHP and eight organizational documents are reviewed to respond to
the study's three research questions. Interview participants are selected using a snowball
sampling strategy; they represent 15 organizations from federal/state agencies, local
governments, and nongovernmental organizations. Documents are selected based on their
relation to the policy mandate, implementation of the mandate, or interactions with other
organizations. These data collection strategies are appropriate for this research because
interviews facilitate exploration of multiple views through information-rich data while
document review is particularly useful for exploring the context in which interactions
occur, the history of interactions between organizations, and the formality in which
interactions are initiated. The use of both strategies creates opportunities to explore
multiorganizational interactions in different ways.
Content analysis is used to analyze the textual data collected from interviews and
organizational documents based on a predetermined coding scheme aligned with the
operationalizations of the theoretical model. Efforts are made to identify patterns that the
MIM does not account for. The findings that emerge from data analysis suggest the

following responses to the three research questions that guide this inquiry: (1) the
Multiorganizational Implementation Model helps explain interactions between the
organizations working together to implement the VSHP; (2) a majority of administrators
perceive the multiorganizational arrangement to operate at the collaborative end of the
continuum of interaction; and (3) interactions between partners involved in the VSHP are
initiated in formal and informal ways. The findings from this study are summarized by
research question and further discussed in this section.

The Multiorganizational Implementation Model
This study is guided by a research question that focuses on the helpfulness of the
Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) in explaining interactions in a policy
implementation setting. A response to this question is formulated by organizing textual
data into the categories of a predetermined coding scheme aligned with the model's
operationalizations. Elements aligned with each of the following four constructs of the
model are mentioned in interviews and documents: interorganizational policy objective,
interorganizational infrastructure, interorganizational procedures, and organizational
management.
Alignment between the data's empirical patterns and the model's theoretical
patterns suggest that the revised model is helpful in explaining interactions between
organizations during multiorganizational implementation. Authenticity for the MIM is
established in two ways. First, more than 92% of the elements introduced in the model
are identified in this study. These elements operationalize the variables within the MIM
and align with the policy implementation and interorganizational theory literatures.
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Suggestions are made in Chapter Four to address eight elements from the model that are
not identified in interviews or documents. One half of these elements are removed from
the final version of the model while the other half of the elements remain for further
research. Second, authenticity for the model is further established as all patterns
identified in interviews and documents fit into one of the categories established in the
predetermined coding scheme. Although an opportunity to gather competing evidence is
given, interviewees do not mention factors that are not already captured within the MIM.

Interactions during Multiorganizational Implementation
This study explores a second research question pertaining to how administrators
perceive the use of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration when working in a
multiorganizational arrangement to implement policy. The perceived use of these
interaction terms in this study are determined by organizing the data into the categories of
the predetermined coding scheme aligned with the operationalizations of the MIM.
Elements align with each of the following three types of interactions: cooperation,
coordination, and collaboration.
Interactions between organizations involved in implementing the VSHP are
perceived to be highly collaborative in both interviews and documents. In this study, the
interorganizational policy objective, interorganizational infrastructure, interorganizational
procedures, and organizational management constructs of the MIM are all found to
operate at the collaborative end of the continuum of interaction. Despite a policy mandate
that requires organizations to work together on coastal zone issues and the presence of
documents intending to formalize multiorganizational relationships, elements associated
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with collaborative interactions are emphasized twice as often as elements associated with
cooperation or coordination. This study supports the assertion that theorists may reconcile
the top-down/bottom-up approaches by focusing on interactions within
multiorganizational arrangements. Progress towards a fourth generation of
implementation research is made by recognizing that implementation action occurs by
linking organizations through middle level personnel. Administrators implementing the
VSHP perceive interactions between organizations to operate beyond formalized
mechanisms at an overwhelmingly collaborative level. This finding is especially
interesting because government organizations represent a majority of the organizations
involved in this study. It suggests that multiorganizational implementation requires the
development of horizontal connections between organizations in addition to vertical
connections within organizations. Government employees transcend highly centralized
and hierarchical structures to create and sustain horizontal linkages between
organizations. In this study, linkages develop across organizational boundaries through
middle level personnel. Implementation action occurs because these personnel are
perfectly situated to commit resources to the collective effort while being aware of
operational issues. Multiorganizational implementation is optimal when organizations are
horizontally linked through middle level personnel at multiple levels.
In addition, elements associated with each of the three types of interactions are
identified in this study. Although interactions between organizations implementing the
VSHP are collaborative, elements associated with cooperative and coordinative
interactions are also identified. Two themes regarding the movement of interactions
between organizations on the continuum emerge. First, organizations appear to operate in
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some degree along all points of the continuum. Relationships between organizations do
not operate consistently within one type of interaction to the exclusion of all others; all
three types of interactions are identified in a majority of the interviews. As organizations
work together to implement policy, they rely on different types of interactions. Second,
the perceived placement of multiorganizational interactions along the continuum may
vary based on organizational function. Participants directly involved with projects funded
through grant money are more likely to mention elements associated with the
coordinative area of the continuum while participants involved in the collective decision
making process of the Coastal Policy Team are more likely to mention elements
associated with collaborative interactions.
The findings from this study reiterate that collaboration is not appropriate for use
in all situations. Participants involved in implementing the VSHP indicate that
developing and sustaining the collaborative arrangement takes great amounts of time and
resources. This study confirms that certain factors lend themselves to collaborative
interactions. The presence of a sense of crisis, interconnected responsibilities, mutual
interests, and trust may help situations become more conducive for collaborative
interactions.

The Initiation of Interactions
Inquiry is guided by a third research question that examines how
multiorganizational interactions are initiated. Textual data are organized into the
categories of a predetermined coding scheme aligned with the operationalizations of the
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MIM. Elements within the impetus for collective action variable and the formality of the
agreement variable are used to explore this question.
Interactions between organizations implementing the VSHP are initiated formally
and informally. Although much of the literature suggests that formalized interactions are
initiated by policy mandates, agency rulemaking, or organizational procedures, formally
initiated interactions in the VSHP are most prevalent in grant contracts. It is through
these formalized interactions that accountability mechanisms are created within the
multiorganizational arrangement. Since the accountability mechanisms typically found in
bureaucratic organizations do not appear in the implementation network, these formally
initiated interactions fill an important gap. This finding is important because it suggests
that interactions during multiorganizational implementation are formally initiated in ways
other than the current body of literature suggests. In addition, formally initiated
interactions are important in multiorganizational arrangements because they generate
accountability mechanisms for the distribution of financial resources.
Multiorganizational interactions are also informally initiated within this study.
These interactions are most prevalent when participants speak of working with their peers
to achieve organizational goals or align resources. Understanding the missions and
interests of partnering organizations helps personnel informally develop and sustain
relationships. This finding is important because it suggests that multiorganizational
implementation occurs, in part, through informally initiated interactions.
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Contributions to Interorganizational Theory
The literature often describes interactions within multiorganizational
arrangements as cooperative, coordinative, or collaborative. These descriptions are
problematic because researchers use them interchangeably. Findings from this study
support the assertion that each type of interaction is independent and different from the
others. This study makes two contributions to interorganizational theory.
First, a major contribution of this study to the interorganizational theory literature
is the development of the MIM. Ambiguities within a model previously used to explore
interactions between organizations limited its applicability. The MIM clearly
distinguishes between the three types of interaction: cooperation, coordination, and
collaboration. Different elements are associated with each interaction based on the policy
implementation and interorganizational theory literatures. Distinctions between different
types of interactions are important because theorists may now subject this model to
empirical testing in settings outside of policy implementation. Varied application will
benefit the model and enhance its transferability.
In turn, improvements to the model may also generate theoretical consistency and
improve communication within the interorganizational theory literature. Up until this
point, theorists have not embraced a model that allows them to acknowledge different
types of interactions between organizations collectively. Instead, they tend to focus on
multiorganizational interactions in a singular way and assume that a specific type of
interaction occurs. The MIM creates a foundation for comparing interaction terms
empirically. Since a specific type of interaction will not be effective in all settings (Keast,
Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Thomson & Perry, 2006), it is especially important to
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understand distinctions between them. The constructs and variables within the theoretical
model provide a needed structure for deciphering between different interaction terms.
Second, a contribution of this study to the interorganizational theory literature
involves clarifying the movement of interactions between organizations on the
continuum. While some researchers describe cooperation, coordination, and collaboration
as falling along a continuum of increased interaction (see, for example, Mattessich,
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006), this is the first time that the
movements of interactions along the continuum are explored empirically. Relationships
between organizations do not necessarily progress in a linear manner along the
continuum. This may be a result of the maturity of the relationships between the
organizations involved in the VSHP. A more linear progression along the continuum may
occur in the beginning stages of relationships due to increased levels of interdependence.
As relationships mature, they may move on the continuum to ensure operations align with
the type of interaction necessary to achieve the program's goals. Nonlinear movements
along the continuum of interaction support assertions within the literature that one type of
interaction is not inherently better than the others. Findings from this study suggest that
nonlinear movements give organizations flexibility to adjust to contextual conditions by
moving to a different area along the continuum.

Contributions to Policy Implementation Inquiry
Much of the previous policy implementation research focuses on differences
between the top-down and bottom-up approaches. This line of inquiry is problematic for
theoretical advancement because an emphasis on synthesizing the top-down and bottom-
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up approaches fails to account for the multiorganizational arrangements frequently
involved in policy implementation. Textual data gathered from interviews and documents
supports the use and emphasizes the importance of multiorganizational arrangements
during policy implementation. This study stands apart from previous research because it
examines interactions during multiorganizational implementation empirically. By
broadening the scope of current inquiry, this research contributes to theoretical inquiry in
the policy implementation literature in four ways.
First, the findings from this study may help implementation theorists move
beyond the top-down/bottom-up debate. The literature may be guided toward a fourth
generation of implementation research by focusing on the interactions within
multiorganizational arrangements. The MIM embraces elements associated with
competing implementation approaches, but neither approach is assumed to be more
important because elements align with different types of interactions. The top
down/bottom-up debate becomes less important as interactions move toward the
collaborative end of the continuum. As multiorganizational arrangements become
increasingly prevalent, implementation success may have more to do with how well
organizations work together rather than the specificity of policy characteristics or the
acknowledgement of environmental conditions at the local level. It is important to
understand the linkages within a multiorganizational arrangement, and the MIM provides
a theoretical lens to explore these linkages.
Second, theoretical understanding of policy implementation in
multiorganizational arrangements may be improved through the exploration of a range of
interactions. Through the use of the MIM, this study is the first to link cooperation,
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coordination, and collaboration collectively to multiorganizational implementation. By
looking at the entire continuum of interactions, researchers are better able to identify the
conditions under which it is appropriate to use a particular type of interaction as an
implementation strategy.
Third, the literature may be guided toward a fourth generation of implementation
research through the realization that implementation may occur by connecting middle
level personnel across different organizations. Although the public administration
literature typically associates government organizations with highly centralized and
hierarchical structures, the findings suggest that structures within individual organizations
are far less important to the administrators implementing the VSHP than the horizontal
structures linking organizations. It appears that the nexus of the top-down/bottom-up
approaches to implementation occurs because middle level personnel across different
organizations couple the two approaches.
Fourth, theoretical understanding of policy implementation in multiorganizational
arrangements may be expanded through the exploration of the ways interactions are
initiated. Interactions between organizations are initiated in ways other than the literature
suggests. The literature emphasizes formal interactions deliberately configured through
policy mandates, agency rulemaking, or organizational procedures. However, findings
from this study suggest that formalized interactions within the VSHP are initiated through
grant contracts. The literature's focus on the origin of formalized interactions should be
reconsidered.
This study is the first to acknowledge that multiorganizational policy
implementation occurs in part through informal relationships. Although informally
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initiated interactions are less prevalent than formal interactions, their presence in this
study suggests that multiorganizational implementation occurs outside the boundaries of
operational authority. This line of inquiry is not considered in the current literature.
Therefore, the presence of interactions informally initiated within this study's
implementation network suggests that multiorganizational arrangements should not be
treated as a mere extension of hierarchical organizations that abide by specifications in
policy mandates. By focusing on formally initiated interactions as the sole source for
action, researchers miss a piece of the larger picture. The different ways in which
arrangements are initiated should continue to be examined empirically. This gap in
current inquiry highlights a need for fourth generation implementation research to move
beyond the top-down/bottom-up debate.

Limitations of the Study
The researcher acknowledges four limitations pertaining to this case study. First,
this research focuses specifically on the implementation network involved in the VSHP.
The findings from this study may be particular to this context and are not intended for
generalizations. Different types of interactions may occur between organizations involved
in implementing environmental policies, such as the Coastal Zone Management Act. This
limitation is addressed by fully describing this study's sample and setting. With this
information, other researchers can assess the study's transferability.
Second, much of the data collected in this study is based on the interpretations of
the interviewer and the perceptions self-reported by those interviewed (Stake, 1995).
Subjectivity is critical to understanding the context of this research (Stake, 1995).

However, it can bias research if textual data are unintentionally filtered (Creswell, 2003).
This limitation is addressed by utilizing a transparent data analysis process. Each step of
the process is revealed to prevent an unintentional filtering of data and enhance the
study's confirmability.
Third, this research is initially limited to the variables identified within the
theoretical model. While it is possible that other factors could influence interactions
between organizations implementing the VSHP, it does not appear to be a concern in this
study. Interview participants are given an opportunity to provide additional information
after completing the semistructured interview. A search for competing evidence is used to
enhance the model's authenticity (Miles & Huberman, 1994). When responding to this
opportunity, interviewees do not identify factors outside of the model. Instead, many
participants use this opportunity to reiterate an element of the model previously
discussed.
Fourth, all variables within the MIM are initially assumed to influence
interactions between organizations equally and simultaneously. Findings from this study
suggest that some variables influence multiorganizational interactions more than others.
This limitation is addressed through the use of qualitative methodology. In addition to
looking for the verbal mention of elements in interviews and documents, the researcher
uses examples and context provided by interviewees to give additional meaning to the
perceived variation in levels of importance.

Recommendations for Future Research
Due to the use of a single case study design, findings from this research may be
specific to interactions between organizations implementing the VSHP. While the model
is found to be useful in explaining multiorganizational interactions in this setting, future
research should focus on using the MIM to explore interactions between organizations in
other settings. The theoretical model's confirmability may be enhanced through
additional research. For example, relationships between constructs should be further
explored. While this research suggests that relationships between variables within the
organizational management construct are present, relationships between variables from
different constructs are not prevalent.
The findings from this study suggest that the literature should continue to refocus
its energies away from the top-down/bottom-up debate towards more fruitful lines of
inquiry like multiorganizational interactions. As multiorganizational arrangements
become increasingly prevalent, future research should continue to explore
multiorganizational implementation. In these situations, implementation success may
have more to do with how well organizations work together rather than the specificity of
policy characteristics or the acknowledgement of environmental conditions at the local
level. Therefore, continued exploration of linkages within multiorganizational
arrangements is necessary.
Informal relationships play a significant role in developing and sustaining
relationships between organizations implementing the VSHP, and this is an area
deserving of further inquiry. More specifically, informally initiated interactions can be
explored through cooperative relationships. While almost 20% of the elements mentioned

throughout interviews and documents are associated with cooperative interaction,
empirical research for this type of interaction is visibly absent from the
interorganizational theory literature. The potential for interactions to be informally
initiated should be further explored through research focused on cooperative interactions.
Theoretical understanding of policy implementation in multiorganizational arrangements
may be improved through the exploration of the ways interactions are initiated.
Findings from this study also indicate that coordinative interactions are most often
associated with grant processes in which some organizational roles and responsibilities
are formalized. As organizations work across organizational boundaries, the use of
hierarchical controls becomes less relevant and formalized structures are often associated
with the distribution of money. The applicability of coordinative interactions in
multiorganizational arrangements may need to be reconsidered in order to explore the
context of grant processes and their influence on formalized interactions.
In addition, previous research suggests that policy mandates infrequently provide
monetary support to the organizations designated to implement them (see, for example,
Montjoy & O'Toole, 1979; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). The Coastal Zone Management
Act is considered an "unfunded mandate." While a stable funding stream is created
through the distribution of grant funds, the availability of funds is less likely in other
situations. Many policy mandates do not have a state agency distributing one half of a
million dollars to entice organizations to work together. The criticality of a stable funding
stream in this study suggests that researchers should consider ways in which
implementation networks can access funding streams despite the regularity of unfunded
mandates.

Furthermore, data from this study suggests that the convening organization plays
a pivotal role in bringing organizations together and providing an organizational structure
to carry out the program's operations. Although this role is acknowledged in the literature
(see, for example, McNamara, Leavitt, & Morris, 2008), specific guidance for convening
organizations is lacking. Additional research should further explore the roles of
convening organizations.

Conclusion
The purpose of this case study focuses on interactions between organizations
during implementation of the VSHP. This study explores the helpfulness of the
Multiorganizational Implementation Model in explaining interactions between
organizations during policy implementation, administrators' perceptions regarding the
use of different types of interactions, and the ways in which multiorganizational
interactions are initiated. Interviews and documents suggest that the MIM is helpful in
exploring interactions between organizations during multiorganizational policy
implementation. More than 92% of the elements introduced in the model are identified in
this study. Aligning the model's operationalizations with the policy implementation and
interorganizational theory literatures allows theorists to clearly distinguish between
cooperation, coordination, and collaboration.
In addition, the findings suggest that administrators involved with the VSHP
strongly perceive interactions to operate at the collaborative end of the continuum of
interaction. This study supports the presence of multiorganizational arrangements during
policy implementation. Progress towards a fourth generation of implementation research
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is made by resolving the top-down/bottom-up approaches by focusing on interactions
within multiorganziational arrangements and by recognizing that implementation action
occurs by linking organizations through middle level personnel. Despite the presence of
highly centralized and hierarchical structures within individual organizations, horizontal
linkages between organizations are created and sustained because middle level personnel
couple the two approaches. Multiorganizational implementation is optimal when
horizontal connections between organizations are created at multiple levels.
Finally, the findings suggest that multiorganizational interactions are initiated in
formal and informal ways. Formalized interactions are initiated through grant contracts
rather than policy mandates, agency rulemaking, or organizational procedures. Therefore,
the literature's approach to formalized interactions should be reconsidered. This study is
the first to acknowledge that multiorganizational policy implementation occurs in part
through informal relationships. The presence of informally initiated interactions suggests
that a top-down approach to implementation does not fully capture relationships that
occur outside the boundaries of operational authority. In order to capture the full picture,
theorists must acknowledge the presence of informally initiated interactions as well as
those that are formally initiated.
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Appendix A
Semistructured Interview Protocol
Name:
Place of Work:
Work Phone:
Email Address:
Position/Title:
1. What organizations do you most closely work with to implement the Virginia Seaside
Heritage Program?

Interorganizational Policy Objective Construct:
2. How would you describe your organization's involvement in working with other
organizations on tasks associated with achieving the goals of the Virginia Seaside
Heritage Program?

Variable
Time

Probes
Short-term
Longer-term
Long-term (evolutionary)

More Specific Interview Questions (use if needed)
How long do you anticipate working with other
organizations to implement the VSHP?

Difficulty

Simple task, routine
Multifaceted tasks, repeatable
Complex tasks, crisis

How would you describe the complexity of tasks
associated with implementing the VSHP?

Role of Single
Organizations

Independent
Need some assistance
Interdependence

To what extent could a single agency effectively
complete tasks associated with implementing the
VSHP?

Impetus for
Collective
Action

voluntary, informal, external change
voluntary/mandated, common objectives
voluntary/mandated, complementary

Why does your organization work with other
organizations to implement the VSHP?
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Interorganizational Infrastructure Construct:
3. How are relationships built between organizations involved in implementing the
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program?

Variable

Probes

More Specific Interview Questions (only use if
needed)
What administrative structure supports relationships
between organizations involved in implementing the
VSHP?

Design

Existing org structures; no interagency staff
Formal relationships; central admin; hierarchically
managed; reorganization or consolidation
Shared power; new program structures; collective
admin staff

Formality of
the Agreement

Informal; individual focus
Formal; contractual or nonfinancial; higher
authority reviews agreements
Formal bargaining and informal relationshipbuilding. Jointly draft shared purpose.

How are the roles and responsibilities for each
participating organization determined?

Organizational
Autonomy

Fully autonomous
Semiautonomous; require some assistance
Not autonomous; relinquish autonomy to collective
unit.

How would you describe the degree to which partnering
organizations operate independently during
implementation of the VSHP?

Policy
Authority

Follow pre-existing policies; no multiorganizational
policy decisions
Each org retains authority; Policy decisions
compatible with pre-established policies
Collectively develop policies for policy domain

To what extent does your organization give authority to
the collective group to develop policies that guide
operations pertaining to implementation of the VSHP?

Key Personnel

No leadership involved in decision to work together
Leaders have decision making authority; managers
implement these decisions; facilitator.
No one in charge; lead organization; membership
changes.

What individuals/organizations play a key role in
bringing organizations together to implement the
VSHP?
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Interorganizational Procedures Construct
4. What processes are used to sustain relationships between organizations throughout
implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program?

Variable

Probes

Information
Sharing

Informal; basic info shared
Formal & informal
Open & frequent communication; share what
individual organizations can/cannot provide

More Specific Interview Questions (only use if
needed)
How do you communicate with other organizations
involved in implementing the VSHP?
What kinds of information are shared?

Decision
Making

Independent decision making
Centralized decision making; lead organization
Participative decision making; consensus,
negotiation, compromise

How are decisions made in regards to implementing the
VSHP?

Resolution of
Turf Issues

Turf issues avoided
Neutral facilitator resolves turf issues
Turf issues may occur; incongruent demands
individual & collective organizations.

Do turf issues occur between organizations involved in
implementing the VSHP? If so, how are these issues
resolved?

Resource
Allocation

Resources not pooled; discretionary funds
Resource exchange; mandate provision
Pooled resources

How are organizational resources reallocated to the
collective group during implementation of the VSHP?
What resources does your organization contribute?

Systems
Thinking

Organizational systems unchanged
Compatible information systems
Integrated systems to link organizations

To what extent are organizational systems integrated
among the group of organizations involved in
implementing the VSHP?
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Organizational Management Construct
5. How do participating organizations show support for implementing the Virginia
Seaside Heritage Program?

More Specific Interview Questions (only use if
needed)
What incentives are provided to encourage you or your
organization to participate in implementing the VSHP?

Variable

Probes

Incentives

Based on pre-existing job responsibilities
Statutory provision, organizational leadership
Collective & individual organizations

Commitment

Regular job responsibilities; interests of individual
organization
Supervisory administrative body; benefits outweigh
costs
Collective & individual organizational interests
balanced; collective interest serves individual
interests; reciprocity

How would you describe your commitment and your
organization's commitment to implementing the VSHP?

Willingness to
Change

Complete independence, standard operating
procedures (SOPs) are not modified
SOPs are modified when it supports the
organization's individual goals
Organizations mutually adjust; establish policies

To what extent are you and your organization willing to
alter standard operating procedures in order to support
implementation of the VSHP?

Trust

Trust not required, but can develop
Leaders work to build trust relationships
Partners build trust by sharing information, open
communication, & supportive past behavior

How would you describe the level of trust between the
organizations involved in implementing the VSHP?

Risk Taking

Low levels of risk
Moderate levels of risk; some interdependence
High levels of risk; interdependence, integration

To what extent does working with other organizations to
implement the VSHP require your organization to
deviate from organizational standards?

6. Are there any other factors that would help me understand the interactions between
organizations when implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program?
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Appendix B
Preinterview Questionnaire
As a member of an organization involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage
Program, your experience with this program is very valuable to the research I am
conducting for my doctoral dissertation through Old Dominion University. The purpose
of this research is to explore interactions between organizations when working together to
implement policy. More specifically, this study focuses on the use of cooperation,
coordination, and collaboration between government and nongovernmental organizations
during implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program.
I appreciate your agreement to participate in an interview in support of this research
effort. A series of demographic and background questions are included in this document.
Please fill out this questionnaire and I will collect it from you during our scheduled
interview. In my research, your identity will be kept confidential and the information you
provide will be grouped with information from other interviewees.
If you have any questions, please contact me.
Thank you for your participation.
Madeleine McNamara
921 Edgewater Drive
Newport News, VA 23602
Phone: 757-880-9475
Email: mwmcnamaral (Siverizon.net
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1. Please fill in the following information:
Name:
Place of Work:
Work Phone:
Email Address:
Position/Title:
2. How long have you been in your current position with your organization?

3. How long have you been involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage
Program?

4. Have you worked for other organizations partnering with the Coastal Zone
Management Program?
4a. If so, what organization(s) did you work for, what positions did you hold, how long
were you there, and were you involved with the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program
(VSHP)?
Place of Work:
Position/Title:
Length of
Employment:
Involved
VSHP:
5. Does your organization provide training or education programs to help you develop the
skills needed to work within a collaborative arrangement?
5a. If so, what training or education programs are provided?

5b. If not, how do you develop these skills?

6. Please describe the goals of your organization.
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7.1 would like to identify the network of organizations involved in implementing the
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program and the involvement of specific people within these
organizations. Who do you work with on a regular basis to implement the Virginia
Seaside Heritage Program? (Please provide names and contact information below).
Name:
Organization:
Contact
Information:
Name:
Organization:
Contact
Information:
Name:
Organization:
Contact
Information:
Name:
Organization:
Contact
Information:
Name:
Organization:
Contact
Information:
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Appendix C
Informed Consent
Exploring Interactions during Multiorganizational Policy Implementation: A Case
Study of Virginia's Coastal Zone Management Program
As a member of an organization involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage
Program, your experience with this program is very valuable to the research I am
conducting for my doctoral dissertation through Old Dominion University. The purpose
of this research is to explore the types of interactions used when multiple organizations
are involved in policy implementation. More specifically, this study focuses on the use
of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration between government and
nongovernmental organizations during implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage
Program. Your responses in this interview will contribute to this research.
Participation in this interview is voluntary. Your identity will be kept confidential and
the information you provide will be grouped with responses from other interviewees.
The interview will be audio taped and a verbatim transcript of the interview will be
created. If you would like to review this transcript, please contact the researcher below.
The interview was designed to gather in-depth information based on your perceptions
pertaining to the interactions that occur between organizations during implementation of
the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. There are two sections within the interview.
First, you will be asked a series of structured questions pertaining to the program
objectives, infrastructure, procedures, and management. Second, you will be given an
opportunity to provide the researcher with additional information that was not addressed
in the structured portion of the interview.
Thank you for your participation.
Madeleine McNamara
921 Edgewater Drive
Newport News, VA 23602
Phone: 757-880-9475
Email: mwmcnamaral (Sjverizon.net

Please sign to indicate that you have read and understand this informed consent:

Signature

Date

Appendix D
Organizational Documents Reviewed
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. 16 U.S.C. 1451
Evaluation Findings for the Virginia Coastal Management Program - November 1999
through July 2003
Evaluation Findings for the Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program - August
2003 through May 2006
Executive Order Number 21 - Continuing the Virginia Coastal Zone Management
Program
Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Management of Conservation Lands
Located on the Southern Tip of the Eastern Shore
Planning District Commission Technical Assistance Grant Minimum Standards
Virginia's Eastern Shore Seaside Management Plan - Draft January 22, 2008
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program Accomplishments 2002-2008
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Appendix E
Summary of Elements in Interview/Document
Type of
Interaction
Cooperation
(CP)

Construct

Variables

Elements

Interorganizational
Policy Objective
(O)

Time (T)

Short-term

Difficulty (D)
Role of Single
Organizations
(R)
Impetus for
Collective
Action (I)

Simple task
Independent; possible to
accomplish the task
individually
Voluntarily initiate
collective action because
helpful to world of work (a)
Build capacity to serve
individual interests (b)
Changes in external factors
- search new solutions (c)

Design (D)

Work within existing
organizational structure (a)
Interagency staff
unnecessary (b)
Informally work together to
achieve individual goals

Construct Total
Interorganizational
Infrastructure (I)

Formality of
the Agreement
(F)
Organizational
Autonomy (A)
Policy
Authority (P)

Key Personnel
(K)
Construct Total
Interorganizational
Procedures (P)

Information
Sharing (I)

Decision
Making (D)
Resolution of
Turf Issues (R)
Resource
Allocation (A)

Fully autonomous
No multiorganizational
policy decisions made (a)
Pre-existing policies
followed (b)
Organizational leadership
not involved in decisions to
work together
Dialogue maintained
through informal
relationships (a)
Basic information is shared
(b)
Decisions are made
independently
Turf issues are avoided
Discretionary funds are used
to pursue individual goals
(a)
Resources are not pooled (b)
Units of exchange are
determined at the lowest
levels (c)

#of
hits

% for
element

% for
variable
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Type of
Interaction
Cooperation
cont.
(CP)

Construct
Total
Construct
Organizational
Management
(M)

Systems
Thinking (S)

Organizational systems are
unchanged

Variables

Elements

Incentives (I)

Opportunities for synergistic
benefits are realized based
on the desire to avoid
negative impacts resulting
from changes in external
factors
Work completed as part of
regular job responsibilities
(a)
Interests of individual
organization paramount (b)
Colleagues may encourage
each other to work with
personnel in other
organizations (c)
Organizations maintain
complete independence in
establishing rules, roles, &
policies to govern their
organization (a)
An organization's standard
operating procedures remain
unchanged by the collective
effort (b)
Trust relationships are not
required but can develop
Do not engage in risk taking
behavior (a)
Low levels of risk (b)

Commitment
(C)

Willingness to
Change (W)

Trust (T)
Risk Taking
(R)
Construct Total
Cooperation
Total

#of
hits

% for
element

% for
variable

Type of
Interaction
Coordination
(CR)

Construct

Variables

Elements

Interorganizational
Policy Objective
(0)

Time (T)

Longer-term

Difficulty (D)

Multifaceted tasks,
repeatable
Require assistance from
other organizations to
accomplish individual goals
Linkages are mobilized
because compatible mission
areas mutually increase
abilities to achieve
individual goals (a)
An interagency liaison or
boundary spanner may forge
relationships to meet
resource needs or shared
interests (b)
Legislative mandate or grant
contracts enhance cohesion
or minimize duplication (c)

Role of Single
Organizations
(R)
Impetus for
Collective
Action (I)

Construct Total
Interorganizational
Infrastructure (I)

Design (D)

Formality of
the Agreement
(F)

Organizational
Autonomy (A)

Policy
Authority (P)

Hierarchical structure is
used to centrally manage
roles & responsibilities (a)
Centralization may involve
program reorganization or
consolidation (b)
Mechanisms, such as
contractual or nonfmancial
agreement, formalize
relationships (a)
Agreements, clearly
identifying roles and
responsibilities, are often
developed or reviewed by a
higher authority (b)
Semiautonomous; require
some assistance from other
organizations to achieve
goals
Organizations maintain
individual authority over the
policies that govern their
respective organizations (a)
Policies developed for the
collective group are
compatible w/ policies
established in individual
organizations (b)

#of
hits

% for
element

% for
variable
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Type of
Interaction
Coordination
cont. (CR)

Construct

Construct Total
Interorganizational
Procedures(P)

Variables

Elements

Key Personnel
(K)

Leaders in each org make
decisions (a)
Managers implement
decisions (b)
Facilitator may coordinate
actions at local level (c)

Information
Sharing (I)

Communication channels
are used to link vertical &
horizontal organizational
levels
Centralized (a)
Lead organization
dominates process (b)
Resolved through neutral
facilitator or convener
Exchange resources to
improve abilities to reach
individual goals (a)
Resources may be provided
through mandate or grant
arrangements (b)
Resource needs satisfied by
a preexisting program
within an individual
organization (c)
Compatible information
systems

Decision
Making (D)
Resolution of
Turf Issues (R)
Resource
Allocation (A)

Systems
Thinking (S)
Construct Total
Organizational
Management
(M)

Incentives (I)

Commitment
(C)

Willingness to
Change (W)

Trust (T)

Risk Taking
(R)
Construct Total
Coordination
Total

Statutes or grant contracts
provide funding (a)
Leadership communicates
importance (b)
Encouraged by supervisory
administrative body (a)
Linkages recognized when
benefits are perceived to
outweigh costs (b)
Leaders explore
modifications to SOP when
program goals align with
individual organizational
missions
Leaders work closely to
create relationships based
on trust
Some interdependence
based on resource needs (a)
Moderate levels of risk (b)

#of
hits

% for
element

% for
variable
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Type of
Interaction
Collaboration
(CL)

Construct

Variables

Elements

#of

hits
Interorganizational
Policy Objective
(0)

Time (T)

Evolutionary (b)
Difficulty (D)

Role of Single
Organizations
(R)

Construct Total
Interorganizational
Infrastructure (I)

Long-term (a)

Complex tasks that are
highly varied and diverse
(a)
Situations of crisis (b)
Interdependent; each
organization is one element
of the larger system

Impetus for
Collective
Action (I)

Complementary interests in
attaining mutual goals (a)
Cannot achieve the desired
goal without working
together (b)
A lead agency or convener
brings relevant
stakeholders together (c)

Design (D)

Jointly develop shared
power arrangements to
address collective interests
(a)
New program structure (b)
An administrative element
is present to sustain
collective efforts (c)
Stakeholders jointly
develop course of action
(a)
Mutually agreed upon roles
& responsibilities, rules,
goals, or boundaries (b)
Not autonomous;
operations within
organizations are
intertwined
Jointly develop policies
and procedures that govern
the collective group (a)
Policies & procedures
include working rules that
specify which stakeholders
can make decisions, who
will guide collective
action, and the distribution
of costs/benefits (b)

Formality of
the Agreement
(F)

Organizational
Autonomy (A)

Policy
Authority (P)

% for
element

% for
variable
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Type of
Interaction
Collaboration
cont. (CL)

Construct

Construct Total
Interorganizational
Procedures (P)

Variables

Elements

Key Personnel
(K)

No one in charge (a)
Lead organization proposes
policies/rules for the
collective group to
consider (b)
Membership, roles, and
responsibilities adapt to the
task at hand (c)
Each role is considered
equally important (d)

Information
Sharing (I)

Open and frequent
communication (a)
Communication channels
are used to widely
disseminate info related to
the collective group (b)
Understanding is enhanced
by a willingness to share
info about organizations
which may include what
can/cannot be offered to
the collective group (c)
Participative decision
making through consensus
and compromise (a)
Personnel have latitude to
negotiate rules and
deliberate agreements to
find common ground (b)
Conflicting roles;
incongruent demands
between individual
organization and group (a)
Consideration given to
adjusting
policies/procedures to
reduce conflict; common
ground maximized (b)
Pooled resources (a)
Organizations have
resources, skills, or
knowledge needed to
achieve goals (b)
Allocate staff, time, or
funding to support
collective unit (c)
Resources allocated by
balancing needs of group
& individual organizations
(d)

Decision
Making (D)

Resolution of
Turf Issues (R)

Resource
Allocation (A)

#of
hits

% for
element

% for
variable
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Type of
Interaction
Collaboration
cont. (CL)

Construct

Construct Total
Organizational
Management
(M)

Variables

Elements

Systems
Thinking (S)

Integrate systems to share
information & foster
linkages across org

Incentives (I)

Incentives are provided by
the individual
organizations to encourage
involvement (a)
Incentives are provided by
the collective group to
encourage involvement (b)
Committed to own
organization and the
collective group - need to
balance interests (a)
Collective interest serves
each organization's
individual interests (b)
Relationships are impacted
by the extent to which
collective action is
reciprocated (c)
Mutually adjust (a)
Changes to SOPs are
considered when needed to
align with the group (b)
Trust is necessary (a)
Share information openly
(b)
History of supportive
behavior or long-standing
relationships (c)
Integrated approaches
create dependency (a)
Depart from normal
behavior (b)
High levels of risk (c)

Commitment
(C)

Willingness to
Change (W)

Trust (T)

Risk Taking
(R)

Construct Total
Collaboration
Total

#of
hits

% for
element

% for
variable
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